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CHAPTER ONE. INTRODUCTION 
1. Introduction 
Each chapter in this study will begin with an introduction setting out the 
purpose and the structure of the chapter. The present chapter ~s introductory 
to the whole work. Accordingly it begins with a consideration of the con-
temporary setting of the issue that is the central concern of our study. We 
then set out in detail the aim of the study and the method to be employed. 
The notions of spirituality and materiality, which are the keys both to the 
definition of the contemporary issue about the nature of persons and to the 
notion of a person that our analysis of intersubjectivity is held to manifest, 
are then presented by means of a brief historical sketch and also a preliminary 
conceptual analysis. That concludes our introduction which we judge 
sufficient to ensure an accurate grasp of our aim and method and the central 
concepts that we shall employ. 
1.1 The contemporary scene 
The ideas '.re have about the nature of persons are among the most important 
we have about anything. Not only will they have far reaching implications 
for the human sciences; they will also influence our actual attitudes and 
actions. Ideas about the nature of persons will underlie our political 
and religious practice, our moral beliefs and our actual personal relationships 
themselves. This being the case, it is also important to be critically aware 
of them, as far as possible to remove contradictions between them and ensure 
that the resulting coherent system of ideas is true to what we are. 
For I am assuming that we are indeed persons. In one sense such an assumption 
is a tautology. In English the word "person" is ambiguous. It can mean 
simply an individual-human being. It has however a more technical use, 
connoting properties which certainly all human beings naturally possess but 
which it is possible that other sorts of being (angels, Martians, apes, 
dolphins?) do as well. What properties these are shall presently be enquired 
into. But taking the word in its most common sense it is the case that at 
present in English-speaking philosophy there are two competing systems of ideas 
about the nature of persons engaged in apparently irreconcilable opposition. 
I shall refer to them as "dualist" and "materialist". 
As I shall be discussing dualism and materialism ~n detail in other places ~n 
this work I shall not say much about them by vmy of definition here. ·By 
"dualism" is meant any sort of ontological distinction between "mind" and 
2/ ... 
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"matter" in human persons~ in whatever terms this is expressed. By 
"materialism" I refer to the various forms of "physicalism", "mind-brain 
identity theory", "central-state materialism" that are current in contemporary 
philosophy. For the purposes of this work it is unnecessary to distinguish 
between particular variants of materialism or dualism. I shall make quite 
clear what view of persons I am arguing for and quite clear what this excludes, 
This opposition of dualism and materialism is not merely a philosophical 
phenomenon. It has a wider.cultural form as Hell. Materialism regarding 
the nature of persons is an aspect of a generally scientific and technological 
culture. Dualism 1s chiefly to be found in the sphere -of religion. But 
however widely the opposition extends it raises philosophical problems. The 
problem of dualism is that of the unity of persons. We do experience our-
selves as possessed of an enduring unity of life. How can this be the case 
if we are composed of two radically different elements? The problem of 
materialism is its apparent inadequacy to give a satisfactory account of the 
"mental" in human life. 
The term that I shall use in this study to signify those properties that 
constitute their possessors persons in the technical sense is "spiritual". 
This is not a word that is com.'llon in contemporary English-speaking philosophy. 
It is partly for that reason that I use it. I shall be defining it exhaust-
ively, and there will be less cause to confuse my own with other usages. 
It is also a term that is quite at home in one contemporary school of philosophy, 
namely the Thomist. And as we shall be making special use of Aquinas' meta-
physics in this study, it 1s convenient to use a term that is closely r.elated 
to them. The notion of the spiritual has h.mvever a long history in Western 
philosophical thought, having its roots in Biblical and, as some would argue, 
also in Greek thought. This might well be a sign that it denotes some 
enduring aspect of our nature, something moreover that might well be over-
looked in a culture and a philosophy that has ceased to use it in any serious 
sense. 
The term spiritual" is at home 1n the dualist camp of the contemporary opposition. 
Indeed many will no doubt feel that "spirit" is more of a "ghost" in the 
machine than a mind could ever be, Be that as it may, we shall certainly use 
the term to mean at least "immaterial". We shall, that is to say, oppose a 
spiritual notion of persons to a materialist one, On the other hand we shall 
argue that although per-sons are spiritual beings, and although human beings 
are undeniable material, nevertheless human beings are persons and, moreover, 
3 I . .. 
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human persons are possessed of a unity as complete and as enduring as any 
materialist monist could wish. 
1. 2 Our a~m and method 
This is perhaps enough by w2..y cf necessary prologue. \.Je must nmv state the 
purpose of this study. It is, put baldly, to reconcile the opposing views of 
persons that we have described. 
precise. 
But now we must make this purpose more 
The two views of persons have had histories of their own. The dualist v~ew 
was not always so dualist. And the materialist view gained an important new 
dimension after the Enlightenment, connected both with the philosophy of Hegel 
and the rise of the human sciences. This new dimension was the bringing to 
light of the essentially relational character of personal life. 
He. feel that the t1vo v~ews of persons can be reconciled by means of, on the one 
hand, a re-understanding of the spiritual, and, on the other, a thorough 
examination of the structure of personal relations to reveal their special 
character. 
We propose accordingly, in this work, to analyse the fundamental forms of 
interpersonal relations, those in which persons are related to others as 
persons and \vhich 1ve call inter-subjective, Hith a view to showing that they 
do in fact manifest the spiritual nature of persons. 
Our whole study ~s situated in the Thomist philosophical tradition. We thus 
approach the notion of the spiritual from this standpoint. To be more precise, 
we presuppose a basic foundation of Thomist metaphysics and expound the notion 
of spirituality against this background. We intend nevertheless to interpret 
and express this metaphysics ~n terms that will make sense both to those phil-
osophers who are ignorant of it and to those who disagree Hith it. He 
specifically wish our interpretation to be understood by English-speaking 
philosophers of other philosophical schools. 
To expound the notion of a person as a spiritual being we will make use of th~ 
work of contemporary Thomists rather than Aquinas himself. The reason for 
this ~s that they have consciously assimilated elements of the relational view 
of the person as it has come dmvn to us through Hegelian, existential and 
phenomenological philosophy and so are able to define the spiritual in terms 
that are better suited to a compar~son with the phenomena of intersubjectivity. 
In addition to this contemporary Thomists have to a large extent "personalised" 
4/ ... 
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the somewhat cosmological categories of Aquinas' metaphysics (and this too 
' 
unJer the influence of currents of thought produced by the rise of the human 
sciences), 'l.vhich makes it easier to relate metaphysical terms to terms descrip-
tive of the phenomena of personal relations. 
W11en we leave the metaphysical account of a person as a spiritual being and turn 
to the analysis of intersubjectivity, we shall not limit ourselves to Thomist 
authors. Other things being equal we would prefer to do so since it would be 
easier to relate our metaphysical account of persons to descriptions of inter-
personal relations by those who in fact shared our metaphysics. Apart from 
anything else there would be more chance of the t~-.ro tallying. Other things 
however never are equal, and our concern 1s primarily tG develop descriptions 
that are true. And that has been our sole criterion 1n selecting authors to 
assist us in our task. In fact although Thomist authors predominate in the 
chapters of this work devoted to the analysis of intersubjectivity, a very wide 
variety of others are also made use of. This we feel has the additional merit 
of ensuring objectivity. vJe cannot fairly be accused of "tailoring" the 
descriptions to fit the metaphysics. In any case the ultimate test is the 
description itself.· Each description must stand or fall on its ovm merits. 
If our project 1s well-conceived and our descriptions of the inter-subjective 
relations of persons do 1n fact manifest the spiritual nature of persons, 
then in completing them we shall have developed a new personal and inter-
personal way of conceiving of spirituality. For those suspicious of all 
metaphysical categories, as 'l.vell as for those \vho merely find the categories 
of Thomist metaphysics rather alien, this will be a great help towards 
accepting a view of persons that is, in our view both true and profound. 
In any case we hope that the metaphysical part of this project, our essay 
towards a re-understanding of the spiritual (if it can claim so grand a 
title -which it can't really since we are only presenting in slightly 
different terminology vThat is after all the common view of contemporary 
Thomists), will also help to dispel the cloudy "mythical" notion of the 
spiritual that lurks in some philosophical as well as in most popular con-
ceptions of it. 
Finally - and here we must presu~e that our ma1n project has been successful -
having shown that the phenomena of intersubjectivity do manifest the spiritual 
nature of persons, we hope to present a view of human persons which, while 
doing justice both to their spirituality and their materiality, nevertheless 
also preserves their essential unity, 
sI ... 
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Having set out the a~m of this study ~ve must indicate how we are to go about 
pursuing it. After this introductory chapter (which we shall conclude with 
two brief sketches, one of the history of the two notions of persons with 
which we are dealing, the other of the concept of matter), there follm.vs a 
chapter whose purpose ~s to present our new metaphysical formulation of the 
notion of the spiritual. This is followed by a sequence of three chapters 
containing descriptions of the intersubjective situation attendant on, in this 
order, the exercise, growth and fulfilment of our specifically personal powers. 
Why there should be three and only three such descriptions it is a little 
difficult to say. We have been influenced in this to a certain extent by 
the ~vork of the Scottish philosopher John Macmurray (about whom more presently), 
but even this influence is not sufficient to justify the precise number of our 
descriptions. In fact though it is perhaps true to say that there could 
have been any number of descriptions of different interpersonal reiations, it 
is probably also true that there could not have been less than three. Personal 
life, and so personal relations too, develops in time and the logic of 
beginning - middle-end has something ineluctable about it. For want of a 
better covering clause we shall take shelter in that. It must be adverted 
to in this connection that our descriptions are ~n no sense randomly chosen 
from the limitless wealth of personal relations between persons. They are 
descriptions of the necessary intersubjective conditions for the exercise 
(and development and fulfilment) of our specifically personal pmvers. 
only as such that their manifestation of spirituality can have all the 
significance that we require. 
It ~s 
This study ~vill conclude with a chapter of summary and application. The 
results of the three chapters on intersubjectivity will be related to those 
of the chapter on spirituality and a final judgement on their consonance 
delivered. Last, but not least, the problem of the unity of a human person 
will be tackled, and thus the work will end. 
We are not yet ~n possession of all we need' in order to grasp the problem of 
this study as we ought. We need both to know more of the nature of the 
opposed views of persons and also of the opposition of spirit and matter that 
we intend to introduce in place of more common descriptions of the duality. 
To this end we thus proceed first to a sketch of the historical background 
of the two notions of persons, and then, since we shall be defining the nature 
of the spiritual at great length, to a discussion of the concept of matter. 
6/ •.. 
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2. The historical background 
The historical root of the notion of the person that underlies most forms of 
contemporary dualism is the Biblical notion of man being made "in the image 
of God" (Genesis I). The God of the Bible, unlike those of the Greeks, is 
conceived of as transcendent to the universe He has created. Indeed the 
notion of creation precisely expresses this transcendence. Insofar as he 1s 
"the image of God" man shares in this transcendence. In the case of man this 
transcendence is not expressed in the activity of creation but rather in that 
of ordering and controlling the natural order. He is in a derived sense 
also responsible for creation. The other side of this responsibility is 
freedom to carry out the divine commands. Han 1s thus, like God, independ-
ent, at least to a lin1ited extent, from the natural order of the world. 
On this Biblical basis and through the reflection of the Church Fathers a 
theological anthropology is progressively constructed. It is no longer 
expressed in narrative and mythical terms as in the Bible but in the term-
inology of Greek, and especially Platcnic and nee-Platonic, philosophy. 
The pre-medieval dev2lopment of this notion of the person can be summed up 1n 
Beothius' celebrated definition: "persona est natura rationalis individua 
substandia" (Du Duabus ~aturis, 3). (Halder, 1969) This definition captures 
in philosophical terminology the special sort of individuality attendant on 
personal being. The noteof rationality lS peculiarly Greek, but the concept-
ion embodied in the definition is that of a being possessed of a peculiar and 
absolute unity and independence of being that reflects the simplicity and 
eternity of God. The scholastic development of the notion emphasizes this. 
Aquinas takes over Boethius' definition but adds by way of explication the 
notes of "incommunicabilis" (Sum::?a Theologiae, 1.30.4 ad 2),(1963) and 
"subsistentia" (Summa Contra Gentiles 4.49). (1955) Finally, Richard of St 
Victor appears to put it all together in "intellectualis naturae incornmunicabilis 
existentia" (De Trinitate 4.22.24).(Halder, 1969) Here the emphasis is clear, 
of an absolute unity and independence of being. As A Hald~r (1969: 404) puts 
it 1n the article "Person" in Sacramentum Mundi: "Person does not mean "essence" 
or "nature" but the actual unique reality of a spiritual being, an undivided 
whole existing independently and not interchangeable with any other." The 
word "spiritual" is actually introduced to signify the difference of this sort 
of being from other kinds of being in the world. And the fact that human 
persons in addition to being persons are also beings in the world, formed from 
"the dust of the earth", is where the connection of this notion of persons with 
dualism is to be found. A certain duality was present from the very beginning, 
7 I . .. 
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a duality of transcendence of versus involvement in the world. In the term-
inology of Greek philosophy this became an internal duality of soul and body. 
Often this was understood in a Platonic sense. This involved a strict 
dualism, the human individual being identified with the soul at the expense 
of the body. Nevertheless, this position was always in conflict with the 
official doctrine of the Church, which strongly affirmed the unity of the 
human person in its faith in "the resurrection of the body" and the real 
presence of the person of Jesus in the "body" and "blood" of the eucharist. 
It \vas not hmvever until the Christianisation of the philosophy of Aristotle 
by Aquinas in the thirteenth century that a satisfactory formula could be 
found to relate this notion of the person to human persons, namely that where-
by the spiritual soul was defined as the Aristotelian form of the body. 
The notion of the person whose development we have so briefly charted though 
strictly metaphysical, was big with consequences for ordinary personal and 
social life. Apart from implying the incorruptibility of the soul, and 
hence the possibility of a life beyone death for its possessor, it also 
entailed the:notion of respect for the moral dignity of the subject of such a 
self-contained and independent form of life. As such persons were seen as 
being the possessors of rights and duties that went far beyond those granted 
or imposed on them by any particular state or positive law. 
In spite however of the Thomist synthesis, the dualist potential of this 
conception of the person was revivified in the centuries that followed Aquinas. 
The development of the natural sciences fostered a conception of nature as a 
mechanical, or at any rate, a material system. The notion of material 
extension, partes extra partes, as also that o£ measurable regular forces 
producing changes in thepositionand behaviour of otherwise inert substances, 
were diametrically opposed to the notion of the person that had been developed 
during the middle ages, Even the atomism built into the scientific conception, 
though superficially similar to the radical individuality of persons, was in 
fact the very antithesis of it. Whereas each person was a unique centre of 
life and activity, each atom was merely an identical unit of a homogeneous flux, 
The radical dualism of Descartes was a perhaps inevitable result of this vision 
of the natural world. Man was after all a thinking subject and as such quite 
opposed to the object of his (scientific) thought. At the same time there 
could be no doubt that his body was part of the same objectified world that his 
science studied. 
thought. 
A dualism of substance became an exigence of reflective 
8 I . .. 
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Such a dualism of substance fitted ill with the theoretical superstructure of 
the natural sciences. As we shall see in greater detail in the following 
section the pre-dominance ofthenotion of matter in the natural sciences led 
eventually to a metaphysical materialsim. The success and prestige of natural 
science led to the generalisation of its object and method to encompass the· 
whole of reality. So even where a dualistic theory of man was maintained it 
was against the background of a naively realist theory of science that had an 
internal affinity with materialism. Man appeared as the one exception to an 
otherwise admirably monist theory of reality. 
This opposition between dualism and a materialist monism 1s the form in which 
the problem about the nature of human person appears even in contemporary 
philosophy. It is not in its fundamental features any different from the 
opposition between, say, the phenomenalism of Hume and the dualism_of Kant, 
in the 18th century. During the 19th century however a reaction to dualism 
began that has quite distinctive features of its mm. He must devote some 
attention to this since it forms, so we believe, the hisaorical root of that 
quite new approach to persons that offers promise of reconciliation between 
materialism and dualism. 
In spite of the fact that the new approach explicitly intended to overcome 
the dualism of the older tradition by a renewed understanding of the notion 
of the spiritual, it is nevertheless situated within a "materialist" tradition 
of thought about persons. The sense in which this is true will very soon 
become apparent. 
The clearest, the most influential and the most enduring example of the new 
approach to persons is the philosophy of Hegel. His philosophy begins indeed 
as an explicit attempt to overcome what he saw as the false dichotomies of 
Kant, those of understanding and reason, inclination and will, of moral freedom 
and natural necessity and, above all, of the noumenal and the phenom~nal ~vorlds. 
What is new in the attempt to overcome dualism that is typified by Hegel's 
philosophy is that it is also a reaction to mechanism of any sort, and the 
atomism that that inevitably implied. In place of a fundamentally mechanical 
model of reality Hegel puts a fundamentally organic one. Charles Taylor brings 
this out very well in his study on Hegel. Taylor ( 1975: 80) writes "Hegel .is 
in fact one ofthe important links in a chain of thought in modern philosophical 
anthropology, one which is opposed to both dualism and mechanism, and which we 
see continued· in different ways in Marxism and modern phenomenology." 
9/ ... 
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Hegel's conception of persons is intrinsically related to his notion of Spirit. 
I do not need to go into theramifications of this extremely complex notion 1n 
order to explain how Hegel's conception of persons differed from a dualist one. 
But I must say something in a sunnnary way so as to relate Hegel to the general 
argument of this study. 
The notion of Spirit is that of a subject who realises itself by virtue of an 
activity of self-expression, the result of \vhich is then appropriated by a 
further act of affirmation or recognition. Put otherwise, Spirit's self-
realisation occurs in two stages armaments, one of self-externalisation or self-
objectification in what is other than the self, the other of identification with 
or possession of this external objectification of itself. 
Taylor calls the view of man derived from Hegel 's notion of Spirit an "expressivist" 
one. This is a useful term in the context of the present work because it 
introduces the notion of an intrinsic relation to "otherness" into the notion 
of subjectivity itself. It is perhaps a good thing to see a little more of 
what Taylor means by the term. 
quotations: 
With this in mind I give the following tvm 
"If we return to our guiding analogy, the way 
in which an action or gesture can express tvhat 
is characteristic about a person, we can see 
that there are two aspects which can be united 
in this idea. Something I do or say can express 
my feelings or aspirations in the sense we can 
speak of a person expressing himself when he 
finally gets out and thus makes determinate, 
perhaps for the first time what he feels or wants. 
In another sense we can speak of somenon~'s 
actions as expressions of his feelings or desires 
when they carry out what he wants, or realize his 
aspirations. These two aspects can be separated; 
I can bring my desires to verbal expression without 
acting, I can act and remain an enigma to myself 
and others; but they often do go together, and 
frequently we are :inclined to say of ourselves or 
others that we did not really know what we felt 
or wanted until we acted. Thus the fullest and 
most convincing expression of a subject is one 
where he both realizes and clarifies his 
aspirations •.•••... 
Thus the notion of human life as expression sees 
this not only as the realization of purposes but 
also as the clarification of these purposes. 
It is not only the fulfilment of life but also the 
clarification of meaning. In the course of living 
adequ~tely I not only fulfil my humanity but clarify 
what my humanity is about. As such a clarification 
my life-form is not just the fulfilment of purpose <:o\"'- BiBil. ~ut the embodiment of meaning, the expression of an / 4r?'*-
1dea. The expression theory breaks with the Enlighten- c:;o .., 
ment dichotomy between meaning and being, at least as 
far as human life is concerned." (Taylor, 1975: 16) 0.1. 10/ ... 
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To this one must add, as Taylor himself also makes clear, that the categories 
of the exptessivist view are opposed to all internal dualisms as well. The 
self is seen as a radically unitary being, developing itself as a whole 1n 
its expressive outward directed activity. Spirituality as interiority is in 
nb way opposed to the externality of matter. 
Expressivist theories of man, by virtue of the intrinsic connection of self-
realisation with otherness, overcome the opposition inherent in the dualist 
theories between the knowing subject and an objective nature. Tl~is dualism, 
also reflected in an interior dualism of mind and body, was replaced by the 
duality of self and other. This duality was however, in the notion of Spirit, 
merely the duality of two "poles" of a self-referential unity of conscious life. 
The relevance of this highly abstract metaphysical conception of Spirit to 
this work can be seen once one takes note of the \vay in which Hegel "fleshed 
out" the notion in concrete terms. In the concrete, Spirit exists only as 
persons in relation to each other. AsHegel (1910:227) himself puts it, 
"A self-consciousness has before it a self-consciousness. Only so and only 
then is it self-consciousness; for here first of all it comes to have the 
unity of itself in its otherness. Ego which 1s the object of its notion, 1s 
in point of fact not "object" When a self-consciousness 1s the object, the 
object is just as much ego as object." And again, "Self-consciousness exists 
in itself and for itself, in that, and by the fact that it exists for another 
self-consciousness; that is to say, it 1.s only by being acknowledged or 
"recognized"." (Hegel, 1910: 229) 
Our concern here is historical rather than critical. We shall see however 
1n the chapters to follow the pervasive influence of such ideas as these. 
In particular the idea that persons can only realize themselves as persons 
1n relation to other persons will provide the key to our analysis of inter-
subjectivity and the possibility of a bridge between a "dualist" or spiritual 
notion of persons and a materialistic one. 
It is important 1.n this connection to note that Hegel's conception of persons 
is a materialist one in the broad sense we have already defined. The fact 
that he derives it from his notion of Spirit should no~ mislead us into thinking 
otherwise. Hegel's notion of spirit is quite other that the traditional notion. 
Taylor (1975: 24) sees this very clearly: "The rejection of any disembodied 
spiritual reality is as we shall see one of the basic principles of Hegel's 
philosophy" And, distinguishing Hegel's idealism from Cartesianism, "This 
1s paradoxically very different from all other forms of idealism, which tend 
to the denial of external reality, or material reality ••• Hegel's idealism, 
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far from being a denial of external material reality, is the strongest affirm-
ation of it; it not only exists but necessarily exists." 
In contradistinction to the older v1ew Hegel's Spirit is not characterised by 
the absolute transcendence of the natural world that we have noted. Nor are 
persons possessed of an enduring and unique identity; they are in no sense 
incorruptible or capable of a life beyond death. In fact it is probably true, 
though there is a good deal of difference of interpretation, here, that Spirit 
1s a cultural rather than a natural category. It certainly seems to me to be 
true that in asserting that man is Spirit Hegel 1s not wishing to say that he 
1s 1n any sense possessed of an immaterial nature. He·is rather drawing 
attention to the way 1n which each person's identity depends on his relation 
to human culture 1n the broad sense. Thus his humanity is derived from this 
product rather than being the necessary natural condition for it. 
This novel conception of persons embodied in Hegel's notion of Spirit did not 
die with Hegel, but has proved immensely fruitful ever since. The idea that 
persons can realize themselves only in relation to other persons, coupled with 
the notion that "person" is a cultural rather than a natural designation, has 
a strong affinity with the emphasis on environmental influence, both natural 
and social, that characterises the biological and behavioural sciences that have 
developed since his time. John Macmurray (1957: 62-83) has carefully charted 
this connection. 
Hegel's formulations of the "relational" v1ew of persons are both extremely 
brief and extremely enigmatic. They are constructed at such a high level of 
metaphysical generality that they are open to the most various interpretations. 
But because individual persons are only a manifestation of or a participation 
1n Spirit there is an in-built tendency to collectivism and even "totalitarianism" 
1n Hegel's theory. In other words the relational element is always understood 
primarily as the dependence of individual persons on their relations with others, 
or in terms of the influence of the social environment on the individual. What 
I have said above about Hegel's notion of Spirit being a cultural rather than a 
natural category is of a piece with this tendency. 
The best example of this kind of interpretation of Hegel is of course that of 
Marx. From Feuerbach (1957: 66) ("Only through his fellow does man become 
clear to himself and self-conscious.") Marx took over the notion of man as a 
"species being" and used this to interpret Hegel's metaphysical categories 1n 
a definitely sociological sense: 
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"The individual is the social being •.• In his 
species-consciousness man confirms.his real 
social life, and reproduces his real existence 
in thought; '"hile conversely, species-life 
confirms itself in species consciousness and 
exists for itself in its universality as a 
thinking befng. Though man is a unique 
individual - and it is just his particularity 
which makes him an individual, a really 
individual communal being - he is equally 
the \vhole, the ideal \vhole, the subjective 
existence of society as thought and experienced. 
He exists in reality as the representation 
and the real mind of social existence, and as 
the sum of human manifestation of life." (Fromm, 1961: 130) 
The species-being of an individual ~s not a natural property but his consc~ous 
participa:tion in the cultural life of the social whole. Only insofar as he 
does so is the individual a strictly "human" individual, a member of the i•human" 
spec~es. Such dependence on others in order to develop one's humanity so far 
from being opposed to a materialist vie1v of man is entirely consonant with it. 
He shall see this more clearly when we come to discuss materiality as relation 
to otherness in the work of contemporary Thomist writers. 
Existentialist writers also derive their v~ew of the relationality of human 
existence from HegeL By and large they reject his "collectivism" finding it 
incompatible with the autonomy of the individual person. But asserting the 
freedom of the individual at the same time as his relationality proves a 
difficult task, putting a great strain on the metaphysical frame\vork in which 
they attempt to do it. 
Heidegger's account of human existence certainly includes the relational 
aspect as an essential part of it. As he puts it, "Dasein is essentially 
Being-With." (Heidegger, 1962: 137) And again, "The vlorld of Dasein is a 
with-world. Being-in is Being-with." (Heidegger, 1962: 135) The status of 
such expressions is that of a phenomenological description of a basic structure 
of consciousness. They are not factual statements about concrete relations 
between different persons. They thus refer to the consciousness of every 
individual person. In Being and Time, where the expressions occur, Heidegger 
is content to simply assert them. And nowhere else does he offer any deduct-
ion or derivation of them. Perhaps this intrinsic relatedness to others is 
associated with (and even to be derived from) the fundamentally artificial 
environment that constitutes the "world" of Dasein. ·All Heidegger's examples 
point to this connection. He speaks of the presence of Others in the equipment 
and the artefact of the craftsman, in the book we have bought or the boat we 
happen upon or even in the field along whose perimeter we are walking. The 
"world" of Dasein is haunted by the presence of Others. The "world" of Dasein 
1 ') I 
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is not however the real world in which real people meet or avoid each other 
but the object-term of the individual's conscious self-presence. It is here, 
prior to all involvement in the real world, that Heidegger wishes to affirm an 
orientation to the Other. Just as much as persons are turned out~.,rards towards 
objects of concern, so are they always related to possible others similarly 
placed - even if no actual others actually exist. "Being-with is an 
extential characteristic of Dasein even when factically no Other is prese:nt-
at-hand or perceived. Even Dasein' s Being-alone is Being-Hi th in the \.Jorld." 
(Heidegger, 1962: 137) Heidegger seems to be describing an essential plurality 
in our aHareness of ourselves. What the source of such plurality is, he does 
not say. In vie\.J of its connection in his thought with spatiality and 
temporality, it does not seem to me far-fetched to connect it with what we 
shall presently come to understand as the intrinsic plurality of a material 
essence. 
This speculation is of interest in view of the apparent tendency towards 
"collectivism" of Heidegger's notion of "being-with". This basic orientation 
of our consciousness expresses itself in social life most naturally in the 
inauthenticity of the "they". The individual's identity l.S submerged in that 
of the crowd. Sartre (1966: 222) picks up this tendency of Heidegger's thought, 
perceptively remarking that the best symbol of Heidegger' s intuition is that of 
the "crew". 
Whether or not one is justified in remarking totalitarian tendencies in 
Heidegger's thought, he does seem to find it difficult to show how the 
individual can affirm his freedom except in opposition to the Others. Sartre 
(1966: 223) certainly criticises him for his illogicality in doing this. And 
Heidegger does not say enough about authentic modes of existenc.e to counter the 
conviction that Sartre is right. "Being-with" certainly should not be under-
stood as implying any real intimacy and mutuality, or even "recognition" in an 
Hegelian sense. The nearest Eeidegger gets to equating an authentic form of 
Dasein and a form of Being-with is when he speaks of solicitude, "Solicitude" 
is a general term, as wide as "Being-,.,rith". But within it Heidegger distinguishe 
"deficient" from o_ther - presumably not defic-ient - forms of solicitude. One 
such "non-deficient" form of solicitude he calls "Being for", (Heidegger, 1962: 138 
The change in preposition 1.s significant. It throws light on the otherwise 
obscure statement that "Being-alone is a deficient mode of Beirtg~with". 
(Heidegger, 1962: 137) by suggesting that there 1.s a way of reconciling authentic 
existence and relations with others. But even if Heidegger does feel that this 
can, and indeed ought, to be done, his notion of Being-with does not seem to 
provide an adequate foundation for the possibility of doing it. 
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Sartre too stands in the tradition of thought about the human person which ,.,e 
are discussing and whose roots we have discerned in Hegel's idea of Spirit. 
Though an existentialist thinker he is, as we have already noted, intensely 
critical of Heidegger. He feels that in giving his whole attention to the 
structures of the individual Dasein's consciousness, Heidegger ignores the 
actual relations between persons that do in fact affect and tran~form that 
consciou~ness in its life in the real world. So Heidegger's category of 
Being-with obscures both the real aloneness of each individual person, and the 
real and inevitable state of conflict that characterises social relationships. 
(Sartre, 1966: 222,226) Sartre bases his account of actual relations between 
persons on Hegel's, and in particular on his account of the dialectic of Master 
and Slave which he much admires. (1966: 214) Accordingly he describes the 
encounter of Self and Other in terms of conflict rather than as any kind of 
"togetherness". This is a direct result of the solitariness of the individual 
person that is bound up with his autonomy. 
"Human-reality remains alone because the 
Other's existence has the nature of a con-
tingent and irreducible fact. We encounter 
the Other; we do not constitute him. And 
if this fact still appears to us in the form 
of a necessity, yet it does not belong with 
those "conditions of the possibility of our 
. experience" or - .if you prefer - with 
ontological necessity. If the Other's exist-
ence is a necessity, it is a "contingent 
necessity"; that is, it is of the same type 
as the factual necessity which is imposed on 
the cogito.n (Sartre, 1966: 226) 
Neither the being nor the actual development of a person imply any relatedness 
1n the sense of "togetherness" with Others. Yet other persons remain necessary 
1n terms of the individual's project of self-realisation. They are ne~essary 
precisely so that by being dominated by the freedom of the self, the freedom of 
the self can be affirmed. Speaking of love between persons, Sartre (1966: 403) 
writes: "It does not demand the abolition of the other's freedom, but rather 
his enslavement as freedom; that is freedom's self-enslavement," 
We cannot go further 1n this work into Sartre 1 s (often brilliant) descriptions 
of relations between persons. Nor need we examine further the "phenomen-
ological ontology" (Sartre, 1966) that underlies them, Among Thomist philosophers 
Sartre is criticised both for his phenomenology of interpersonal relations and 
for his metaphysics. (Lujipen, 1960; Marcel, 1951; Nedoncelle, 1966) We follow 
Marcel and others in judging Sartre to be a materialist. So there is little 
hope that his account of the relational aspect of persons would be compatible 
with a Thomis t metaphys ic, In this connection we feel it worthwhile to point 
out that in terms of the position taken up in the present work the "contradiction" 
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often pointed out by critics of Sartre between the individualism of his 
existentialism and the collectivism of his professed Marxism is in fact no 
contradiction at all but an association entirely to be expected. If it is 
true, as we shall argue, on a spiritual view of persons that. the freedom of the 
self is augmented rather than dimished by a certain involvemeni with the other, 
then the converse might reasonable be expected tb obtain on a materialist view. 
Individualism and collectivism are not such strange bed-fellows after all; 
they have this in corrunon, that both alike deny the possibility of a mutuality 
and reciprocity in tvhich personal freedom can actually flourish. Freedom and 
relations with others are only contradictory on a materialist v~ew of persons. 
Sartre is phenomenologist enough to recognise that it follows from the nature 
of human freedom that it should seek augmentation and self-realisation ~n 
relations with others, and indeed ~n the community of mutual recognition itself. 
His metaphysics however rules out the possibility of such a state of affairs 
and he consequently judges the project, though inevitable, illusory. 
Sartre's vmrk, though unhelpful ~n terms of our purpose of reconciling a 
relational view of persons with a spiritual one, does present more clearly than 
any other the consequences of a materialist metaphysic in the field of a 
philosophy of the person and relations between persons. 
A historical outline of the development of the relational view of persons 
would not be complete without mention of Hartin Buber. He has perhaps more 
than any other writer identified himself with this view and strengthened its 
influence, at least in certain circles. His descriptions of the phenomena of 
intersubjectivity have a profundity and poetic perceptiveness that is unique. 
The perspective that emerges from these descriptions, of the way in which 
the being of persons is bound up with their relations with other person, ~s ~n 
all maJOr respects identical with our own. It is therefore necessary to say 
why it has been thought necessary in the present work to repeat much of what he 
has done and to restate many of his conclusions. Without doubt the writers 
we have used have been influenced by Buber. We have used them rather than him 
chiefly for two reasons. Buber is not a systematic writer, content to describe 
the phenomena of intersubjectivity from every angle and, as it were, piecemeal. 
We have sought system and hence an accurate picture of only the most fundamental 
structures of intersubjectivity ~n their relation to one another. Secondly, 
in spite of Buber's insistence that his descriptions have an ontological rather 
than a merely "psychological" significance, it ~s impossible either to discover 
an implicit metaphysic hidden in them or even to provide one that will "fit" 
his description with any degree of certainty. As Tallon (1973: 75) puts it 
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1n his r1gorous study of-Buber's basic category, the "between", "One is left 
with the task of supplying a metaphysics, that is, of making explicit the 
metaphysics implicit in the statements about, for example, my becoming I as I 
say Thou " The poetic quality of Buber's writing however has so far 
resisted all attempts to do this. For this reason too, Buber could not be 
used in this study. We are intent on bringing out the metaphysical implications 
of the phenomena of intersubjectivity so as to relate them, if possible, to a 
particular metaphysical view of persons. And the language of Buber's 
descriptions does not permit one to do this with sufficient precision to make 
the attempt worthwhile. 
In spite of this there are s1gns 1n Buber's writings that the metaphysical 
position implied by his descriptions is one that is closer to our own than to 
the other writers \-le have mentioned in this historical sketch. He even uses 
the vmrd "spirit", though in a variety of ways and in none that is clearly the 
same as our own: "Spirit 1s the word ... Spirit is not in the I, but between 
I and Thou .•. Man lives 1n the spirit, if he is able to respond to his Thou." 
(Buber, 1958: 39) 
For this reason his criticisms of other writers in this tradition are instruct-
ive. Marx he criticises for subordinating the individual to society in his 
"sociological reduction" of Hegel: "Marx did not take up into his concept of 
society the element of the real relation between the really different I and 
Thou, and for that very reason opposed an unreal individualism with a collect-
1v1sm which \vas just as unreal." (Buber, 1947: 182) As can be seen from this 
quotation, the basis for his criticism was the peculiar nature of the relation 
between persons. 
Wereas Marx is criticised for·his collectivism, Heidegger is taken to taks for 
the opposite fault - individualism. "Heidegger's "existence" is monological." 
(Buber, 1947: 204) He notes the influence of Kierkegaard on Heidegger. In 
Kierkegaard however the very individuality of the "individual" he so exalted 
was derived from the finite person's relation to an infinite person, And in 
secularising Kierkegaard's basically theological anthropology Heidegger has 
done away with this relation, replacing it with an "internal" relation of the 
lndividual to himself. Buber relates Heidegger's anthropology to the 
phenomenon of "the death of God" in contemporary European thought and sees in 
it a philosophical expression of this loss of faith, not only in a divine Other 
but in other persons in general. "Heidegger isolates from the \vholeness of 
life the realm in \-1hich man is related to himself, since he absolutizes the 
temporally conditioned situation of the radically solitary man, and wants to 
derive the essence of human existence from the experience of a nightmare." 
(Buber, 1947: 205) 
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These criticisms indicate the central positive thrust of Buber's philosophy of-
the person, that of breaking down the false alternative between individualism 
and collectivism. 
"Its first step must be to smash the false 
alternative with \vhich the thought of our 
epoch is shot through - that of "individual-
ism or collectivism." Its first question 
must be about a genuine third alternative 
- by "genuine" being understood a point of 
view \vhich cannot be reduced to one of the 
first two, and does not represent a mere 
compromise between them." (Buber, 1947: 243) 
It 1s Buber's conviction that such a genuine alternative can only be supplied 
by his insight into the nature of distinctively personal relations. 
"The fundamental fact of human existence is 
neither the individual as such nor the 
aggregate as such. Each, considered by 
itself, is a mighty abstraction. The 
individual is a fact of existence in so 
far as he steps into a living relation with 
other individuals. The aggregate is a fact 
of existence in so far as it is built up of 
living units of relation. The fundamental 
fact of human existenceis man with man. 
What is peculiarly characteristic of the 
human world is above all that something takes 
place between one being and another the like 
of which can be found nowhere in nature. 
Language is only a sign and a means for it, 
all achievement of the spirit has been incited 
by it. Man is made man by it; but on its way 
it does not merely unfold, it also decays and 
\vi thers away. It is rooted in one being 
turning to another as another as this particular 
other being, in order to communicate with it in 
a sphere which is common to them but which 
reaches out beyond the special sphere of each. 
I call this sphere, which is established with 
the existence of man as man but which is 
conceptually still uncomprehended, the sphere 
of "between". Though being realized in very'·· 
different degrees, it is a primal category of 
human reality. This is where the genuine third 
alternative must begin." (Buber, 1947: 244) 
The insight embodied in Buber's expression "the between", and sketched 
out in the above passage from his ."Between Man and Man" is, in our view, 
what is most valuable 1n the tradition of thought about persons that we 
have been outlining. In general however the effect of the relational 
view of persons has been either to threaten true individuality or to subsume 
all relatedness into the. individual's relation to himself thus making his 
solitariness absolute. In this regard the precise metaphysical status of 
the "relations" is crucial. In sutrumary however, it would seem true to say that 
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effect of the development of this notion of the person has been to challenge 
not only the dualism of Enlightenment thought but, as I have already pointed 
out, the older notion of a person as the possessor of a spiritual nature that 
is prior to any social relations with others he might be involved in. It 
would seem therefore that to the extent that one shares the insight into th~ 
nature of persons represented by this view, though not necessarily subscribing 
to the slant given it by any particular thinker mentioned, one would lose faith 
1n the theory of persons as spiritual beings in the traditional sense. After 
all the two vie•..rs do seem to be diametrically opposed. The older view 
stresses the radical incommunicable individuality of persons as, moreover, a 
natural fact; the new view the intrinsic interdependence of persons for their 
personal identity as a cultural condition. In the one ·view a person appears 
as a separate autonomous origin of life that 1s well-nigh absolutely independent 
of other persons; in the other the very possibility of self-realis?tion depends 
on the existence and activity of others. Put like that the t-.;.;ro views do seem 
simply contradictory. The sense of opposition between them 1s, if anything 
heightene~ by the reflection that the one implies the immateriality, the other 
the materiality of persons. 
We shall be discussing both the notion of immateriality and materiality and the 
personal relations of persons in this work. And in spite of all the indi-
cations mentioned above we hope to demonstrate the compatibility of the two 
notions of the person whose historical background we have sketched. Our 
confidence in this project is based ultimately on the common experience of 
personal life. This experience can be indicated as follo-.;.;rs: We do indeed 
discover ourselves to be possessed of a peculiar and radical independence of 
life and thought, and this independence is both gained and augn1ented through 
a certain equally peculiar dependence on other persons. If this sounds 
enigmatic that does not so much matter. The assertion is to be thoroughly 
analysed and tested in the chapters to follow. 
Our first task however will be to thoroughly-clarify the notions of the 
spiritual and the material that we will be using in this -.;.;rork. 
3. The notion of materiality 
A difficulty that must be stated at the outset is the difference of usage 
regarding these two terms between modern common sense and science on the one 
hand and Thomist metaphysics on the other. In my account of what it is to be 
a person I shall be using the terms spiritual and material 1n a carefully 
defined metaphysical sense, since in that sense they are essential for my 
19/ .. 0 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
- 19 -
purpose, and indeed for adequately describing the reality under consideration. 
But since I wish to oppose contemporary ideas \vhich centre on the same terms 
I must relate the one set to the other. If the meaning of the terms in the 
solution bear no relation to their meaning in the problem, then the problem 
is not solved. 
As I shall be defining and developing the notion of spirit at great length 1n 
the next chapter I will here concentrate rather on the notion of matter. 
One should, I suppose, distinguish between a common-sense, a scientific and 
a philosophical view of matter. The common-sense view is, I should say, that 
matter is Hhat everything is made of and is therefore a sort of featureless 
solid stuff we can't actually perceive. And of course this stuff can be 
divided up both logically and, Hithin practical limits_, actually, into ever 
smaller and smaller bits or particles. 
The scientific view 1s very different. Atoms or sub-atomic particles are not 
little chips of homogeneous stuff. At least on a realist vieH each is an entity 
in its own right and therefore has an essence or nature of its own. 11Meson" 
11 neutrino", "quark11 -each refers to a specific nature or type of entity. 
w'hatever particles science of the future may discover, however lm.;r it goes as 
it were, it Hill never reach the fundamental matter of commonsense but only one 
or other kind of entity, a new kind of 'particle'. If, on the other hand, one 
Here to ask a physicist in a general way what the different particles \vere 
particles of he Hould be very likely to reply that they Here forms of energy, 
or something like that. 
probably fairly typical. 
The following quotation from Heisenberg (1958:13) is 
11All elementary particles are made of the same 
matter, which He may call energy or universal 
matter. They are only the different forms in 
\vhich matter can appear. If we compare this 
situation with the concepts of matter and form 
in Aristotle, He might say that the matter of 
Aristotle, which was essentially potentia 
i.e. possibility, should be compared to-our 
notion of energy. Energy appears as material 
reality through the form, when an elementary 
particle 1s ·produced." 
This quotation 1s interesting 1n that it shoHs how the fundamental concepts of 
physics are closely related to metaphysical ones. "Hatter" in the sense of 
energy, even though a scientist is constrained to use the term or something 
like it, is not really a scientific term at all. Energy in this absolute 
sense is not something that could be the object of some experiment, it is not 
something that could - even in principle - be discovered. It is on-the 
20/ •.. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
- 20 -
contrary the necessary condition for anything at all being discovered or 
observed. No energy of any sort, no movement of the needles on the dials 
of our instruments. One knows before one starts that what one will find 
will be a form of energy. For if it isn't one will never be able to verify 
that it is there. In practice physicists tend to this more 'idealist' 
notion of matter. 
In philosophy, and probably e-,ren in contemporary philosophy, the ~vord "matter" 
has so many meanings that it is probably best if I simply stipulate those that 
seem relevant to the concerns of this study. 
Since Descartes (1931) "matter" and "material" have referred to a definite kind 
of thing. His dualism is a dualism of substance: there is extended substance 
(matter) and thinking substance (mind). And that is all there is; the universe 
contains only tvm sorts of things, material bodies and immaterial minds. 
This then is the dualism that is opposed by the forms of contemporary material-
ism that I wish to correct. These agree in supposing the universe to be made 
up of only one sort of thing and that material. A thing must be material to 
be real. Of course 11material" doesn't mean "real". If that \vere so no 
problems would arise. Materialsim, as I understand it, is a doctrine about 
what sort of things are real or, more precisely, what sort of thing a thing 
must be to be real. If, for instance, "material" is taken to mean "extended", 
then a materialist must hold that, at least, nothing that is not extended can 
exist. That is a very mild form of materialism for it leaves open the 
possibility that being extended is only one of a number of necessary qualities 
that all existing things must possess. The sort cf materialist I am interested 
in correcting however 1s the sort who holds that matter is the fundamental 
attribute of all real things in the sense that whatever other attributes they 
may have they must all be understood as modifications of matter. 
In this philosophical context "material" does 1n fact mean "extended" or 
"spatia-temporal" \vith the implication too of divisibility and measurability. 
The metaphysical notion of matter, drawn from the tradition of Aristotle and 
Aquinas, which I will be using must be distinguished from all these usages. 
In Aristotelianism, unlike Cartesianism, the term "matter" is not used primarily 
to designate a type or kind of thing but instead a metaphysical principle of 
a thing. (Shutte 1981) By this I mean that the term refers to a. condition of 
possibility of the thing being as it is and being knowable as it 1s. In the 
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case of matter, it ~s the condition of varwus related possibilities among 
\vhich are those of there being more than one thing of the same kind and of such 
things being known in their distinct individuality. Put thus materiality 
looks very like extension or spatia-temporality. It is certainly that which 
makes things able to be experienced by us, that is (as we shall see in greater 
detail presently) the objects of a receptive rather than a creative condition. 
But it is the cause rather than the effect of spatia-temporal extension. In 
this it has much in common with the "energy" of Heisenberg. It is a priori in 
both a scientific and a common-sense ,,my in that it can neither be discovered 
or observed but is instead the condition for scientific observation, and it is 
also the necessary condition for ordinary sense-perception. 
Hatter as such, materia pr~ma, ~n the Aristotelian sense, does not exist. 
Since it is, as we have said, a condition of possibility of things being as 
they are, it only exists as a constituent of things; not as a sort of stuff of 
which they are made but as a quality or mode of their way of bei~g, namely the 
possibility they contain within them for-not being what they are, for becoming 
something else, for changing or ceasing to be. Materia prima is the pure 
possibility of being other than they are. They lack as it were an enduring 
identity. 
Thomists do speak of "material beings" and contrast them ,.,ith immaterial ones 
but this ~s a different sort of contrast from the Cartesian contrast between 
thinking and extended substance. There is question here, as we shall see in 
greater detail presently, of differing degrees of being. An immaterial being 
is itself, has an enduring identity and as it were a "hold" on its own being. 
A material being is wholly dependentfor its being on what is other than it; 
its centre of being is not within itself, but it exists only as a function or 
effect of another. 
I have said enough to g~ve an idea of how I shall use the term 'material'. 
And enough has been said, I hope, to show that my use of the term designates 
the same sort of things as the contemporary usages. Hence when I claim that 
persons are immaterial I will be really opposing the view of contemporary 
thinkers who hold that they are material, and not saying something that is ~n 
fact quite compatible with what they say though in mare verbal contradiction 
to it. 
Perhaps the notion of the physical can throw added light on what is at issue 
between me and materialism. By "physical" I mean something answering to the 
terms and laws of physics. A physical thing is a reality that is postulated 
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by the terms of a physical theory and whose behaviour is defined by the laws 
of physics. To claim that a human person is a physical thing ~s to claim that 
their behaviour is either wholly or partly explicable in terms of the laws of 
physics, that they are either wholly or partly definable in terms of physical 
theory. The "wholly" I deny, the "partly" I accept. I wish to deny that 
human persons are purely physical things and that their behaviour is determined 
wholly by physical laws. Not that I wish to assert that human beings are 
partly physical and partly something else, say, spiritual. That would be a 
reversion to the ghost in the machine, a dualism of substance once aga~n. Nor 
do I wish to imply that the laws of physics break down in human beings. It is 
only if physical lavJS are seen in grossly real is tic terms, as the complete 
description of a machine-like universe, that the spirituality of persons would 
imply a sort of break in the system. If physical laws are seen rather as one 
sort of order discovered and verified in and between things, then r6om ~s left 
for other sorts of order as well. Persons can then be seen as things to which 
. 1 
physical and other laws can both apply. In this connection it must be 
remembered that the laws of physics, as indeed the laws of all the sciences, 
are defined and verified according to the norms of our ovm cognitive processes. 
We are the subject of scientific activity as ~vell as possible objects of it. 
This reflection should indicate that any account of human beings or explanation 
of human behaviour in terms of entities or causal processes that are extrinsic 
to the person or shared in any Hay \vith the rest of nature is bound to be 
incomplete if not actually false. It is not enough therefore to allow that 
though the science of physics is inadequate to give a proper account of persons 
and their behaviour nevertheless if one considers the whole system of the 
special sciences, both natural and social, then one would have as complete an 
account as one could ask for. However many sciences there be they are all 
alike based on the data of sense and in that sense have to deal with material 
realities. If human persons are spiritual then they must escape though not 
necessarily contradict the competence of the sc1ences. 
We are now in possess1on of the necessary conceptual clarity so as to be able 
to grasp the problem of this work. Our aim is to give an account of the 
spirituality of persons as it is revealed i"n the phenomena of intersubjectivity. 
In the course of pursuing thatobjective it is our hope that the subsidiary 
~ssues that have been raised in this introductory chapter will be grasped more 
clearly and even shmvn to have their own solutions. 
Our first ta.sk is thus to present a metaphysical analysis of the notion of 
spirituality with a view to ga~n1ng a renewed understanding of this much abused 
term. To that task we now turn. 
For a philosophical theory of physical science that supports such a viewpoint 
while nevertheless doing justice to the requirements of scientific realism, 
see the ;,.;rork of P A H2elan (1964:334-342 . 1965) 
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CHAPTER THO. THE NOTION OF SPIRITUALITY 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter 1s to present a detailed treatment of spirituality. 
I propose to effect this by means of analysing and commenting on Karl Rahner's 
understanding of the notion. One of the foremost of contemporary Thomists, 
his account of the spiritual 1s eminently suited to the purposes of this work. 
It is firmly rooted in Aquinas' metaphysical psychology of the human person. 
At the same time it has learnt from the tradition of Heidegger and the 
phenomenologists as well as that of transcendental philosophy. In his 
philosophical writing Rahner has gone a long way towards bridging the 
conceptual gap between these schools of thought. His treatment moreover has 
the effect of "personalizing" Aquinas' somewhat cosmological categories and 
this is ideal from our point of view, increasing the usefulness of his work 
immeasurably. Rahner's work is profound but obscure. Any adequate inter-
pretation of it is bound to be both detailed and difficult. In what follows 
I have tried to express the essence of what he has to say about the spiritual 
irr terminology that could be understood by an English-speaking philosopher 
without expert knowledge of scholastic philosophy. 
partial success. 
I dare hope for only 
The spirituality distinctive of persons is usually deduced from persons' 
capacity for ihtellectual kn0wledge by philosophers in the Thomist tradition 
and Rahner 1s no exception. We accordingly follm..r his analysis of the 
conditions of possibility for intellectual understanding. We are however 
interested chiefly in the spirituality of human persons and, in Thomist 
terminology, human beings are material as well. We thus turn to deal with 
the relationship between spirit and matter as understood by Rahner. And 
this relation thrmvs added light on the notion of spirituality itself. 
Fi~1ally we consider two further "proofs" of spirituality from the data of 
intellectual knowledge, 1n order to carry the notion of the spiritual beyond 
the terminology of Thomist metaphysics and to relate it to other coiTmon-
sense and scientific notions. In particular we are concerned to relate it 
to con~on and scientific notions of matter since the notion of the spiritual 
that we are trying to defend 1s seen as an alternative to contemporary 
materialistic notions of the person. 
1be chapter ends with a transition to the chapters on intersubjectivity to 
follow. 
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2. The Notion of the Spiritual: K Rahner_ 
Rahner (1978: 30) defines the spiritual by means of the notion of "self-
possession". "Being a person, then, means the self-possession of a subject 
as such in a conscious and free relationship to the totality of itself.'' 
Here, in Foundations of Christ).an Faith, one of his most recent books, Rarmer 
prefers the term "person" to "spirit" but the meaning is identical. One could 
find similar expressions throughout his writings but I have chosen this 
precisely because it comes from that work in which he explicitly tries to sum 
up the main themes of his philosophical anthropology. 
"Self-possession" is a comprehensive term to include both self-awareness and 
self-determination, the cognitive and volitional aspects of personal life. 
Hence the deliberate duality of "conscious" and "free". Rahner always 
distinguishes these t-vm aspects as irreducible "moments" ~n the fundamental 
unity of personal existence. The use of the one, neutral term, "self-possession 
to refer to both is intended to stress precisely this unity. There is ho0ever, 
~n addition to the notion of unity, that of reference to self. The unity is 
one of self-reference. And as such is differentiated. Hence the language 
about the "relationship ... of a subject ... to ... itself 1'. A person is· 
both subject and object of his consc1.0~1sness and action. And as such is 
identically the same. Hence the term '"totality". A person ~s, at least 1.n 
principle, completely present to himself in the sense that he has to do with 
himself as a whole, in all his conscious and free acts. 
Fully to expound the meanLng of the terms of this definition would be to give 
a complete ·account of Rahner 's understanding of spirit. And that ~s not the 
way I judge it best to da it. The above explanation is intended to be only 
preliminary. There is however one further remark I would like to make at this 
stage about something else involved in the definition above. The term "self-
possession" has for Rahner the connotation of a certain sort of infiniteness. 
In the passage from which the above definition is drm-m one finds Rahner ( 1978: 2 
concerned to point out that "a finite system of individual, distinguishable 
elements cannot have the kind of relationship to itself which man has to 
himself ... A finite system cannot confront itself in its totality. From its· 
point of departure, ~hich is ultimately imposed upon it, a finite system 
recc1.ves a relationship to a definite operation, although this might consist 
in maintaining the system itself, but it does not have a relationship to its 
own point of departure." We will of course have to examine in detail the 
~neaning and import of this line of thought, Here I vmnt simply to point out 
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the connection between the ideas of self-possession and infinity. It ~s 
clearer perhaps in the realm of choice and \vill, \vhere self-possession takes 
the form of self-determination. Bringing oneself into act rather than being 
brought into action by another can be seen to imply independence of, and hence 
lack of limitation by, the causal efficacy of the other. To the extent then 
that a person is really self-actuating he transcends the finiteness of lintit-
ation by the causality of others. 
Rahner, following Aquinas, and ~n common with virtually all writers 1n the 
Thomist tradition, establishes the spirituality of persons by an examination 
of our experience of cognition and knowledge. The expression reditio completa 
subjecti 1n seipsum refers, for Aquinas, precisely to that self-reference that 
he holds to be the characteristic of all strictly intellectual life, and hence 
of what is spiritual in Rahner's use of the term. The locus classicus for 
this idea is Summa Contra Gentiles, IV, 11. So Rahner (1969:54) comments, 
''In this perfect return to itself St Thomas sees the distinctive attribute 
of the spirit in contrast to all that is sub-spiritual." Our reason for 
drawing attentton to this way of talking of the spiritual is that it is this 
express1on that Rahner uses to define strictly intellectual operations in 
his theory of knowledge. And as it is in the sphere of knm.;rledge that Rahner 
attempts to show how human spirituality manifests itself as such, it 1s to 
this that we must nm.;r turn. As we shall see the notion of reditio, return, 
has a peculiar appropriateness in the context of specifically ?uman spirituality. 
Human spirituality manifests itself ~n the sphere of knowledge in our ability 
to form universal concepts, to make objective judgements and to achieve a 
grasp of truth. These three "indications" of the "complete return to self" 
are in fact intrinsic elements of the one human knowing. In human knowing 
we always know "something" about "something" and this is expressed in the 
typical act of human cognition, the judgement. (Rahner, 1968: 122). Just as 
Rahner takes it for granted that our judgements are characterised by universality 
objectivity and the intention of truth, so he also assumes, follm.;ring Aquinas, 
that their proper object is the objects of sense experience. No innate ideas, 
no intellectual intuition; sense experience is the foundation for all human . 
' knowledge, however abstract. For this reason one can take as one's example of 
a typical judgement some such expression as, let us say, "This J_s a pig". We 
must now follow Rahner in considering the conditions of possibility for the 
making of such a judgement. 
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Any judgement is the affirmation of something as true. And as such it is 
objective, positing a real distinction between the knowing subject and what 
"really" is the case, what he judges to be true. So any judgement, because 
it involves this differentiation between subject and real object also involves 
a re.-:11 presence-to-self of the knowing subject as one who ~s over-against-the-
real-object. Hhat is it that makes this positing of truth, this objectivity 
and hence this subjectivity, possible? The clue is to be found in the other 
necessary element of a judgement, the grasping or referring of a universal 
concept in or to a particular sensibly given thing. All judgements have this 
structure, even judgements about concepts themselves. (Rahner, 1968: 121). 
The grasping of universality in the object of knowledge is what makes possible 
the objectivity of that knowledge and the differentiation of subject from 
object that we are concerned with. This is because apart from the universal 
concept in the judgement ("pig"), there is merely the reference to a particular 
"this". And Hith that reference the distinction between subject and particular 
object is achieved. Prior to grasping this distinction in the object, if one 
may speak in this way since there can in fact of course be no actual priority 
of that kind, there is no avmreness of the object as an actually existing thing. 
If thus making the distinction within the object of knowledge bet~veen \vhat is 
universal and what is particular is what makes possible the complete return of 
the subject to itself, then our task becomes that of finding out ~1at it is 
that makes this possible. 
by the following quotation: 
That it is for Rahner., and how, is made clear 
"Every objective knovJledge is always and in every case 
the reference of a universal to a "this". Hence the 
"this" appears as the reference point standing over 
against the knowing to vJhich the knower refers what is 
(universally) known by him. But then the subject with 
the content of this knowledge (the universal concept) 
already stands to some extent at a distance from the 
"this" to which he refers the content of the knowledge. 
This content of knowledge is universal precisely because 
it stands on the side of the knowing subject in its 
opposition to the "this" and therefore can be related to 
any number of "this's". Or, to put it vice versa: pre-
cisely by the fact that the subject disengages the content 
of the universal concept from the indifferentiation of 
subject and object in sensibility (which dces not at all 
have to mean a diminution of its content, because of course 
in this disengagement only a completely empty "this" has 
to remain behind), the subject att;dns to itself for the 
first time in its opposition over against the "this", it 
turns back into itself and thus for the first time has an 
object to which it can refer the knmm which is brought 
along in its return to itself and thus has become 
universal. The return of the knowing subject to himself 
and the liberation of a universal from its "subjects" is 
one and the same process. Thus the universal concept is 
actually the first indication of the opposition between 
subject and object which first makes possible an objective 
experience." (Rahner, 1968: 122) 
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In the judgement about the pig, to distinguish the universal from the 
particular is to distinguish its being a pig from its being this pig. 
In Rahner's Thomistic terminology it 1.s to distinguish the form and 
matter of the pig. Its being a pig 1.s clearly something that is in 
principle shareable, and thus universal. Even if it is a question of only 
one pig, to kno\-1 it as such is to have grasped the possibility of their ·being 
more than one. It 1.s, in Thomist termi~ology, of the essence of a pig to be 
material, and hence for its formal characteristics· to be share.able by others. 
The question He must ansHer now 1.s how can this universality be grasped 1.n 
the individual pig that is the object of our knowledge. Or, as Rahner himself 
puts it, how can He discern the "confinement", the "limitation" of the form 
by matter. The possibility of comparison is of course ruled out since that 
would already presuppose the distinction of form from matter that has to be 
explained. (Rahner, 1968: 139) 
Rahner' s ans\Jer to our question l.S that objective knowledge entails a 
"pre-apprehension" that is infinite in scope such that it is against this 
limitless "horizon11 that the form of a particular sensible thing can appear 
as limited in that thing and thus as 1n itself universal. The power capable 
of such a pre-apprehension is called by Aquinas "agent intellect". Thus: 
"He must therefore ask hm-1 the agent intellect is td 
be ~nderstood so that it can know the form as limited, 
confined, and thus as of itself embracing further 
possibilities. Obviously this is possible only if, 
antecedent to and in addition to apprehending the individual 
form, it comprehends of itself the v1hole field of these 
possibilities and thus, in the sensibly concretized form~ 
experiences the concreteness as limitation of these 
possibilities, whereby it knOV.7 S the form itself as able to 
be multiplied in this field. This transcending apprehen-
sion of further possibilities, through \-lhich the form 
possessed in a concretion in sensibility is apprehended as 
limited and so is abstracted, we call "pre-apprehension .•• " (Rahner, 1968j 1 
At first sight one might identify such a pre-apprehension with an intuition of 
space and time. After all, the only essential difference between one pig 
and another (accidental differences, such as colour and shape, apart) might be 
said to be the fact that each occupies a unique position in space and time. 
The pre-apprehension would thus be of the infinite horizon of space and time 
or, in Thomist terminology (more or less), of prime matter. But this would be 
incorrect. Space and time is necessary for the numerical distinctness of 
individuals, and for grasping that distinctness. But the ability to do this 
would only help one to grasp the universality of an individual form if one 
were able to count all individuals of that form and find them to be more 
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than one. And one ~vouldn't be able to do that unless one had already 
"abstracted" the form itself. In any case "matter" in its Thomistic sense l.S 
in itself pure possibility for form, can only be grasped as already in some 
form, and hence is useless for revealing the limitation and universality of 
form. 
Rahner calls that to which the pre-apprehension that makes objective knmvledge 
possible attains esse. We have already seen that every act of forming a universal 
concept contains a reference to a possible "this", (or, better, universal:·concepts 
exist only as moments in judgements which refer them to a "this"). In our 
knowledge the "this" is ahvays some sensibly intuited obje"ct. But it is not the 
sensibility of the object itself that grounds the possibility of forming the 
concept. If it were our question would not have ar1sen. The "this" to which 
all concepts are referred is some or 0ther esse. Let us, to avoid difficulties, 
simply think of this in terms of some or other real thing, 1n a quite normal and 
loose sense of the expression. Its necessary qualities will become apparent soon. 
To have knowledge of an individual thing it 1s necessary to grasp the principle 
that enables all the possible universals that can be predicated of it to be 
possible forms of one thing. It is a pig, it is pink, it is angry, it is in the 
field and making for the gate. It lS also material, in both the scientific and 
the Thomistic senses. What makes it one thing however is its esse. This 1s of 
course its being a pig. This is the essential form that makes all the other 
forms possible for it. And one can distinguish within it the essence and the 
esse of the pig. As essence this form lS considered as the locus of possible 
predicates of the one type of thing; it 1s what differentiates pigs from ·other 
sorts of animal or thing. As esse on the other hand the form is the principle 
of reality and unity of this particular pig. It is the principle of reality 
1n the sense that this pig's being a pig is·distinguished from its not being at 
all rather than being distinguished from its being something other th<tt a pig. 
It is distinct from matter in that being material is part of the essence of a 
pig, \vhereas being at all is not. Esse is the principle of unity of the 
particular pig in the sense that it is the one foundation of the connection of all 
possible universal predicates in a particular subject. 
universal as the predicates themselves. 
And as such it is as 
Esse is usually translated "being" in English. In Spirit in the World (1968: 
157 et seq) Rahner sticks to the Latin (in the German editions too) in order to 
preserve the essential ve.rbal character of Aquinas' term. Esse means to-be-real. 
Now the only realities are individually existing things as far as Rahner and 
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Aquinas are concerned. And such things are truly known in universal concepts and 
objective judgement. Hence the ground of the reality and the unity of a thing 
is also the ground of all possible universals that can be truly predicted of it. 
(For Rahner (1968: 168) it is only because individual things really exist that 
we can have universal concepts at all, by \vay of abstraction from what is g1.ven 
1.n sensibility). And that is \vhat is called the esse of the thing. 
Now according to Rahner it is the 11re-apprehension of esse in the individual 
sensible thing that enables one to know the universality of the forms that are 
the objects of ones judgement about that thing. \lliy should this be so? 
Because esse in itself is not limited in any way, and 1.n our pre-apprehension of 
it is grasped as such. This is how Rahner (1968: 171) puts it: 
"This unity of esse appears most clearly in the fact 
that there belongs to one ens as a single real thing 
different determinations (as-its parts, its essential 
or accidental properties) which make up a single reality 
in that they appear united in the one esse of this real 
thing. For if each of these determinations were real 
through its own reality, then there would be just as 
many real things as there are determinations, and not 
a single real thing; but it is to be a determination 
of this latter as a single thing which alone constitutes 
the essence of these determinations ...... But from this 
it follows necessarily that the one esse which bestows 
reality upon the essence and its accidents must have 
the intrinsic fr~edom and infinity to best6w reality as 
much upon one quiddity as upon another. But this 
means that in every essential judgement (e.g. the tree 
is green) a universal esse is also simultaneously 
afirmed which, as one,~-able to include in itself 
the quiddity of the subject and that of the predicate 
(being tree and being green), and to that extent is 
one and universal (that is, the being of many determin-
ations)." 
So esse is at once the ground of the unity and the universality that judgement 
grasps in a really existing thing: 
"Insofar as an existent has esse, the plurality of its 
determinations is unified into a synthesis which is 
always already realized and given prior to the affirm-
ative synthesis, that is, into a really existing essence. 
And insofar as esse is apprehended in the judgement as 
something of many quiddities, it is essentially apprehended 
as universal." (Rahner, 1968: 173) 
The universality of esse 1.s not simply the universality of any material form, 
that is the universality of repeatability in many subjects. This is clear since 
its universality is revealed within a single individual as comprising the several 
determinations of that individual. Hence Rahner (1968:175) writes that, "it is 
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universal as the unified fulness \vhich releases out of itself the essential 
determinations of an existent as those of a single thing and holds them 
together in itself." 
step -- that 
He goes on however to say - and this is the crucial 
'' ... (I)t 1s also in itself the fullness of all 
possible determinations absolutely. For in 
every judgement it is the same to-be-in-itself 
that is pre-apprehended. Insofar as all possible 
quidditative determinations are real through esse 
as to-be-real in the usual sense, in every judge-
ment the same esse is pre-apprehended, in every 
judgement a knowledge of the same esse is simul-
taneously known. But this esse manifested itself 
as the act of quidditative determinations not 
merely in the sense that they are real through it 
in some sense or other, but in the sense that esse 
is the unified ground of the determinaticns which 
produces them from itself as its own, holds them 
together in itself, and has already anticipated 
them in itself. 
But it follm·lS from this that esse 1n itself must 
be the absolute ground of all possible determin-
ations ....... " (Rahner, 1968: 1977) 
This amounts to saying that esse is not simply the ground of the reality of a 
particular thing of a certain kind so as to be the one origin of all the possible 
qualities of that thing. It is also the one origin of the different essential 
characteristics of different sorts of things. One cannot, 1n other words, 
differentiate the esse of one thing of a certain kind from the esse of another 
thing of a quite different kind. For if one could the differentiating factor, 
the essence in question would be taken to be more fundamental and as qualifying 
the ess~ by its own reality and specificity from it. Hence esse 1n all 
individuals of whatever type 1s one and the same, the source of all similarities 
as well as all differences. The essences of different sorts of things owe 
their difference to esse; in Thomistic terms "essence is a potency for esse." 
(Rahner, 1968: 160 and 178) 
The unlimitedness of esse is therefore absolute. Not only does it underlie 
the limitations of form by matter in a particular thing. It also underlies 
the limitation of particular kinds of thing to things of that kind. Each kind 
of thing is, if you like, a particular limited way of having esse. And this 
means that esse is not present 1n all its fullness 1n any kind of thing. Hence 
it never appears as the object of judgement but always only as its horizon or 
enabling ground. The pre-apprehension of ~ is not objective knowledge 
but that which makes such knowledge possible. 
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We now have a complete account of what, according to Rahner, the necessary 
conditions are for the achievement of the "complete return" of the knowing 
subject to itself in objective knowledge. The ultimate enabling foundation 
of these is the pre-apprehension of esse 1n its infinite scope. It is 
precisely this capacity of human persons that makes their self-possession 
possible: it is this therefore that makes them spiritual. We have up to now 
spelt out the conditions for spirituality in the sphere of knowledge, but our 
results can be applied in the other spheres of personal life as well and so to 
persons as a \vhole. Rahner (1968: 186) himself sums up the results of his 
investigation as follows: 
"Human knowledge as pre-apprehending is ordered to 
what is absolutely infinite, and for that reason man 
is sp1r1t. He always has this infinite oi1lv in the 
pre-apprehension, and for that reason he is finite spirit. 
Man is spirit because he finds himself situated before 
being in its totality >vhich is infinite. He is finite 
because he has this infinite only in the absolutely 
unlimited breadth of his pre-apprehension. Therefore 
he is not absolute esse himself, and in his concretizing 
thought he can neve-r re-present and objectify it because 
in such thought it cannot be represented and object-
ified in its totality, since esse in itself has no form 
distinct from itself 'vhich completely preserves the fullness 
of esse and which could be distinguished from it, and thus 
could be affirmed of it in a concret izing and affirmative 
synthesis \.Jithout limiting it." 
In Hearers of the Word Rahner deliberately applies >vhat he has demonstrated in 
the case of human knowledge in Spirit in the World also to action and freedom. 
He typically speaks of the pair knowledge/action or judgement/freedom or some 
such, as in the following, "To the extent that judgemer1t and free action are 
necessarily part of man's existence, the pre-concept of being pure and simple 
1r1 its own intrinsically proper infinitude is part of the fundamental constitution 
of human existence." (Rahner, 1969: 63) He speaks not only of a cognitive 
capacity for e~se in its infinite scope but also of a desire for it. ' In his 
last book, Foundations of Christian Faith, this ordination to esse is present 
as the foundation of every aspect of our distinctively personal life. Here, 
as has already been said, Rahner prefers not to speak of spirit or spirituality. 
We have seen how he uses the term "person" to refer to our capacity for self-
possession. He uses another term, "transcendence" and "transcendent being", to 
refer to our capacity for esse: 
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"Insofar as man is a transcendent being, he is 
confronted by himself, is responsible for himself, 
and hence is person and subject. Fo~ it is only 
in the presence of the infinity of being, as both 
revealed and concealed, that an existent is in a 
position and has a standpoint from out of Hhich he 
can assume responsibility for himself. A finite 
system as such can experience itself as finite only 
if in its origins it has its own existence by the 
fact that as this conscious subject, it comes from 
something else \vhich is not itself and which is not 
just an individual system, but is the original unity 
\vhich anticipates and is the fullness of every con-
ceivable system and of every individual and distinct 
subject." (Rahner,, 1978:34) 
3. Interpretation of Rahner 
In our treatment of Rahner's theory of knowledge we have been conc~rned merely 
to throw light on his idea of spirituality. He have therefore had to leave 
out a vital element on which the coherence of the whole account as a theory of 
knowledge depends, namely his treatment of sensibility. Some of the steps 
in his deduction of the necessity of a pre-apprehension of esse are not fully 
explicable except as against the background of this treatment. Our intention 
however has been merely to give an account of his idea of spirituality and not a 
critical account of his theory of knowledge. So far we have tried to explain 
this idea in such a way as to be true to Rahner. In the process we have had 
to speak quite a bit about knowledge, and often in our own \vords as vJell as 
Rahner's 1.n order to clarify the sense or to summarise a relatively extended 
discussion. I now propose to offer some interpretative remarks of my own 
which will, I hope, throw light not only on Rahner's understanding of spirit-
uality but also show the coherence of the notion as such. 
The importance of Rahner's theory of knowledge for his idea of spirituality rests 
firstly on the theory that human knowing entails a grasp of esse, and secondly 
that the esse so grasped is in some sense infinite. From this it necessarily 
follows that human persons have a (cognitive) capacity for infinite esse, which 
capacity is no merely passive possibility but an active tendency or orientation. 
And this, correctly understood, is the foundation for the peculiar self-possession 
held to characterise personal life. 
Hence it 1.s of the first importance to have a thorough grasp of Rahner's notion 
of esse, and, if possible, of the sort of infinity it is held to have and why 
it is necessary that it should have it. 
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The necessity of a pre-apprehension of esse ar~ses out of the needto account 
for the attributes of human knowledge that sensibility itself cannot account 
for, namely its universality, objectivity and truth. Both the notion of esse 
and that of a pre-apprehension are difficult and obscure. Apart from any 
intrinsic difficulty the I'.otions may have they derive a certain obscurity from 
their dependence on the whole Thomist approach to kno"t-1ledge which has such 
different assumptions from most contemporary approaches. Perhaps the chief of 
these is the assumption that what is known is in every case some individual 
existing thing. (We are considering our ordinary knowledge of the world rather 
than science, but the same principle applies there too.) This is true even in 
the case where the object of knowledge is a concept. 
11 Even if an attempt is made to conceive a universal 
concept by itself, it succeeds only in an affirmative 
synthesis, in a judgement. For if such a concept is 
thought "alone", then this thinking thinks something 
about it, as was said before. In this process it is 
itself conceived as something already objectified, as 
something existing in itself which thought holds before 
itself as something standing opposite, and to which as 
object (res) the kr1ower relates a knmvn intelligibility. 
Hence the universal concept is already and always 
conceived as independent from thcught as knowing, as 
existing in itself and so as definite, and thus not 
merely a synthesizing, but an affirmative synthesis 
takes place." (Rahner, 1968: 125) 
Hence it is always individuals, of whatever sort, that are knovm and not universals. 
The fact that human knmvledge is ahvays universal ~s a sign of imperfection in us, 
of the fact that we have no intellectual intuition of existing individuals but 
that our knowledge is always based on what is sensibly given. (Rahner, 1968: 137) 
This conviction that we know the existing individual rather than some general truth 
about it is one aspect of what is meant by saying that our knowledge is of the 
esse of the thing. Of course \vhat we know of the thing in question is ahvays 
general in the sense that it is grasped in a universal concept. But,this 
universality is secondary to the individual reality of the thing itself in the 
sense that it is derived from it. How \vhat really exists only as individual 
can be the true origin of what is universal is part of the problem about the 
nature of esse. Of course if what is universal is only something "in the mindJI 
then such a problem does not exist. Instead there is a problem of truth, of how 
what is 11 in the mind" is true of the thing itself. 
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If all the universal concepts that apply to a particular thing are in some 
way derived from its esse as an individually existing thing, then such ~sse 
can in no way be identified with the sheer materiality of the thing, its 
position in space and time or \vhatever, or its numerical distinctness from 
other things, since this sort of particularity is merely \vhat is opposed to 
universality as such. There 1s a sort of infinity about matter to be sure 
but it is what Rahner calls "privative" infinity. 
Another aspect of the doctrine that our knowledge attains to the esse of a 
thing 1s the Thomist confidence that we do know the real, 1n the sense that 
there 1s no "thing-in-itself" beyond what is knowable by us. If one asks, 
seeking a deeper understanding of esse, what it is to be real, then no strict 
definition can be given but only a list of all the sorts of things there are. 
"Real", or "esse", is predicated analogously of every different sort of thing. 
This being the case it is not difficult to see that the notion of esse has a 
certain sort of infinity. Just as the individual reality of a thing can't be 
expressed by a finite series of universal concepts, so too the sum of the 
different essences of different things do not exhaust the scope of the real. 
If esse is to be understood as "being real", then the notion of a pre-apprehensior 
of esse amounts to saying that in addition to and quite apart from sense 
·intuition (though only ever occurring in the context of sense-experience) \ve have 
a sense or grasp of reality or what it is to be real. To say "what it is" 
suggests a conceptual grasp but that is not ~vhat is meant. Nor does the word 
"grasp" quite get the idea of a pre-apprehension. Initially and fundementally 
there is only a question of a pure presence to or contact with or openness on 
reality. It is only in the course of cognition that this presence is raised 
to the 1 evel of a grasp, where what 1s apprehencled 1s unders too(! and ·what is 
understood is judged to be \vhat it 1s taken to be, The point of the expression, 
nevertheless, is that the terminus of our cognitive openness on the world is 
whatever is real. If that is the case then one can see how such an openness 
could be described as infinite, For although being real entails being some-
thing of a certain kind it does not entail being of this kind or that, It is 
not limited to any possible kind of being at all. This is an infinity of 
non-exclusiveness, of the Jack of that opposition that must exist between 
specific classes of finite things. Vice versa, one can from this perspective 
view each essentially different kind of thing as a particular fom or \vay of 
being real, and because particular therefore limited. A pre-apprehension of 
esse in its unlimited scope would then explain the possibility of knowing 
the limitation of every universal form grasped by our cognitive powers. 
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This last point suggests a final reflection which, although it departs from 
Rahner' s approach, is close e·nough to a generally Thomist approach and which, 
if justified, could bring the tricky notion of a pre-apprehension of infinite 
esse closer to intuition. 
To speak, as Rahner does, of the essential limitation of material things is not, 
as we have said, making a point about their materiality. Nor 1.s he only, 
so it seems to me, making the point that to be a pig is not to be a dog, and 
1.n this sense too to be limited. It 1.s also the case ·that being a pig is to 
be essentially dependent on something else for existing at all. And this 
sort of dependence for being at all is another sort of finiteness. One can 
express this in various ways. One can say that its existence is caused. 
Or that it is not self-explanatory. Being a pig doesn't sufficiently account 
for its being real. In Thomist terminology there is a real distinction betHeen 
its essence and its existence; its essence doesn't explain its existence. At 
all events if vJe can think of finiteness as dependence of this radical sort, 
dependence for existence, and if we are able to grasp the finiteness of every 
possible object of knowledge then this can only be 1.n virtue of the prior 
possession of a standard of the finite, or in this case the dependent, namely 
something infinite. The infinity in question now is that of being absolutely 
independent. It is this sort of infinity that must define the scope of our 
pre-apprehension. 1 Such a notion is clearly akin to that of the sort of 
infinity associated with the notion of self-possession which we drew attention 
to at the outset. If to know something to be real 1.s to know it to be 
dependent in the way suggested above, then this is, 1.n Rahner's terminology, 
to have a pre-apprehension of independent being. Such an expression ra1.ses 
1.n an even sharper form a question about the subjective and objective poles 
of this pre-apprehension. Hhat is this absolutely independent being? 
could equally well have asked the question: Hhat is this infinite esse? 
One 
This 
is nevertheless not our question. 
capacity for a being of that sort. 
He are interested rather in the subjective 
This is what 1.s asserted of us. Not 
merely a concept of the infinite, but an infinite openness. Or in this case 
a capacity for infinite independence. As long as one restricts the extension 
of such expressions to the cognitive sphere their full import can escape one, 
since one can always say of a cognitive capacity "Oh, but that's just an idea! 1' 
In this case however this won't do, since the capacity in question is one that 
1 For a metaphysical foundation for this line of thought see M Pontifax 
and I Trethowan, The Meaning of Existence, Longmans, 1952,(especially pp.t-40) 
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enables a contact with the real - individually existing reality - and a 
contact with the real is a real contact and so implies a real capacity on 
the part of the subject. 
This way of understanding the infinity of being and its pre-apprehension is 
one that finds support from another line of thought in Rahner. The reason 
we were led to posit an unlimited openness on the part of the knower was 
because of the view that each object of knowledge was grasped as limited, 
both 1n its materiality and its formal property. As we have seen this 
limitation cannot be interpreted simply in terms of the object in question 
having a specific nature and therefore being limited to the properties 
possible to such a nature. Its specificity, its being something of a certain 
determinate sort, can only be contrasted with an absolute lack of.form, the 
"privative'' infinity of prime matter. Although such a horizon or background 
is implied by the specificity of a material essence, and although it does have 
a certain infinity, this is not the infinity of the pre-apprehension of 
being, which must rather be seen as a fullness than a lack. 
If individual things are therefore grasped as having only limited being against 
a background of being that is absolutely unlimited, what can it mean to be 
limited or unlimited in being? The answer to this question 1s found 1n 
certain theses of Rahner's which we cannot go into in detail but must simply 
state in summary. These theses are of a piece with all his metaphysical 
thought and indeed are foundational to it; he claims moreover that they are 
thoroughly Thomistic. The first concerns the nature of being as such and 
is expressed as follows: "being signifies the being-present-to-self of" that 
which is" (Rahner, 1969; 48), "being-able-to-be-present-to-itself (is) ... 
the fundamental conception of being" (1969: 43), "being-present-to-self is 
the being of the existent" (1968: 69). The second concerns modes or "degrees" 
of beings: "the degree of "having being" manifests itself 1n the d~gree in 
which the particular thing which is, is able to turn back on itself, that is, 
1n the degree in which it is possible for it to be reflected in itself, to 
be illumined by itself and in this sense to be present to itself" (1969: 47), 
"the intensity of being of the being of an existent is determined for Thomas 
by the reditio super seipsum, the intensity of being is determined by the 
degree of possibility of being able to be present to itself." (1968: 69) 
The first thesis 1s derived from the equation of being with the knowable and 
an understanding of knowledge as "the being-present-:-to-itself of being". 
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The second follows from the common fact that the presence-to-self of 
different sorts of thing is a matter of degree. 
made definitive of the nature of the thing. 
This common fact is 
Thus we have an ans\ver to our question about the mean1.ng of 1 imitation of 
being, and one moreover that is consonant with our previous reflection. 
Limitation of being is limitation of presence to self; unlimited being is 
complete self-presence. So we have a way of speaking of infinite being and 
also of a pre-apprehension that is of infinite scope. It is a capacity, an 
orientation, a dynamism that has as its term complete self-presence. 
In following this line of thought it looks as though Rahner has attempted to 
define being, to give its essence as being-present-to-itself. This is in 
fact 110t his intention, since this "meaningr: of being underlies the essence 
of every existent thing. It is because they differ in degree of being-present-
to-self that things have different natures. For this reason "being" is not 
a univocal but an analogical notion; the degree of "having being" is the degree 
of presence-to-self and this is the foundation of an analogical attribution. 
4. Spirit and Matter 
We are attempting to clarify the notion of spirit~ality according to the 
doctrine of Karl Rahner. So far we have dealt simply with the notion itself. 
But there is further clarification to be gained by seeing it in r~lation to 
the complementary notion of "matter". And, as we shall see, to understand 
the spiritual in relation to the material will be helpful in gaining a clear 
picture of specifically human spirituality. 
Most of what Rahner has to say about spirit 1.n relation to matter is to be 
found in his book Hominisation. Here he is concerned with the evolutionary 
origin of man as a theological problem. Consequently his starting point is 
a theological one, the Church's teaching regarding both the fundamental unity 
of the human person and the real distinction of material and spiritual elements 
1.n him, Nevertheless Rahner attempts to justify in a purely philosophical 
way a view of spirit and matter that explains precisely this unity and duality. 
As far as the unity of spirit and matter is cpncerned, Rahner bases his 
account on just that doctrine of degrees of being we have already met with. 
Regarding spirit and matter he remarks on "the intrinsic ontological kinship 
in nature between them as two different levels, "densities"', greater or less 
limitations of "being"." (Rahner, 1965: 56) He goes on to point out that 
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' 'finite spirit 1s conceived as a limitation of exactly the same reality 
which confers on matter what is positive 1n it, namely, "being", and that what 
is material is nothing but a limited and as it were "solidified" spirit, 
being, act." (Ra~mer, 1965: 57) This limitation in material being is then 
described as "its lack of immanent self-possession given by transcendent 
dynamic orientation towards being as such" (Rahner, 1965: 57), which is, 
as ,.;e have seen, precisely what characterises spirit as spirit. 
Explaining the unity of spirit and matter 1n this way however seems to prevent 
the possibility of real distinction. It 1s all simply a question of degree. 
Note on the other hand that Rahner has spoken of 11\vhat is positive" in matter, 
not simply of matter as such. He is contrasting "what 1s positive" in a 
material thing with "its negative aspect and limitation by materia prima." 
(Rahner, 1965: 56) Hatter, properly speaking, is materia primA. and this 1s 
not any sort of thing at al Lbut a principle in things. It is not however 
a principle in all things, at least not in the Thomist universe, since 
wholly immaterial finite spirits are held to exist. It is not therefore 
that principle of limitation spoken of above, which distinguishes "material" 
things from spiritual. The limitation that differentiates one degree of 
being from another is a limitation of form and being, not of .matter. We 
must make a distinction therefore between materia prima, which is, among 
other things the pure possibility for there being a plurality of things of 
a common essence, and material things \vhich are things of a particular sort, 
having a determinate essence. What then is this essence? It is not enough 
to see it in terms simply of less of ,.;hat makes spirit spirit. For this 
would not explain why it was really different or why, for that matter, 
human beings, as beings that are both material and spiritual, are really 
different from angels, who are purely spiritual. Materiality is not, in 
other words, an inevitable characteristic of the being of a finite spirit, 
in the Thomist understanding of the terms, and hence its concept can't 
simply be deduced from that of finite spirit or distinguished from that of 
spirit simply by negation. 
In order properly to grasp the unity and distinction of spirit and matter 
according to Rahner, we have to derive it from the one and only experience 
where both are given 1n an equally primordial way, namely the experience of 
human cognition, As Rahner puts it, "what is really the first datum is the 
~nity of a relation between the person inquiring, in the perspective of a 
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limitless horizon of inquiry, and an object that manifests itself as 
sensibly perceived a posterior~ and is received within the horizon but 
cannot be derived from it." (Rahner, 1965: 49) In knowledge, because of 
the pre-apprehension, we are present to ourselves and so are spiritual but 
only insofar as \ve are present to some or other finite being other than our 
own (spiritual) selves. To knmv in this way, receptively rather than 
creatively or intuitively, 1s to be material. To be material is in fact to 
have an essential relation to otherness. Human materiality shows itself 1n 
knowing as sensibility and 1n general as our bodiliness. Matter exists 
in other forms of course and not only 1n beings capable of knowing. A 
material but non-sentient being only exists in relation to and dependence 
upon the other members of its species or type. Plurality is thus an 
essential note of things with a material essence. The potentialities of 
the essence are not able to be realised in any one individual of that 
essence. This is of course true of human beings since they ar~ material, 
and is perhaps especially evident 1n this case. 
More of course could be said about the matter and material beings. Not only 
is matter (materia prima) the principle of plurality in beings of the same 
type. It is also the cause of a certain lack of enduring identity, @r 
changebleness, or beings of that type. These two notes of matter manifest 
themself in an "incompleteness" in material beings, that shows itself either 
by a tendency to become more complete by becoming part of something else or 
by in fact changing into something else. We are however not really 
concerned with matter as such but with its opposite, spirit, and with matter 
only as it shows itself alongside of spirit in human life. 
From what has been said of puman knowing it can be seen that human spirituality 
is closely bound up with matter, in human life. If in human life, self-
presence is only able to be acheived by being present to another, and is 
therefore something acquired receptively in spite of being the most intimate 
act of the self, then being material makes a difference to our way of being 
spiritual. And such is certainly the doctrine of Rahner and of Thomas. 
In fact from the perspective of Thomistic philsoophy it 1s probably back to 
front to define spirituality as such and then relate it to human life. What 
in fact comes first, as has been _said above, is the irreducible unity of 
human life, and then an equally irreducible duality is discovered within it. 
This duality, we now see, is the simultaneous reference to self and to other. 
The only excuse we can give for our separate treatment of spirituality in 
this chapter is that it is spirit and not matter that is the foundation of the 
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unity of the t'vo principles. 
the form of the body". 
As 'fhomist psycholo-gy has it "the soul ~s 
The "priority" of spirit over matter ~n the constitution of human beings 
is seen in the fact that the "self 11 of the self-presence 1.s not simply the 
opposite of the "other". Self-presence, as has appeared from the prev~ous 
pages, is made possible by a positive apprehension of being and not a negative 
distinction from what is other. In human cognitive life this pre-apprehension 
of being makes possible both awareness of self and of the other. 
"Man is a finite cognitive being who is immanently 
present to himself precisely because, on the occasion 
of any particular finite being that manifests itself 
to him as he encounters it in experience, his cognition 
is intrinsically orientated and tends towards being in 
general. This "transcendence" as a mark of mind or 
spirit, that is to say this dynamic orientation of mind 
or spirit above and beyond itself towards being in 
general •.... is the very condition of the possibility 
of reflective self-awareness and of the objective discrim-
inating conceptual representation of particular objects 
experienced, and consequently of the unity of the 
t;;.;o." (Rahner, 1965: 83) 
Seeing spirituality in relation to materiality in this way ~s of great 
importance for an understanding of the spirituality of human persons. 
If human persons are both finite and also material then their spirituality, 
if indeed they have it at all, will show itself in a special ;;.;ay. 
The essential mark of the spiritual is as we have seen a cognitive and 
volitional self-possession. But as we have also seen this implies a 
cognitive and volitional openness to being as such that is infinite in scope. 
It is only against such a background that a person is present to himself and 
deals with himself at all, and hence he is bound to experience himself as 
finite. At the same time, insofar as the term of his infinite openness is 
the real enabling ground and condition of his o~~ self-possession it must be 
experienced as other than himself, at least as that from which his personal 
existence is always continually derived and to which it is always continually 
referred. Such ·finiteness and otherness is of course something different 
from the distinction and difference a person experiences between himself and 
the objects of his knowledge and action. We are talking about his relation 
to that which makes such objective knowledge and activity possible. 
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This may appear to be labouring a point, since 1n fact the only persons 
we have experience of are finite. We are however concerned to emphasize 
that our very personhood is derived 1n some sense, and ineluctably experienced 
as such. Hence our spirituality, the spirituality of finite persons, in 
addition to being self-possession is also orientation to (infinite) otherness. 
In addition to this human persons are, as has already been pointed out, 
material. And this brings with it its own orientation to otherness, the 
-
otherness of plurality. So in defining the spirituality of finite, material 
persons, one will always be required to refer both to their relation to self 
and their relation to the finite other. For instance, that a person is both 
capable of self-determination and of entering into the personal life of another 
(finite) person. And this at one and the same time and to the same extent. 
If the keynote of spirituality is self-possession, human spirituality will 
always at the same time show itself iira distinctive orientation to 1..rhat 1s 
other. It will bethe.function of our descriptions of intersubjective relations 
between persons to show this simultaneous self- and other-orientation in its 
most explicit form. 
I have more than once in the preceding pages pointed out that although 
R.ahner prefers to elaborate the notion of human spirituality in the sphere 
of cognition, he does not intend it to apply only in that sphere. In fact 
all that is said regarding cognition is meant to apply ceteris paribus to the 
sphere of appetite as 1..rell, or, to be more precise, to volition. A term like 
"self-possession" therefore must not be understood in a merely cognitive 
sense and hence interpreted exclusively as "self-awareness" or "self-knowledge;'. 
It must also be understood in the sense of "self-determination" or 
"self-affirmation". Indeed the primary reference of a term like "self-
possession" for Rahner is not to any sphere of activity of the person but 
but to his being. This is shown by the fact that self-possession is pre-
dicatedofbeings that are not capable of cognition or even of sense-knowledge, 
albeit in a lesser degree. (Rahner, 1969:49) Nevertheless, as the scholastic 
tag has it, as a thing is so does it act; a person's activity reveals his 
nature. It seems best therefore to understand the term "self-possession" 
as referring to the actual expressive activity of a person, that by virtue 
of which 1..re are entitled to call him spiritual. 
cognitive or volitional does not really matter. 
Whether the activity is 
Human cognition cannot 
take place without the will, nor can the will operate without the cognitive 
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faculties. Indeed the most comprehensive notion to designate in a 
general way the spiritual activity of a person is perhaps "action" itself, 
prescinding for the moment from the fact that in the case of human persons 
action inevitably involves physical movement. For these reasons I choose 
to use the term "self-enactment" as the defining characteristic of the 
spiritual rather than any other. In addition it avoids the notion of 
' 
completeness or perfection that lS suggested by "self-possession". As is 
perhaps already clear, and will be constantly stressed in what is to come, 
human spirituality exists initially only as a potentiality or capacity. 
Although from the start it is a capacity for self-enactment, this capacity 
is fulfilled, if at all, only be degrees. 
from incompleteness to completion. 
There is a question of growth 
I shall therefore use the term "self-enactment">'~ to mean everything that 
Rahner means by "self-possession". I must repeat that it \vill be used 
in a quite general sense indifferent to the distinct powers of the person 
and to the degree to which they have developed towards perfection. 
5. Froperties of the spiritual 
We now need to show that spirituality, as we have defined it, will entail 
immateriality in the contemporary sense, For if it didn't then there 
would be no problem of reconciling the two Vlews of persons, the materialistic 
relational-cultural view and the spiritualistic dualist natural vlew. 
Because, as we shall show, spirituality in the sense we have defined it does 
entail imn1ateriality in the contemporary sense, there is a problem as ·to 
whether human beings can be persons in this sense. Our descriptions of 
intersubjectivity are intended to show that they can, They thus in a sense 
will "take the place" of the "proofs" of immateriality that are to follow 1.n 
this section. There lS however a difference in the degree to whi~h they can 
be taken as "proofs", The Thomist proofs are all based on the nature of 
intellectual understanding and even if they are judged to be sound it can 
always be argued that human intellectual activity has been wrongly described. 
Be that as it may, we feel thar the experience of intersubjectivity is more 
accessible to most people, more all-inclusive, more typically personal than 
intellectual activity as such and for these reasons choose to expound 
spirituality in these terms rather than the traditional ones. To speak 
* For which term I am indebted to Andrew Tallon of Marquette University, 
Milwaukee 
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of self-enactment and self-transcendence and dependence on the other and 
identification with the other seems more readily comprehensible and more 
immediately revealing of the nature of the processes and beings involved 
than the language of form and matter, being and spirit. 
I propose to discuss two proofs, both based on what is regarded in Thomist 
tradition as the most typical of personal acts, (and as therefore the 
best candidate for spirituality in our sense) namely intellectual 
understanding. 
defined it. 
Each highlights one aspect of spirituality as \ve have 
5.1. Transcendence of particularity 
The first proof is that of St Thomas himself. He sets himself to prove 
that the mind is not a body nor the act of understanding the act of a 
bodily organ. His proof ~s succinct, though complex, and I give it here 
~n full, as it appears in de Anima, (Ill iv, 680-681). The reference 
to "he" is of course to Aristotle, on whose text he is commenting: 
"Anything that is in potency with respect to 
an object, and able to receive it into itself, 
is, as such, without that object; thus the pupil 
of the eye, being potential to colours and able 
to receive them, is itself colourless. But our 
intellect is so related to the objects it under-
stands that it is in potency \vith respect to them, 
and capable of being affected by them (as sense 
is related to sensible objects). Therefore it 
must itself lack all those things of which of its 
nature it understands. Since then it naturally 
understands all sensible and bodily things, it 
must be lacking in every bodily nature; just as 
the sense of sight, being able to know colour, 
lacks all colour. If sight itself had any 
particular colour, this colour would prevent it 
from seeing other colours, just as the tongue of 
a feverish man, being coated with a bitter moisture 
cannot taste anything sweet. In the same way then, 
if the intellect were restricted to any particular 
nature, this connatural restriction would prevent 
it from knowing other natures .•. 
.....• From this he concludes, not that in fact the 
nature of the intellect is 'not one', i.e. that it 
has no definite nature at all; but that its nature 
is simply to be open to all things; and that it is 
so inasmuch as it is cap ab le of knm..ring, not (1 ike 
sight or hearing) merely one particular class of 
sensible objects, nor even all sensible accidents 
and qualities (,..rhether these be common or proper 
sense-objects) but quite generally the whole of 
sensible nature. 
Therefore, just as the faculty of sight is by nature 
free from one class of sensible objects, so must the 
intellect be entirely free from all sensible 
natures·'( Thomas Aquinas, 1951) 
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To clarify my own interpretation of this argument I ~.;rill permit myself 
a short con~entary on the above text. 
Aquinas is exploiting the parallel between the operations of the senses 
and of the understanding in order to clarify the latter. He then 
distinguishes between the two. His model of sensation is that of sight 
(since he considered sight the "most spiritual" of the senses and thus the 
closest analogue to the understanding) and is made rather obscure by his 
medieval optics. The logic of the example can however be perfectly 
preserved by substituting spectacles for "the pupil of the eye". If our 
spectacles are coloured then we will not be able to discriminate all colours 
in nature. To be able to see ("to be potential") to all colours, '"e must 
wear colourless spectacles. 
Aquinas' real point regarding sense experience concerns the notion of 
sensation as such and not simply the sense of sight. The point that one 
should grasp is that a sense as such, a sense power as distinct from a 
sense organ, 1s not the sort of thing that could be coloured and that is why 
it is able to sense colour. The point is perhaps best made in connection 
with another sense, that of touch. If I touch a warm object then, with 
regard to the resulting effect of the contact, one must distinguish between 
the warming of my finger that occurs and the sensation of heat that I 
experience. Two things occur: the temperature of my finger is raised and 
I expe~ience the sensation of heat. They are clearly different since the 
object of my experience 1s not my finger but the hot kettle. If it is 
too hot I will cease to experience its heat but only the pain of a scalded 
finger. It is only because it is the sort of thing, i.e~ a physical one, 
that can have a temperature which can be changed that my finger 1s fitted 
to be an organ of touch. Hence touch itself, the actual power of sense, 
can't be the sort of thing that can be either hot or cold. In Aquinas' 
words it "is, as such, without the object", namely it is itself intangible, 
just as the sense of sight is invisible. And hence the whole sensual system 
is itself without those properties that make material things sensible and is 
thus, in a certa"in sense, immaterial. 
It is this feature of our power of sensation that makes it a fit analogue 
for the intellect in Aquinas' eyes. Having established the analogy he 
must now demonstrate the difference. The premise for this argument 1.s given 
in his assertion that the intellect "naturally understands all sensible and 
bodily things". Nor is this an extravagant claim. He is not claiming 
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comorehensive or systematic scientific knoHledge for the human mind, least 
. ------
of all as a natural endmvment. He is simply claiming that the mind ~s 
capable of correctly applying concepts to the real world of material things, 
and that as long as anything is material it can have concepts correctlY 
applied to it by our minds. 
Since it has this capacity it ~s radically different from the sense powers. 
The proper object of a sense is a particular sensible property of a thing 
(a sight or a sound or a smell) not the sensible thing as such (the greenness 
of the leaf, not the green leaf). Hence the proper object of a person's 
whole sensual system never extends beyond "all sensible accidents and 
qualities". Of course pure sensation does not exist as such in personal 
life since the normal perceptual process is not a wholly sensual affair, 
being in fact the vehicle for understanding. But if the proper object of 
the senses as such is seen in this way then the contrast with ~he proper 
object of the understanding becomes clearer. As Aquinas says, its proper 
object ~s "quite generally the whole of sensible nature". And this means 
simply that in addition to the sensible properties known by the senses, the 
understanding is capable of knowing the things that the properties are 
properties of, namely of knowing them as real. 
Taken together \·Jith the rule established in the case of sensation, that a 
cognitive power cannot have the nature of what it ~s capable of knowing, 
this yields the conclusion that the mind is not a material thing nor its 
act the act of a bodily organ. 
In the case ~f the senses, though they are free of the properties of 
material things, their act ~s nevertheless the act of a bodily organ nad 
hence they themselves are not an immaterial thing as the mind is. To 
characterise the nature of sensation in abstraction from understanding is a 
well-nigh impossible task since they are always and necessarily found 
together in human cognition. I cannot add anything to Rahner's excellent 
and exhaustive account of it in Spirit in the World (Rahner, 1968: section 2) 
and will therefore say no more about it here. 
Aquinas' proof of the immateriality of the intellect does indeed presuppose 
the view of cognition (both sense and intellectual) that we have encountered 
already in our analysis of Rahner. Cognition of whatever sort is seen as 
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a participation in the being of the thing knmvn so that some sort of real 
identity of the knm..rer and the known is set up. This is opposed to all 
vieHs of knowledge r.vhich see cognition as a merely subjective process that 
is referred to the things of the world or arranges them in previously determined 
categories of our m·m choosing, but never reaches the "thing-itself" or is 
causally affected by the receptive appropriation of its real properties. 
Hence those \..rho have radical objections to Aquinas 1 realistic view of knowledge 
will not find the above proof persuasive. 
We however, 1n this work, are not concerned to criticise Aquinas' v1ew of 
knmvledge. It is sufficient that it be made comprehensible. If this at 
least is granted then it is clear that for Aquinas the mind or principle 
of understanding is immaterial in the contemporary sense. It 1s simply 
not a body, nor is understanding the act of a bodily organ. And this 
carr1es with it the consequences that a modern v1ew of immateriality would 
expect. It is not a sensible thing; therefore in principle imperceptible. 
Before we leave Aquinas' proof of the immateriality of the intellect I want 
to draw out one consequence of it that will have relevance for the notion 
of spirituality that will emerge from our descriptions of the intersubjective 
relations of persons. 
In prov1ng that the mind is not a body nor the act of understanding the act 
of a bodily organ, Aquinas proved that the mind has a sort of universality. 
In the passage above he speaks of it as not having a "particular" nature. 
And then, lest this expression be misinterpreted to mean that, like prime 
matter, it is purely potential having "no definite nature at all", he. 
affirms that "its nature is simply to be open to all things". This then 
is the universality that Aquinas asserts of the principle of the under-
standing. To fill out the notion of universality a little more, as it 1s 
understood by the Thomist traditioh I want to refer briefly to the work of a 
contemporary English Thomist, Herbert McCabe, who is well-known for his 
writing on this topic. (McCabe, 1968 and 1969) In a forthcoming book 
on the psychology of Aquinas, McCabe develops a novel way of speaking of 
the immateriality that Aquinas affirms of both the sense powers and the 
mind. He considers the way Aquinas speaks of knowledge (both sense-knowledge 
and intellectual knowledge) as the acquiring of the forms of things without 
their matter. The crucial, and most misleading, word in this definition is 
"acquiring". There is no suggestion that sensation changes the thing sensed. 
A green leaf retains ·its greenness, even though its greenness is acquired by 
an animal's power of sight. But the animal is changed. The greenness of 
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the leaf as well as continuing to be a real property of the leaf (informing 
the matter of the leaf), is now also a property of the animal. Not that its 
eye becomes green of course. But that the greenness of the leaf becomes part 
of its visual life. And this is a real event. For the greenness of the leaf 
1s noh' able to play a part in the life of the whole animal. This "playing a 
part" must not be understood in a strictly causal fashion (at least not in the 
sense of efficient causality), but in terms of the relevance or significance the 
part (Hhat is seen) has for the whole (the animal). It could be that distinguish~ 
1ng green from brown when standing near a tree has the significance of distinguish-
1ng the edible from the inedible for the giraffe. And grasping this distinction 
might well have a causal effect on the giraffe's behaviour. 
This idea, that a sensation can be best understood as the part played by a 
particular sensible form 1n the life of an animal as a whole, is generalised by 
McCabe by speaking of it as becoming part of "a transcendent community". The 
sensible form, by being sensed, becomes part of the transcendent co~nunity of 
an animal body, and ultimately, by virtue of its deep inherited inclinations, 
of the whole species. It is this "becoming part of" that constitutes sensation, 
and this is why the power and the organ of sense cannot be described in similar 
language. The body, precisely as an animal body capable of sensation, 1.s not 
reducible to its constituent.parts taken as entities in their own right. In this 
sense it is transcendent. And 1.n this sense it transcends materiality. It 
cannot be properly described in simply physical or chemical or even physiological 
language. 
the like. 
Instead it must be described in terms of relevance, significance and 
Similarly, in the case of understanding, the sensible form, the sensation 1.s 
taken up into yet another and more strictly transcendent community, namely the 
community of language. 
"Just as the sensible form is the form existing 
intentionally in the sensual system, so the 
intelligible form is a form existing intentionally 
in the mental or linguistic system, having a role 
in that system - the linguistic system being the 
special form of communication that makes up a 
linguistic community, as the sensual system makes 
up the community of the body. Just as the impulses 
in the nerves link to gather and bind up the parts 
of the animal body, just as DNA and the genetic 
determinants link together and bind up the 
animal species, so meanings link together and 
bind up the linguistic community." (McCabe, 1981) 
(Unpublished MS, Chapter 5, p.8) 
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If bur sense-experience is understood by becoming part of, taken up into, the 
transcendent community of a natural language, then it is not difficult to see 
why such an act of understanding transcends materiality 1.n a far more radical 
way than does sensation itself. For, as we have seen, both ~n animal and an 
animal species are material things. But a language, although it is always 
embodied in material symbols is not. This is because the meanings that 
constitute a linguistic system ar~ intrinsically shareable in a way that 
sensations are not. My sensations are irreducibly my own; my thoughts are not. 
The shareability of language is vlhat constitutes its universality and hence, 
since everything material is particular, its immateriality. Now, McCabe argues, 
that insofar as human beings have a genuine linguistic ability they participate 
1.n the communication system of a natural language, the linguistic community, and 
to that extent they too transcend their o\m particularity. To the extent then 
that we are capable of intellectual understanding we share 1.n a universality 
possessed by the whole community of language-speakers. There is even a sense 
in which the universality of the linguistic system precedes and 1nakes possible 
any individual apprehension of meaning. As a human individual I only come 
actually to understand anything insofar as I make an already existing system 
of universal meanings my own. 
As we shall see such an understanding of the universality enjoyed by persons 
will fit in well with that reached by our description of intersubjectivity. 
Universality as the shareability of meanings fits in well with certain forms 
of intersubjective relations between persons. And both are well suited to 
reveal the essential spirituality of persons. 
5.2. Freedom from physical causality 
The second proof of the spirituality of persons from our exper1.ence of intellectual 
understanding has many forms. It is an argument of an essentially retortive 
kind and in modern philosophy is employed by Thomists and non-Thomists alike. 
(Boyle, 1976: Donceel, 1967; Lewis, 1947; Lonergan, 1957 and 1967; Mescall, 1957; 
Moleski, 1977; Muck, 1968) It has a distinguished history, being traceable at 
least as far back as Aristotle's argument against the skeptic in Metaphysics T.4. 
The version that I shall base my remarks on is that of C S Lev1is. It is both 
succinct and lu~idly expressed and well-knmvn to' English-speaking philosophers. 
It is printed in his book Miracles (Lewis, 1947: 23-31) but appeared originally 
as a paper given to the Oxford Socratic Society in 1947. 
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Lewis' argument is essentially an argument against any universal determinism of 
a mechanistic, physicalistic or materialistic kind. Thus in arguing that the 
strictly intellectual activity or persons escapes the universal causality of 
material things he is arguing for the immateriality of persons in the modern 
sense. 
Lewis argues that a thorough-going determinism (\vhich he calls "naturalism") is 
self-refuting. If everything that happens, human thought and action included, 
is the result of the operation of physical or at least material causes, then no 
process of thought or argument could claim to be rational or valid since it, like 
everything else, would have been produced by non-rational .causes. There would 
thus be no better grounds for believing naturalism itself to be true than a 
theory that contradicted it. The naturalist's attempt to argue for a radical 
determinism is therefore self-refuting. 
Lewis' major premise ~n this argument ~s his v~ew that "no thought is valid if 
it can be fully explained as the result of irrational causes". (Lewis, 1947: 27) 
To point the truth of this he contrasts two different ways in which a person 
could hold the same belief, one rational the other not. "(1) 'He thinks that dog 
dangerous because he has often seen it muzzled and he has noticed that messengers 
always try to avoid going to that house.' (2) 'He thinks d1at dog dangerous because 
it is black and ever since he was bitten by a black dog in childhood he has 
always been afraid of black dogs ... "' (Lewis, 1947: 26) Both sentences explain 
why the person holds the belief but the first justifies the belief whereas the 
second invalidates it. Lewis thinks that whenever we discover a belief to have 
been produced by irrational causes we assume it to be false. Even determinists, 
he holds, such as Marxists or Freudians for instance, apply such a rule to the 
beliefs of others, dismissing them as bourgeois ideology or wish fulfilment, but 
make exceptions in the case of their own theories. 
Precisely in what sense the naturalist is involved in a "self-contradiction" we 
shall have to see. But Lewis' case against him depends on the rule set out 
above. Apart from its general acceptance Lewis justifies the rule by means of 
a Humean theory of knowledge which I suspect he imagines would be shared by most 
determinists of the type he is concernet to refute. 
"It is clear that everything we know, beyond 
our own immediate sensations, is inferred 
from those sensations. . ... All possible 
knowledge, then, depends on the validity of 
reasoning. If the feeling of certainty 
which we express by words like must be and 
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therefore and since is a real perception 
of hm.;r things outside our minds really 
'must be', well and good. But if this 
certainty is merely a feeling in our minds 
and not an insight into realities beyond 
them - if it merely represents the way 
our minds happen to work - then ~..re can 
have no knowledge. Unless human reasoning 
is valid no sc1ence can be true." (Lewis, 1947: 26) 
This being the case, one really ought to accept (1) above and reject (2) s1nce 
"in the first instance the man's belief is caused by something rational (by 
argument from observed facts) \vhile in the other it is caused by something 
irrational (association of ideas)." (Lewis, 1947: 27) 
We can now sum up this argument as follows: No thought 1s valid if it can be fully 
explained as the result of irrational ca.uses; we do in fact think validly; hence 
irrational causes are not the only causes that there are and determinism is false. 
It can be seen that there are really two arguments here, a negative rebuttal of 
determinism and a positive argument for the freedom of rational activity from 
universal materialist determinism. We must nm.;r try and formulate what it is 
that forms the foundation for Lewis' confidence that determinism is positively 
VJrong, rather than spend time examining the form of argument that appears to show 
that it cannot be formulated without self-contradiction. 
The exper1ence on which Lewis bases his argument lS our experience of rationality 
in thought and action. In rational thought and action we believe or do some-
thing for a reason. We might not actually advert to the ground of our belief 
or the rationale of our action at the time, but if questioned we could supply 
it. Hhat is always true hm..rever is that if our belief or action is to be a 
rational one, one of the causes of our coming to believe or deciding to act 
in this way must have been our actually seizing upon some or other belief that we 
already happen to have (\vhether a belief about a fact or a desire) as standing 
in a specific logical relation to the belief that we. have now come to hold or the 
action that we have now chosen to perform. We must. actually see that the one 
belief 1s a reason for believing the other or for performing the act. Thus one 
among the many causes of a rational belief or act must be the actual grasping 
of a logical connection between two different mental contents or states of affairs. 
Consider Lewis' example of the black dog. To have a reason for his belief that 
the dog is dangerous the person concerned must have actually noticed, for 
instance, that it was muzzled and that messengers avoided the house. Nor is that 
enough. He must hold that the one belief (that the dog is dangerous) 1s true 
because the other (that it is muzzled) is. So we are talking about real events: 
him noticing that the dog is always muzzled and his believing (beginning to believe 
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and continuing to do so) that it ~s dangerous. And the first is the cause of 
the second in the sense that he would not have begun to believe that the dog 
\vas dangerous if he hadn't noticed that it Has muzzled. The t\vO actual occurr-
ences are really linked but not ~n the sort of causal sequence that Lewis wishes 
to &void, that is a mechanistic one. They are linked by a person who is 
capable of appreciating the logical relation of ground to consequent, that 1s 
to say, 1s capable of reasoning. 
Notice that the above exper1ence of rationality as a certain kind of causality 
does not depend on our being right about the logical links between different 
beliefs. One can with good reason come to believe something altogether false. 
One can simply be logically confused. Still the mere search for such a link 
is a testimony to our rationality, and thought or action that proceeds from the 
affirmation of such a link is to that extent caused by something other than 
material causality. 
It would thus appear that there 1s another kind of causality than a deterministic 
one, that of rational agents. If L~wis is right about this then both determinism 
is mistaken and the determinist who attempts to give reasons for his beliefs is 
self-refuting. Rational agents are thus free from a complete determinism of 
materialistic kind, and thus to that extent immaterial. 
Lewis does not specify the sort of determinism he holds rational agents to be 
free from very closely. I wish to say something as to how I think his argument 
can be interpreted. He ~s, ~n the chapter of the book that contains the above 
argument, trying to discredit a vie\v of the universe as an ultimately homogeneous 
mechanical system. TNhether the happenings in such a universe are random or 
lawlike does not in the end matter. As long as the nature of the basic 
entities that compose the universe and the relations between them are such as 
to exclude the sort of causality I have tried to depict above, the causality of 
rational agents, this view of the universe will be both untenable and false. 
Whether we call such entities and processes material, mechanist or physical 
does not really matter. What we are speaking about are the sort of entities 
and processes postulated by the natural sciences. And Lewis wants to assert 
the existence of entities and processes that no special science could contain 
within its scope. In his assertion of the special causality of rational agents 
he is opposing all reductionism of our distinctively intellectual activity to 
even the human sciences. 
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It might appear from such radical anti-reductionism that Lewis is committed to 
a very sharp form of dualism indeed. I dv not myself feel that this ~s 
necessarily so. Only if physical laws are seen in grossly realistic terms, 
as providing a complete description or explanation of a machine-like universe, 
would the existence of another type of causality altogether imply a break in 
the system. If physical laws are seen rather as one sort of order discovered 
and verified ~n things and between things, then room is left for other sorts of 
order as well. Human persons can then be seen as things to which physical and 
other laws can both apply, the laws of logic included. 
If Lewis' argument ~swell founded then it appears that rational agents are as 
such free from the laws that govern material things and hence transcend the 
possibility of scientific explanation. They are thus immaterial in the modern 
sense. 
This freedom from determinism enjoyed by rational agents can be seen in a way 
that connects it closely with the way we have defined the spirituality of 
persons. To show how this is so we have to return to Lewis' account of our 
exper~ence of rationality on Hhich his whole theory ~s based. As we saw, ~n 
any case of rational belief or action - let us speak simply of rational judge-
ment to cover both the realm of theory and of practice, judgement of fact or 
value - the cause of our making a judgement was a previous judgement coupled 
with the grasping of the logical link between it and the one we are consider-
ing. Nmv, whatever caused the first judgement the fact that our making it is 
the cause of our making the second rules out the possibility of any other causal 
factor in the process. The only link between the t\-JO judgements is a logical 
one (usually I suppose some orothervariant of the law of non-contradiction) and 
not anything that could compete with the causal influence on me of my first 
judgement. In irrational judgements it is precisely something other than a 
judgement of mine that causes the new judgement to be made. Hence it appears 
that in the exercise of rational judgement I am genuinely self-enacting. One 
judgement of mine causes another by virtue of my habitual (?),natural (?), 
grasp of the principle of non-contradiction. As long, therefore, as my 
judgement continues to be rational there can be no interference from "outside" 
the causal chain of judgements (or, depending on the context, of beliefs and 
choices). The sequence of judgements and that of physical causes remain 
forever distinct. So the person who is free from all physical determinism 
because of his rationality, can by that very fact be seen to be self-enacting 
in the positive sense that one of his acts is the sole cause of another. 
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There is a sense 1.n f.ilhich the notion of causality is applied metaphorically 
when speaking of the "causality" of rationality. When speaking of determin-
istic causality of a physical or mechanistic kind one is using the term 
"causality" to refer to the connections and regularities discoverable by one or 
other of the special sc1.ences. And in the case of the rational acts of rational 
agents there are simply no such connections or regularities that sc1.ence could 
in principle discover. When we use the term causality of the acts of rational 
agents we use it in a metaphysical sense taken from Aristotle. And in this 
sense the distinction between the causality of rationality and that studied by 
the sciences is quite clear. Science is interested in what would be named 1.n 
an Aristotelian metaphysics as effi~ient causality, where~s the causality of 
of rationality is forrnal causality. The difference can be grasped by reflecting 
that in the case of the causality of rationality the "cause" and the "effect" 
are both ,; interior" to the same thing, namely the person himself. And one 
can't properly speak of a person causing himself to act, in the sense of 
efficient causality. In what sense the "cause" and "effect" are "interior" to 
the person appears from the following consideration: it is in virtue of its 
content, that is its meaning, that a judgement can serve as the ground for a 
consequent judgement. There must be a logical connection between the contents 
of the judgements that form the premises and the judgement that forms the 
conclusion of a theoretical or practical syllogism for the resulting belief or 
choice to be a rational one. It is clear that the contents of judgements, or 
meanings, cannot act as efficient causes. To say that they are the formal 
cause of the rational act l.S really to say that they enter into the correct 
description of the nature of the act. And this is to say that an adequate 
description of the nature of rational action, and hence of a rational agent, 
must include reference to the meaning of his acts. In rational action there-
fore meaning is really present as part of the nature of the act; an agent is one 
\vho acts in terms of meanings. To say this is to do away with the absolute 
Humean divide between ideas and things, of logic and nature. It is instead to 
introduce a new distinction, that between persons and non-persons. togic and 
meaning are simply an abstraction from specifically personal reality, just as 
scientific causality is an abstraction from non-personal reality. The laws of 
logic abstractly describe the rational behaviour of persons, the transcendental 
method implicit in their enquiry after truth and goodness; meanings are elements 
of the acts that constitute such enquiry, the acts of judgement by which truth 
and goodness is affirmed. And just as meanings, considered in their logical 
function, are relative to a whole language, so as elements in acts of a person 
they are parts of a whole system that is both autonomous and simple, in that it 
is constituted by a reference to itself. It is autonomous in that no amount of 
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discoverable scientific laws can completely account for its behaviour but 
instead circumscribe an area in which it generates its own laws, the laws of 
rational thought and action. It is simple in the sense that in this area it 
deals as a \·lhole with its "Y!hole self, it is both subject and object of its 
acts. 
\fuether or not such a v1ew of persons is a legitimate deduction from the 
conclusions established by Le\vis' argument \ve cannot at present argue further. 
It is enough as far as demonstrating the imn1ateriality of persons is concerned 
to show as Lewis has done that they are free of scientific determinism. That 
this implies that they are self-enacting in our sense is a further matter. 
I have indicated briefly \vhy I think it does. I will conclude this section 
by making one observation that I hope will counteract t~e feeling that if I am 
right about the radical difference between persons and non-persons then I have 
established a dualism as radical as Descartes'. 
The observation is this: lfuat we have had to say about the autonomy and 
simplicity of persons as self-enacting beings applies to persons as such and 
distinguishes them from non-persons. We are however concerned with human 
persons, namely with persons whose spirituality requires bodliness to realise 
itself and whose intellectual life depends on sensibility. Human persons 
compr1se aspects that are strictly personal and others that are not but instead 
are of a piece with the rest of nature. Nevertheless there is not an absolute 
discontinuity between aspects. And the principle of continuity 1s the personal 
principle. This can quite easily be seen in the terms in which we have discussed 
causality above. The logical lm.;rs Hhich explain the rational behaviour of 
persons are the basis for the methods of all the sciences that would give a 
causal account of the world of non-persons. Thus the world of non-persons and 
persons must not be seen as two separate realms. The world of non-persons in 
particular must always be seen in relation to persons, as that \vhich makes the 
. 
personal life of finite persons possible and provides a medium for meeting of a 
plurality of persons. There is a sense however in which the world of persons 
includes the non-personal world as an element within it, As Aristotle said: 
"man is in a way all things by sense and intellect". (de Anima 10, 728) The 
impersonal 1s included in the personal in the sense of being less real than it, 
of having, 1n Rahner's sense of the term, less density of being, less of a 
permanent identity, less enduring individuality. 
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6. CoA.cluding Remarks 
We have now reached the end of our discussion of spirituality. We have 
followed Rahner in defining it in terms of self-enactment, but seen too tbat ~n 
the case of human persons a certain self-transcendence is also involved. The 
basis for both these aspects of spirituality is the orientation of finite persons 
towards being in its infinite scope. 
We have seen too that spirituality defined in this way also implies inmaterial-
ity in the modern sense. Spiritual beings are not bodily in any way nor are 
their actions determined by the causality discovered by the special sciences. 
In the first case they are seen to be possessed of a certain universality which 
~s opposed to theparticularity of matter; in the second they appear to be self-
enacting in a way that is opposed to the dependence on the causal efficacy of 
other thi_ngs which is characteristic of material objects in the world. 
As a result of these conclusions it appears that there is a problem about how 
we can reconcile the two notions of person we have isolated. If persons are 
self-enacting how can they depend essentially on others for the development of 
these powers of self-enactment? If persons are universal how can they be related 
to other persons as one particular to another? These problems are those of course 
that arise out of the idea of a hum~ person, that human beings can be persons in 
the sense in which we have defined them. 
We must accordingly now embark on the attempt to describe the fundamental forms 
of intersubjective relations between human persons. As has already been said, 
the description will proceed in three stages. The first stage concerns the 
basic minimum of reciprocity that must exist if persons are to exercise 
personal powers at all. The second concerns the sort of relationships between 
persons that must obtain if these powers are to develop towards fulfilment or 
perfection. Finally there is the interpersonal situation that is implied as 
the end of the process, the complete development of a person's specifically 
personal powers. 
In adopting this threefold division of the subject I an indebted to the work of 
the little-known Scottish philosopher, John Macmurray. Because he is so 
little kno\vn I did not mention his name in my brief overview of the philosophers 
of intersubjectivity. He is not even a Thomist either. Yet of all recently-
writing philosophers (he is no longer writing), no-one has tackled the topic 
more directly or systematically than he. (Macmurray, 1957, 1959) 
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His interest in the interdependence of persons grows out of a recognition of 
~~~hat he calls "the crisis of the personal" in contemporary Western society. 
It is a cultural crisis manifesting itself chiefly in the increase in political 
totalitarianism of all sort and a decline in the influence of religion. It has 
hm.;ever a philosophical "shadow" in the absence of an adequate theory of the 
human person. Opposing but equally inadequate theories underlie both the 
individualism and the collectivi-sm of contemporary culture. Macmurray smv the 
task of philosophy in our time, and indeed of his own philosophy, to discover 
and forinulate "the form of the personal", a theory that would grasp what. was 
distinctive of personal reality but see it in a unified theory of reality as a 
whole. (Hacmurray, 1957: i1-38) 
Hhether Macmurray \<Tas as much as a p~oneer as he imagined himself to be, 
vlhether, that is to say, much of the \vork had not already been done, ~s some-
thing one could dispute. One of the most interesting things· about his work 
is the way it parallels (in a way most unusual in philosophers writing in 
English) the work of European existential philosophers and phenomenologists, 
though with hardly any detailed reference to them at all. Nevertheless it is 
precisely the originating, progra~~atic character of Macmurray's work that I 
have found most helpful. If, in the last resort, he doesn't provide an adequate 
theory himself, he does give a very comprehensive and penetrating picture of 
what such a theory should include. 
in what follows. 
My indebtedness to him in this will appear 
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CHAPTER THREE. INTERSUBJECTIVITY I THE EXERCISE OF PERSONAL POHERS 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the intersubjective conditions 
necessary for the exercise of our distinctively personal powers so as to reveal 
the spiritual nature of persons. 
As has been said \•le intend to give threP- such descriptions, to cover all 
aspects of the intersubjective relations of persons. It was the work of 
Macmurray that led me to tackle our task 1n this way and hence it is with an 
account and critique of his theory of persons in relation that the chapter 
will begin. Our critique of Macmurray culminates in a critique of his Ulethod 
and this leads us to present our own method in broad outline, as it is to be 
employed in all three chapters on intersubjectivity. 
We then turn to our description of the exerc1se of personal powers. At the 
outset we are obliged to identify them·and do so in a preliminary way as those 
powers that enable us to be agents in the strict sense. Our analysis of 
agency stresses the self-referring nature of these powers, of which there are 
only two, self-consciousness and self-de::ermination. 
Our description of the first form of intersubjectivity, which then follows, 
is based on Macmurray's mother-child model. We take into account however 
the critical remarks we felt bound to direct at his version of the model. 
Our description is followed by a critical discussion of problems arising out 
of it in \.Jhich we refer to the work of other authors on the topic of inter-
subjectivity~ The chapter concludes with a section relating the descrip-
tion of the necessary intersubjective conditions for the exercise of our 
personal powers to our notion of spirituality as self-enactment. 
2. J Macmurray: persons in relation 
If it is true that persons depend on other persons to exercise, develop and 
perfect those pm11ers that make them persons then it is in the relations 
between persons that one would expect those powers, and hence the nature of 
persons, to be most fully revealed. John Macmurray is one who is certainly 
committed to the first view. It is in fact the major theme of his Gifford 
lectures of 1953-4, "The Form of the Personal", a series that represents the 
culmination of his philosophical work. In it he attempts "to show how the 
personal relation of persons is constitutive of personal existence; that 
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there can be no man until there are at least two men in communication . " 
(Nacmurray, 1959: 12) Put even more strongly, "Persons, therefore, are 
constituted by their mutual relation to one another." (1959: 24) In 
Nacmurray's view this truth about persons is a consequence'of his other theme 
in the lectures that it is the capacity for agency in a special strong sense of 
the term that makes one a person. For the purposes of this study it 1s 
extremely instructive to see the manner 1n which he tries to sho-v; the connect-
ion between agency and intersubjectivity. 
Since, according to Macmurray, the capacity for agency can only be realised 1n 
a process of social interaction, his examination of. it takes the form of a 
genetic account of hm..:r it develops towards perfection. This account centres 
naturally on the beginning and the end of this development, considering in the 
first case the relationship between a mother and a baby, and in the second 
a special mutual relation between two adults ' . ..:rhich he names "community". 
Macmurray begins his genetic account by pointing out the significant cliff-
erences between the human child and an animal offspring. The immediate 
striking thing about the child is its helplessness. This is a result of its 
almost total lack of instincts (defined by Nacmurray as 'a specific adaptation 
to environment which does not require to be learnt.' (1959: 48) Another 
difference is the environment itself. The environment of the child is a 
personal and artificial and not a natural one; it consists of the mother and 
the home. And this means that for the child "its existence and development 
depends from the beginning on rational activities, upon thought and action.'' 
(1959: 50) This thought and action is not its mm, of course, but tha.t of 
the mother. It is the intention of the Other (here the mother) that supports 
the existence of Self (the child). The personal attributes must be present. 
In this case they are simply distributed over two individuals. 
Nevertheless if the child does not have intentions it does at least have 
motives. It appears to feel comfort and discomfort. As Macmurray puts it, 
the child has "an original feeling consciousness, -v1ith a discrimination between 
positive and negative phases." (1959: 57) The way in which this consciousness 
develops and the actual form it takes depends of course on the mother, whose 
intentions determine the whole pattern and character of its comforts and 
discomforts. Its mother feeds it regularly and at times witholds its food 
although it desires it. It is 1n such an environment ordered by a pattern of 
restrictions and re-vmrds that the child is able to develop intentions of its 
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mvn and the germ of a sense of right and wro:1g, good and bad. Yet these 
last developments would not occur were it not for something else 1n its make-
up that marks the crucial differencebetween it and an animal. 
Signs of this crucially distinguishing characteristic are to be seen very 
early on in the child's behaviour. Both animals and children are not only 
capable of feeling discomfort but also of expressing it. Their cries have 
an obviously pragmatic value which reinforces the tendency to signal distress. 
With regard to the feeling of comfort, hmvever, Macmurray discerns a differ-
ence. Children, in contradistinction to animals, are voluble in their 
expression of satisfaction. And such express1ons of satisfaction at being 
nursed, cared for or caressed, even at the mere physical presence of the 
mother, seem to have no practical value. They seem to be expressions of 
satisfaction simply at the relation with the mother itself, Macmurray feels 
that this is evidence that the infant "has a need which is not simply bio-
logical but personal, a need to be in tou~h with the mother, and in constant 
perceptual relation with her," (1959: 49) and again, "His essential natural 
endowment is the impulse to communicate with another human being." (1959: 51) 
This conclusion is reinforced by the character of the child's play. The play 
of both animal and child appears to have as its object the acquisition and the 
sheer enjoyment of skills. The skills acquired by the child, however, are not 
ones that have any immediate usefulness. It remains at the mercy of its 
environment. It is Macmurray's op1n1on that, v1hereas an animal's skills are 
learnt to enable it to do things for itself, a child's are learnt to enable 
it to communicate 1vi th others. 
Thus the relationship between mother and child exhibits a two-fold structure. 
On the one hand there is the complete helplessness of the child, on the other 
the "impulse to communicate" that makes the resources of its personal environ-
ment open to it. Macmurray speaks of this as a case of a positive including 
its own negative; the negative being the child's consc1ousness of need and the 
positive being the satisfaction in the presence of the mother. Genetically 
the negative 1S prior, yet the positive is more fundamental in that it goes 
beyond the mere satisfaction of need to take delight 1n the mother herself. 
The relationship lS enjoyed for its own sake and not simply as the means to 
the satisfaction of other needs. Some of the gestures and sounds of the 
child's seem to have what Macrnurray calls a symbolic character. They are 
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symbolic in that they are not signals but simply expressions of affection 
through which the child communicates to the mother its "delight in the 
relationship, and they represent, for its own sake, aconsciousness of 
communicating." (PR 63) It is this consciousness of communicating and the 
symbolic gestures that express it that Macmurray considers to be the true 
foundation of language. 
There is no question as yet of the child being an agent in the proper sense. 
For that self-consciousness is necessary and it has not yet been acquired. 
The original form of objective consciousness is .that of the Other. Initially, 
of course, the impulse to co~nunicate is an unconscious one. The alternation 
between states of satisfaction and disgust, together with its helplessness, 
frustration and delight, soon give rise in the child to a consciousness of the 
Other as that which responds to its cry. This is the first case of something 
being present to it that is not simply a feeling of its mm. Tl:ms the 
consc1ousness of the Other is primary and positive; insofar as consc1ousness 
of self begins to emerge it does so as a negative contained 1n the positive 
knowledge of the Other. 
"The first knowledge, then, is knmvledge of the 
personal Other .•. and since knowledge is primarily 
'of the Other', the 'I do' now appears as the 
negative which falls within the knowledge of the 
Other as agent, and is necessary to it. In the 
actual situation in which ,.,e all begin our 
individual existence - in the mother-child 
relation - our own agency is negative. It 1s 
the Other who does everything for us,, \vho is the 
Agent upon \vhose action \ve are totally dependent, 
and within whose activity, supporting and limiting 
us, our own action is progressively achieved." ( 1959: 77) 
How then does self-consciousness arise? If the basic form of knowledge is 
the knowledge of persons and persons are primarily agents, it is in the 
active movements between mother and child that we should expect it to first 
show itself. As Hacmurray depicts it, it does, and in the form of a 
conflict imposed on the relation by the educative intention of the mother. 
"If the child is to grow up, he must learn, stage 
by stage, to do for himself what has up to that 
time been done for him by the mother. But at all 
the crucial points, at least, the decision rests 
with the mother, and therefore it must take the 
form of a deliberate refusal on her part to continue 
to show the child those expressions of her care for 
him that he expects." (1959: 89) 
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In such a situation the child is thrown back on itself and its own resources. 
Its activity becomes egocentric. Even t..rhen it has learnt to do what it 
must for itself, it feels excluded from the mother's love. Its primary 
impulse to communicate is thwarted and threatened and there 1s nothing it can 
do to restore the apparently ruptured relationship. What has been removed 
from it by the mother (apparently) - her care for the child - can only be 
restored by her m·m act. In spite of having acquired a new skill as a 
result the child is confronted by a task which no effort of its own can 
cop2 with. 
Because self-consciousness arises 1n such a situation it 1s bound up with 
anxiety, and hence the existence of the emerging individ~al is a problematic 
one. The distinction between positive and negative states, (and hence too 
of a basic form of the distinction between right and wrong. good and bad) is 
now experienced 1n direct reference to the Other. The positive state would 
be a union of wills made possible by the will of the mother. Opposed to 
that are two negative states, both egocentric, one of desperate attempts to 
dominate, the other of fearful efforts to seduce, the mother. They have 
this in common, that they appear to deny dependence on the relation with the 
mother, while at the same time of course requiring it. The negative states 
are basically self-contradictory and, because they involve a clash of wills 
with an illusory idea of the (by definition) fully mature and loving mother, 
prevent the realisation of the child's intentions and a full freedom of 
action. So, though it has acquired self-consciousness, the child at this 
stage of its development is not yet an agent in the full sense of the term. 
To become such a rurther development of the relation between persons is 
required, a development that issues 1n the state of positive maturity called 
by Macmurray 'community'. The characteristics of 'community', though 
described in relation to the usual political and religious experience of 
persons, are in fact deduced by Macmurray from his notion of agency. 1bere 
are three, One must be in a conscious intentional relation with another 
agent. One must share a unity of intention with him. Such an intention 
must be positive. Only when these conditions are met 1s the activity of 
a person really f~ee and he an agent in the strict sense. We must now see 
briefly how Macmurray argues such a case. 
With regard to the first condition he points out that any movement requires 
the resistance or support of the other as a necessary condition for its 
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actuality. For action proper this resistance or support must be that of 
another agent. His chief reason for holding this is the necessity of action's 
containing the element of choice. He imagines first of all the situation of 
a solitary agent in a purely material envit·onment, called by him "the 
continuant". 
"The resistance of the continuant is a negative 
resistance, and the support it provides is a 
negative support. It provides for the poss-
ibility of movement but not of action. For 
though the resistance limits the possibilities 
for the agent it still provides no grounds for 
discriminating between the possibilities which 
remain open." (1957: 144) 
Even if the agent is placed in an organic environment the result ~s the same. 
"If we then grant the agent an organic environ-
ment, something more than movement becomes 
possible, and this something more we call 
behaviour. Nature 1..rill provide stimuli to 
which he can respond. But action is still 
impossible. For at most the-knowledge of 
Nature will reveal a plurality of possible 
activities, some easier, some more difficult, 
some pleasurable, some painful. But this 
still provides no ground of discrimination. 
At most the agent could "follow the line of 
least resistance", and this excludes the 
determination of an objective." (1957: 144) 
In an organic as in a n1aterial environment the nature of the Other determines 
the character of the agent's act. Unless the Other is a person the resist-
ance to the Agent is not that of a consclous intention. Hence there is 
nothing he can either be 'for' or 'against'. 
he chooses. 
What is right is simply vJhat 
But this is not all. There is also a sense ~n which action ~s only properly 
action when it realizes an intention. "To act ~s to realize intention with 
the help of the Other.'' (1959: 118) One can have an intention without 
. 
acting, but an action is always expressive of an intention. If one doesn't 
share the intention of the Other, he will be no help to my action, It cannot 
therefore be performed as I intend. That is to say, I cannot realize my 
intention; what happens is probably the intention of neither. Thus the 
condition for the realization of intention is that the self and other must 
share intentions. Macmurray (1959: 118) argues as follows: 
"Now if the world is a continuum of action, 
and there are in it a number of agents; and 
if action is the determination of the future, 
the condition for action is a unity of intentions, 
and actions of the different agents must be 
unified in one action. For the future of the 
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~vorld cannot be determined in incompatable 
ways. If it could be, the world would 
become, as it were, a plurality of 
incompatible worlds." 
This argument builds on the notion of the world as one action (in the sense 
of the resultant of a sort of parallelogram of forces made up of the sum 
of personal acts) and implies that in a struggle of wills action proper 
ceases because (as we saw in the earlier model) the intention 1s negative 
and based on an illusion. "In a struggle of wills action 1s negative, as 
we have seen. The intention of each party is dictated by the other, and 
neit;her determines the common future." (1959: 118) It can be seen that the 
inability to determine the future in accordance with my intention is an 
interference with my freedom as an agent. And as my determination of the 
future is also my self-determination it appears true to say that what 
happens is no act of mine. I do not exist as a freely acting person. 
So, if free action depends on the ability to realise intention then a 
necessary condition for action is a unity of intention between self and 
other. Thus the necessary condition for any intention to be enacted by the 
agent is that he intends a unity of intention with the Other. Because all 
his action is with the other he must either act for or against the other, 
positively or negatively. If his attempts to realise his intentions are 
not to be self-contradictory he must intend, as a general condition of his 
particular intentions, to be united in intention with the other. Such an 
intention is, what Macmurray calls a positive intention and it is the found-
ation of community. 
The notion of a positive intention 1s as such purely formal; it could be 
defined simply as the intention to bring about a form of co1nmunity) of 
personal relation, in which a real unity of intention exists between members. 
But it goes without saying that the character of that unity of intention 
cannot be just anything at all. It is in fact already prefigured by the 
original motivation structure given in the relationship between mother and 
child, and in the exigencies of personal development that flow from it. 
There is an original "impulse" to communicate, the sole human "instinct'" if 
you like. The object of this 1s a simple "being with" the other. Because 
of the problematic nature of personal development, this turns out to be 
either a "being for" or a "being against" the other. Of these two modes it 
is the "being for" that is the most fundamental, and it is the nature of 
this "for" that we will have to determine more exactly. It is the ground 
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of ~.Jhat Macmurray calls (1959: 111) "certain interests which are universal and 
necessary because they belong to the structure of personal experience.'' 
Originally, in the case of the child, a distinction was made between need 
for the help of the other and need for the other itself. This is a need for 
a quality of relation with the other that can only be achieved or acquired if 
it is given by the other. The child needs something \vhich it l.S unable to 
acqu1re for itself not, in this case, because of inadequate power but 
because '>vhat is needed can only exist through the gift of the other. 
Macmurray speaks of the child having to rely on the "grace" of the mother. 
Now in the case of the relation between mature persons, insofar as they 
have become free agents in the strict sense all such need is overcome. 
The same structure nevertheless remains. Because there is no longer any 
"child" in the relation there is no longer any need to "be given to". 
There remains however a "need" to give. This is the final and mature form 
taken by the original impulse to commtmicate "positively" tvi th the other. 
The notion of a need to give is so paradoxical that perhaps it would be 
better to speak of a desire to give. Macmurray (1959:150) 1.n fact prefers 
to speak of a "need to care for one another". This must of course be seen 
1n a properly personal way, as a mature form of personal relation and not, 
for instance, as the desccription of an immature psychological compulsion. 
It must be remembered that this is a description of the final form taken by 
an original impulse or instinct that is distinctive of human beings, and 
the source of their properly personal character. 
The community vlhich is the necessary and sufficient condition for action 1n 
the full sense of the term consists of two persons in fully reciprocal and 
( 
positive relationship to one another. That which makes each person an agent 
in the full sense is the same factor that makes the relationship fully 
positive - a totally heterocentric attitude onthe part of each. Each lives 
\vholly for the other, making the other's will the ultimate condition of his 
own. ·Be cause of this complete mutality there is perfect freedom, both in 
the sense that there 1s no constraint between the two, and in the sense that 
there is no division in the will of either. Macrnurray notes that this free-
dom is conditional .on the inclusiveness and universality of the heterocentric 
regard. In the model there are only two; potentially however all persons 
in the universe are included in the self-forgetful will of each. Let me 
conclude this all too sketchy account of Macmurray's analysis of the second 
condition of action by quoting his own description of the community model. 
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"If, then, we isolate one pair, as the unit 
of personal connnunity, we can dist.:over the 
basic structure of conununity as such. The 
relation between them is positively motived 
in each. Each, then, is heterocentric; the 
centre of interest and attention is in the 
other, not in himself. For each, therefore, 
it is the other who is important, not him-
self. The other is the centre of value. 
For himself he has no value in himself, but 
only for the other; consequently he cares 
for himself only for the sake of the other. 
But this is mutual; the other cares for him 
disinterestedly in return. Each, that ~s 
to say, acts, and therefore thinks and 
feels for the other and not for himself. 
But because the positive motive contains 
and subordinates its negative, their unity 
is no fusion of selves, neither is it a 
functional unity of differences- neither 
an organic nor a mechanical u~ity - it ~s 
a unity of persons. Each remains a 
distinct individual; the other remains 
really other. Each realises himself ~n 
and through the other." (1959: 158) 
3. A critique of Nacrnurray 
Macmurray's account of how personal agency is bound up with personal relation 
is persuasive and, it seems to me, at times profound. But it produces an 
unexpectedly large crop of problems and paradoxes when taken literally. 
Perhaps this is because "The Form of the Personal" is a largely programm-
atic work, content to present the broad lines,Qf a theory to be filled in 
later in detail. It is also partly due to its epigrannnatic, lecturing 
style. 
method. 
The difficulties I have with it concern both its message and its 
As to the former, Hacmurray's whole conception of agency and its necessary 
conditions is obscure, and the use of the terms 'person' and 'personal' that 
is bound up with it is ambiguous to say the least. 
Hi~ general position that the agent's act requires the resistance and 
support of an Other, or environment, in order to take place is unexception-
able. But it is difficult to see why this Other should be a person. We 
have seen that Macrnurray connects this condition to the possibility of 
choice, but I find this explanation unsatisfying. It is probably true 
that a person who had been brought up in complete isolation from others 
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could not be regarded as completely responsible for his actions and there-
fore as able to exercise deliberate chcice. But that may be mere matter 
of fact. Macmurray does not do enough to connect choice conceptually with 
relation to a personal other. Or does he? Let us try to interpret ,.,rhat 
he says in the most sympathetic '..ray to see whether a coherent argument 
emerges. 
lve can paraphrase Macmurray' s argument ~n the following way. Action 
involves two elements: energy or effort and resistance or support, an 
element that is initiating and another that is receptive. In the case of 
animal behaviour the relationship between organism and environment is such 
that the environment ~s not a 'resistance' to the 'initiation' of behaviour: 
it makes it possible by 'supporting' it. The same applies to human action: 
there is a distinction of two elements in the unity of the act. These can 
be called in the broadest sense 'self', and 'other'. But it must not be 
thought that the action 'belongs' to the self in a special way, Both self 
and other are equally necessary for action, are essential elements in the 
actual occurrence and process of the act, and are only recognised as distinct 
by subsequent reflection. 
"The resistance of the Other is not merely a 
negation of the act of the Self, it ~s 
necessary to the possibility of the act, and 
so constitutive of it." (1957:110) 
Thus, to give a purely formal description of action (or behaviour or move-
ment), it is a unity containing and constituted by two opposing elements 
called by Macmurray, quite abstractly at first, positive and negative. 
In the case of action, the movement is consciously intended. Thus both 
elements that make up the act must have this character. (\-Jhether one is 
considering simple movement, animal behaviour or human action, the distinguish~ 
ing characteristic that defines each specific stage applies to both elements 
in it.) In other words both effort and resistance are constituted by a 
conscious intention. So Macrourray (1957: 145) concludes, "The possibility 
of action depends upon the Other being also agent, and so upon a plurality 
of agents in one field of action. The resistance to the Self through which 
the Self can exist as agent must be the resistance of another Self." 
The principle consistently applied in this argument is that the Other is 
primary and positive. Its character determines that of the Self. This 
follows from Macmurray's whole conception of the self as Agent and not 
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Subject. As a lmower the self ~s indeed a subject but simply as such it 
does not actually exist. Even knowledge must be seen in terms of the act 
of an agent if it is to be anything more than a mere idea. This is why 
action is primary and positive and knowledge (especially self-knowledge) a 
secondary and negative element within it that distinguishes action proper 
from mere movement or behaviour. Hence if we distinguish, within the unity 
of an action, Self and Other the role of b1.ower must fall to self and tha_t 
of movement to Other. And just as knowledge considered in abstraction from 
actual movement in the world does not exist, so too the Self apart from all 
relation to the Other. 
One appreciates that Macmurray is trying to get away from the notion of the 
self as an absolute being distinct from and opposed to the material world. 
And he is probably right in thinking that this:usually happens when the self 
is seen primarily as subject of knowledge or consciousness, sinco. then it is 
easier to attribute properties that are strictly only logical to an actually 
existing person. But he is surely wrong to relativise the self to the 
extent or in the way ~n >vhich he does. Who after all performs the act, 
the Self or the Other. It simply won't do to make the relation between 
them the real agent. If Self and Other are both persons, then they are both 
agents. Macmurray often speaks as though the relation between persons had 
a higher ontological status than the persons themselves. Whatever the nature 
of persons that could not be the case. Perhaps this last remark is not 
quite true. If the term 'person' is taken to refer simply to a purely 
'cultural' entity that comes into being through the active relations of 
purely material beings, and if it were believed that human persons were in 
fact simply such beings of culture, epiphenomena of material processes, then 
such a position would be coherent. But Macmurray manifestly does not 
believe this, since he criticises Aristotle (mistakenly in my opinion) for 
holding that human offspring were only potential - and therefore not real -
persons. 
endowment. 
He, on the other hand, wishes to see personhood as a natural 
Although Macmurray believes that a human being is a person from the start 
and not just an animal (the impulse to communicate is the strongest evidence 
for this), the child is by no means an agent in the strong sense. Indeed 
it could appear that this strong sense is so very strong that no-one ~s. 
Macmurray (1957: 87) has this to say about the concept of action: 
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"As an ideal limit of personal being, it/ 
is the concept of an unlimited rational 
being, in which all the capacities of the 
Self are in full and unrestricted employ-
ment. As limited and finite persons, 
such a fullness of positive being lies 
beyond our range. This does not affect 
the concept, but only its application to 
the particular case. The limitation 
marks the fact that we are never fully 
active, without restriction or qualification, 
in our experience as agents." 
If this is so, then what is the empirical basis for the concept? Hhat is 
there to assure us that agency is a real possibility if it is never realised? 
Perhaps it would be better, some might say, to cut our conceptual coat 
according to our empirical cloth and use another notion of action, a humbler 
one closer to that of animal behaviour. 
On the other hand Nacmurray has his descriptions of personal development to 
offer and they are persuasive. I would go further. They are conclusive 
in demonstrating our reliance on the support and indeed the initiative of 
other persons in the development of our specifically personal character-
istics. They do not, however, succeed as a justification of v1hat Macmurray 
considers such characterists to be. If freedom is an essential attribute 
of action, how is it derived from a dependence on the agency of another? 
And is it even coherent to see freedom, freedom of choice that is, not 
freedom from constraint, as something that can be present in degrees, that 
can develop and increase? 
It could be said that Macmurray does not intend his descriptions as justi-
fications of his notion of persons as agents. Exactly how we are to regard 
his account of the development of persons in relation to others we shall 
presently enquire. It is true, however, that he does not intend it precisely 
as proof of our existence as agents. For he regards such a proof as both 
unnecessary and impossible and explicitly says as much: 
"Hust we not raise a prior iquestion, 'How 
do we know that the self is agent?' Clearly, 
if this ques.tion is logically prior, then the 
primacy of the practical cannot be maintained. 
But the question only seems to be a prior 
question from the standpoint of the Self as 
subject. The ans\.;er is simply that if, when 
acting, we did not know that we were acting 
we would not be acting. If any occurrence 
is an act---of mine, I must knm.;r that I perform 
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it. This, indeed, is the meaning of the 
statement that action, in distinction from 
thought, is an inclusive concept. To do, 
and to know that I do, are two aspects of 
one and the same experience. This know-
ledge is absolute and necessary-.--It is 
not, however, knowledge of an object but 
>·lhat ,,.re may call 'knO\vledge in action'." (1957: 90) 
Our agency has for Macmurray rather the status of a practical cogito. Its 
indubitability cannot be proved but only defended by some form of retortion. 
These remarks on Hacmurray's theory of intersubjectivity and its relation 
to human nature should not be taken to imply that I find little value in 
it. Indeed it is because I consider his programme vJell conceived that I 
am especially sensitive to the \vay he outlines for fulfilling it. Further-
more, I believe that persons are agents in the strong sense of the term and 
also that the capacity for such ageucy is one that is developed and perfected 
in intimate dependence on others. Hacmurray's intuition that personal free-
dom increases in direct rather than inverse proportion to a certain sort of 
dependence on other persons ~s the crucial clue to a correct idea of what 
it is to be a person and to the role relations with others have in the life 
of human persons. Yet his account of intersubjectivity is definitely 
confused. The confusion stems, so it seems to me, from the lack of an 
adequate metaphysics for persons. To be precise, he lacks the necessary 
concept of the spirituality of persons. 
This lack will be more clearly revealed in the descriptions to follow. We 
must preface these with a note on method, and will outline our own ~n 
relation to that employed by Hacmurray. 
4. An Excursus on Method 
Macmurray's method in describing the personal development of a chil~ in 
relation to its mother could, I suppose, be called scientific in a broad 
sense. It aims at the statement of general truths about human persons 
based on the observation and interpretation of their behaviour. The 
material for his observations is clearly provided by experimentation that 
is scientific in the narrow or strict sense. The work of Piaget (1929) on 
child development or of Koehler (1925) on the mentality of apes suggests 
itself. Certainly Hacmurray does not appear to have experimented .on his 
own account. Nor does he refer in detail, as for instance Herleau-Ponty 
(1964) or Charles Taylo~ (1964) do, to the experiments of others. As a 
consequence there is a certain ambiguity about the status of his descriptions 
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and the conclusio~s he draws from them. His description of the helpless-
ness of a human child is based on an observation so general as to be 
irrefutable. Yet his account of the difference bet~.;een human and animal 
play, though persuasive, is by no means unquestionable. Hence the con-
clusions he draws from this compar~son, conclusions that strongly support 
his whole argument, that the function of play for the human child is to 
build up skills of communication with others, can't really be accepted on 
scientific grounds. Even less acceptable on such grounds ~s his "impulse 
to conununicate", the innate capacity he regards as definitive of all personal 
beings and which he introduces as an explanatory principle of the whole 
process of human development. If however one considers an expression such 
as 'the rhythm of withdrawal and return' which is crucial to Macmurray' s account 
of the acquisition by a person of self-consciousness one can I think discern 
a bivalence that will help us to form a judgmen-t on his method. If the 
expression is taken in a scientific sense then the implication is both that 
the child acquires its sense of identity in a negative or hostile response 
to the mother and that this identity is reinforced by repetition. On the 
other hand if the expression is taken as the formulation of a necessary 
aspect of the relation between the mother and the child that must obtain if 
the latter, though originally not a person ~n the full sense is to become 
one through the agency of the mother, then no such theory of repetitive 
conditioning is involved nor is the conclusion of some essential negativity 
in the relation supported. Clearly Macmurray interprets this expression ~n 
the first way. Re need not have done so however. Indeed with a few 
exceptions that are too specific, the whole of his description of the 
development of the child in relation to the mother could be taken as an 
analytic or conceptual account of features that are logically necessary if 
a potential agent is to become an actual one through the agency of another. 
In his other description, that of community, Macmurray appears to do just 
that. The notion of community is deduced as the set of conditions necessary 
for the possibility of agency, agency itself having been defined in a wholly 
a priori way as an indubitable feature of our experience. A reference to 
experience is included however, in the case of community, by his application 
of the notion to morality, society and religion. It remains true however 
that it is applied as an explanatory concept in these areas of human life; 
it is in no sense derived from them. 
Our judgment then is that Macmurray oscillates between two types of description 
of personal relationships, one that is scientific in character and another that 
a priori and logically deduced. The first is not truly scientific; the second 
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is not sufficiently closely related to the fundamental features of human 
experience. Nevertheless his attempt in both perceptive in an intuitive 
and imaginative way and also instructive as regarrls a more appropriate method 
for the task. Both logical and empirical elements are required though related 
in a different way from that of Macmurray. In this chapter I shall attempt 
essentially the same description as he did but in what I regard as a more 
appropriate because more philosophical way. Before \ve leave Macmurray I must 
add that there are signs, and fairly frequent ones, that his intentions were 
more truly philosophical than his execution. 
description of the mother and child, that 
He says, for instance, of the 
"The genetic account, "tvhich we have offered, 
therefore differs in no way from an analytic 
account of mature experience, so far as its 
formal conclusion is concerned. We have 
simply looked for the form of the personal 
in the earliest stage of personal existence 
because it is. then at its simplest and least 
complicated~ and therefore most easy to 
discern ... " (1959: 107) 
It is precisely this "analytic account of mature experience" that 1.s our goal 
and Hacmurray's attempt to provide it is extremely useful for the guidance 
that it: gives. 
Macmurray repeatedly points out that as the nature of agency or the personal 
only reveals itself in a process of development, it is not enough simply to 
analyse the notion of a complete or fully-formed person. One must also 
concern oneself with the necessary conditions for the realisation of capacities 
which, though strictly personal, are as yet undeveloped, Because vle a1:e 
interested both in the nature of persons and in the phenomenon of inter-
subjectivity we will have to use two sets of concepts, those that define 
persons in distinction from all other sorts of things and those that naturally 
describe the participants in the most fundamental forms of intersubjective 
relationships. Examples of the first are those such as 'agent' (to use 
Macmurray's own favourite), 'spiritual', 'person', 'infinite', 'self-enacting', 
'self-conscious', 'self-determining'. Examples of the second are those such 
as 'communion', 'identification', 'reciprocity' and 'consent'. If there is 
a real connection petween persons and the intersubjectivity then these two 
sets of terms ought to illuminate one another. 
The notion of a personal power (or capacity, inclination or intendency) we 
shall be using is in our usage directly related to the Thomist notion of 
potentiality or potence. As such it is intrinsically linked to the notion 
of nature, the nature of a thing being simply the sum of its essential powers. 
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Such a usa~e is not however confined to the Thomist thought world. It ~s, 
for instance, the same ~n essential respects as the view of R Barn~ (1975, 1976). 
Thus it in no way implies the existence of mysterious "forces" that are 
inacessible to scientific investigation, but rather a conception of natural 
entities and their scientific understanding that is directly contrary to the 
IJumean view of substance anci caus<1lity _and our knowledge of the world. 
Scientific laws are not merely the formulation of statistical regularities 
that have been observed and are associated with objects discriminated by our 
interests, but the recognition of a structure that is responsible for those 
regularities and which is independent of our interest. 
A writer such as Shatter (1976) insists on a distinction between personal and 
natural powers that we cannot accept. For him "human beings have no personal 
pm.;ers at birth at all.' 1 (Shatter, 1976: 40) They must acquire them ~n a 
process of social interaction that he en'Jisages in terms not unlike our own 
description of the mother-child relation. His reason for insisting on the 
distinction ~s precisely because he has grasped the essentially self-referential 
nature of personal activity, and recognises that "Clearly, at first, a child 
does not exist in the world as an autonomous, self-directing, self-actualizing 
and self-transforming agency, but he can become one." (Shatter, 1976: 29) 
We would add to this that he becomes one not by "acquiring" (Shatter's preferred 
word) but by developing his personal powers. It could be the case that the 
disagreement between myself and Shatter is merely verbal, that, whereas for him 
the notion of having a pmver implies an ability to use it, for me it need 
not but instead refer simply to a difference of (inherited) nature. _I think 
that this is probably the case since in rejecting Harre's definition of human 
beings as beings possessing "the power to control their performance in accord-
ance with rules " (Shatter, 1976: 26), he proposes instead that "we characterise 
human beings by the fact that they possess a natural power to construct or 
create in interaction with other human beings a personal power to control their 
performances in accordance with rules." (Shatter, 1976: 26) The difference 
between "a natural power ~o ... create ... a personal power" and a personal 
power that is part of our nature seems slight indeed. I can't help feeling 
however that Shatter thinks of personal powers more as cultural products 
than as natural characteristics of human beings, whereas I want to say that 
though competence ~n their exercise is a cultural product their possession is 
a natural fact. To claim this is however to claim something unusual, because 
of the self-referring character of personal powers. That the self can 
exist before it has an acquired "content", merely as the empty but real open-
ness. for such a content, is something that many would deny. To grant the 
reality of such an indeterminate natural power is in fact to grant the 
spiritual nature of persons. 
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Because personal characteristics, though present as capacities, are not 
actually revealed in acts from the start, we shall begin our analysis with 
a consideration of the conditionsof possibility for their development. We 
shall focus our description on the relation between two persons, one of whom 
we shall call 111!\Qther" and the other of whom \ve shall call "child 11 • This 
relations hip is intended as an abstract model of a purely "potential'' person 
in relation to a fully "actual" one, yet our descriptions are intended to have 
reference to the actual exp~rience of personal activity though only to those 
activities that are unavoidable if one is a person in any sense of the word. 
Thus there ~s a standard of "realism" implied, though it is not that of the 
scientific study of child behaviour, it is rather that of an imaginative 
reflection on his own experience by a mature adult. To isolate a pair of 
persons from the rest of human society is not realistic in the scientific 
sense of the term. But it ~s essential if one is to discern with any real 
insight what is required, from whomsoever or however many, for personal 
capacities to ·be realised in human life. 
The "mother" thus stands for the personal milieu of persons, the "child" for 
the natural possibility of personal existence. And it would seem to be a 
fact in th'e most obvious meaning of the word that persons cannot realise 
their distinctively personal characteristics ~n a wholly impersonal environ-
ment. Suzanne Langer's account of "wild children" and the attempts to teach 
them the human use of language confirm the prima facie plausibility of this 
thesis. (Langer, 1942: 103-143) On the other hand, the Kelloggs' experiment 
of bringing an ape up from birth with their own baby shows that it is not 
simply communication with persons at a crucial ("lalling") stage of infancy 
that is sufficient to introduce the child to language proper. (Kellogg, 1933) 
The little chimp for all its precociousness and in spite of its far greater 
practical intelligence never learnt to speak. Thus a natural capacity is 
necessary as well as a personal environment. In looking for the fundamental 
features of a person we shall of course have to deal exclusively with human 
persons. But that does not entail that non-humans such as animals, Martians, 
angels or even computers are not persons. Once we have decided what 
qualities distinctively personal relations reveal (and we do presuppose that 
human beings at least possess them) we will be in a position to assess the 
personal status of other sorts of things. 
5~ The nature of agency 
As has been suggested by Macmurray's analysis and confirmed by the cases of 
wild children, human children do require the presence of other persons if 
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they are to develop their distincively personal powers towards maturity. 
'Vlhat precise] y these powers are it is part of our purpose to specify in this 
\vork. For the present let us take the notion of agency suggested by Macmurray 
(though not committing ourselves to his understanding of it) as the defining 
characteristic of a person, and see what is necessary for a child to become 
an agent in at least the common sense of the term. 
By calling a person an agent one does not mean merely that he is capable of 
movement or of behaviour. To act implies at least that one is aware of 
oneself as the cause of certain happenings ~n the world. Thus it involves 
self-consciousness of a practical as well as a theoretical sort. By practical 
self-consciousness I mean that one is conscious of having power, or alternatively 
(since in the way 1n which I am using the term it amounts to the same thing), 
of being a cause. By theoretical self-consciousness I mean .simply one's 
consciousness of existing as a real being distinct from others. Contem-
porary writers in the Thomist tradition usually recognise the self-referring 
character of personal agency. (Donceel, 1967; Coreth, 1973; Lonergan, 1972) 
Bernard Lonergan, for instance, who distinguishes four levels or degrees of 
consciousness in human subjects, makes it quite clear that at the fourth 
level, which is that of choice and action, we have to do with ourselves, what-
ever the actual object of our choice or act may be. "On all four levels, we 
are aware of ourselves but, as we mount from level to level, it is a fuller 
self of which we are aware and the awareness itself is different." Thus the 
final level (distinguished from the empirical, the intellectual and the 
rational level) is the responsible level "on which we are concerned with 
ourselves, our mvn operations, our goals, and so deliberate about possible 
courses of action, evaluate them, decide, and carry out our decisions:" 
(Lonergan, 1972: 9) 
To bring out this self-referring character of personal agency we can take as 
an example of an agent a person singing a song. The singer is a cause because 
the existence of the song depends on her own. Various elements are involved 
in this dependence. She knows she is singing the song. She wants to sing 
the song. Her wapting to sing the song is a necessary "cause " of its being 
sung. And in addition she wants her wanting to sing the song to be a "cause" 
of its bein~ sung. Wanting to sing the song and knowing that she is singing 
it are unproblematic. The third condition is perhaps less so. All it means 
however is that if the existence of the song did not depend ~n any way on her 
wanting to sing it, then the singing could not be seen as an action of hers. 
Nor must this dependence be merely a fact; she must want it as well as the 
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mere existence of the song. Perhaps this distinction is difficult to grasp 
in the case of singing a song. Consider instead the case of a mountain 
climber \vho \vishes to extricate his partner on the rope from a fissure \-lhere 
he has stuck. In the course of his attempts to dislodge his partner he 
loses his footing and falls, thus jerking the rope and successfully dislodging 
his partner. As the partner came out of the fissure his falling friend would 
not be unaware that he was the caus.e of setting him free. He would certainly 
want him to be free. But in this case his wanting to free his friend was not 
a cause of freeing him since his fall was a mistake. And in comparing his 
former attitude with his present the falling climber would be able to see that 
in addition to wanting to free his friend he also wanted his wanting this to 
play a "causal" part in setting him frEe. 
The reason that I have put all reference to causality in inverted commas 1n 
the above paragraph, is because it 3eems to suggest that the wanting and the 
singing, or the saving, are two distince events that are causally linked. 
This is of course untrue. They are instead two distinct elements in an 
all-embracing unity whose character will be further explored in this study. 
They are of course not merely logical elements; they could be called distinct 
acts to establish their reality, but this must not be taken to mean that they 
are "little" actions \vithin the principal action \,Te are concerned \vith. 
have no existence except as parts of a whole. 
They 
The concept of actioncertainly does include that of being a cause, as appears 
from our example. In addition however are the two elements of knowledge and 
v.1hat I have called "wanting". The first wanting is simply wishing or desiring 
and is directed towards the object of the act. The second is what I have 
called "consent" and is directed not at the object but at the subject of the 
action. It has two degrees, the first being the consent to the wanting 
what the action achieves, the second the consent to the action and its 
achievement being partially caused by the very wanting itself. This self-
directed affective act corresponds ~n the realm of the affections to the 
self-knowledge that is the inevitable concomitant of a judgement of fact and 
thus an inevitable ingredient in any action. 
One could say in fact that the distinction between the two types of wanting 
is that between wishing and willing. However one wants to put it the crucial 
point is that the second type is referred to the self and not to the object of 
v 
the act as its primary term. And so in addition to the realisation of events 
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1n the \vorld an action modifies the agent. And this not only in the obvious 
sense that it involves perceptions, judgements of fact and value, wishes and 
movements, all of which are of course new events in the history of the agent. 
The more important way in which an agent is affected by his action is that it 
involves a m1n1mum of self-knowledge of oneself as a single distinct being 
having causal power, and a m:tn:tmum of self-determination, both :tn that one's 
own mere ,.;rish has a causal role in the action and also because :tn one's consent 
to what one judges and ,.;rishes one actually concerns oneself with oneself in 
a direct and total vmy and so affirms, appropriates and enacts what one has 
become. The first meaning of "self-determination" is that it is the subject 
(and not some other) that is the cause of the event, the second is that in 
addition to causing something :tn the world to happen the subject deals with 
and so enacts himself, 
The self-knowledge involved, though minimal, is also certainly real and 
objective. It must of necessity include an awareness of what one desires, 
\vhat one intends to do to realise the desire, and one's consent. And all this 
:ts referred, however implicitly, to oneself and constitutes a concrete notion 
of oneself. If, after the act, one was questioned one could tell the truth 
about oneself under each of these heads. 
Self- consc1ousness and self-determination thus represent two degrees of 
self-possession in the performance of any act. So all action is self-refer-
ential, and it is this that we shall take as its distinctively personal 
character, 
6. The Mother-child model 
Clearly a human child is not consc:tous :tn either a theoretical or practical 
sense from the start. We must now·try to see what is necessary for it to 
become conscious in both. Clearly from the start it is both conscious and 
a cause. To say that it is conscious is to point to a certain effect that 
its environment has on it. There is experience. In addition to the world 
of things there is also experience. If one \vants a word to characterise 
the simplest type of consciousness Macmurray's "feeling" seems a natural 
choice, particularly as "feeling" can refer both to the experience of being 
touched or affected by one's environment (I feel the warmth of the sun) and 
to one's response to one's environment (I feel desire). One's sensations as 
well as one's emotions can be called feelings. And the ambiguity of the 
term preserves the fact that at this stage there is no distinction felt between 
subject and object within experience. Consciousness also always has a subject 
in the sense that it is always somebody's consciousness but it need not have 
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this subject as a distinct object, '"hether vague or specific. Certainly 
at the start it should no·t be seen as containing a vague sense of self which 
then becomes stronger and clearer. This could never be verified by direct 
experience and it is difficult to see how it could even be inferred. In its 
simplest form consciousness should rather be seen as the capacity a person has 
for experience, a real "psychological" capacity for presence rather than mere 
occurrence. At the start, or in itself (if one wishes to forget the model), 
it is wholly non·-specific and hence able to be specified by '"hatever can occur. 
At the same time it is a particular capacity of this particular person. 
What must occur for this consc~ousness to become self-conscious ~n the sense 
entailed by agency? The answer to this question is that the child must be 
present to another person. The reason given by Karl Rahner for this necessity 
is that only another person ~s sufficiently "other" for the distinction between 
self and other to appear as an object for consciotisness. Mere things can 
always be simply subsumed into the domain of the self as elements in its self-
constituting activity. Their otherness ~s the mere passive otherness of 
space and time, their simple physical existence; the otherness of persons 
however is the otherness of autonomy and originality, a real opposition of 
intention and effort to our own. According to Rahner (1969: 138) 
" ..... it is only in that (man) always already 
enters into the concretely determined other of 
materia and experiences its determination (forma) 
as his otm reality, that he is truly "'vith the 
other" in his own existingness (without this 
being again, simply, the pure negativity of his 
being-with-himself). This concrete otherness, 
precisely because ii is always executed as one's 
own determination from the basis (forma) of one's 
own being (motus as actus moti), can only be 
experienced as the one not in our hands, as the 
"truly" other, when it (this otherness) is under-
stood as coming from a free other basis (forma non 
mere materialis, sed subSIStens). This in turn 
again implies, from another point of view, the 
transcendental deduction of a plurality of the eo-
world of free persons as regards man." 
Without metaphor, the self of self-consciousness can only be found vlhere 
consciousness discovers all its objects - in its environment. Now the 
only place where a trace of it could be found is, not in things since they 
are limited to being simply what they are, but in another consciousness. 
Before we clarify this it is as well to note that the "self" in question 
is no purely logical entity. We are not investigating the dawn of the 
realisation that consciousness as such implies the distinction between 
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subject and object. '"e are instead considering the origin of a person's 
knowledge that he is a separately existing real being. We are in other 
words talking about a real item of knowledge (although it need not be explicit) 
rather than a purely logical condition for all knowledge. The self-consciousness 
that is a necessary requirement for action in the common sense of the term ~s a 
real though very general item of knowledge. If it were not so the agent 
could not be held responsible for his acts; it would be as though they all 
proceeded from an uinvincible ignorance 11 of a peculiarly radical sort. 
Having given a preliminary account of the nature of the self that is to be 
found let us now attempt to clarify the process by which it is found. He have 
said that the essential condition is the presence of another person, in this 
case the person of the mother. This by itself however is not enough. The 
acquisition of self-consciousness is not a consequence of discovering in one's 
environment a different sort of being, i.e. a person, then discove~ing that 
they are self-conscious and finally coming to the realisation that one is the 
same sort of being that they are and therefore self-conscious too. That would 
be an entirely fanciful supposition. It would moreover presuppose sophisticated 
cognitive activity \vhich is only possible once self-consciousness has been 
achieved. The sufficient condition for the real acquisition of self-consciousness 
is that one is oneself present to the person 1vho is present to one. There are 
two aspects to this presence. First there ~s the personal presence of the 
mother as such and then there is the existence of the child 1n the conscious-
ness of the mother. ny becoming present to the mother who is present to it 
it becomes present to itself; it disL:over:s itself as the object of the mother 
activity. As such it is not yet fully aware of itself as a person or agent. 
But the first step has been taken, a step that is of a piece with all that 1s 
to follow. Each element of full personal self-consciousness has to be 
acquired from the consciousness its mother has of it, since it ~s not actually 
present as such in any other place, least of all in its own as yet unactual-
ised capacities. 
It is for this reason that we cannot accept John Heron's suggestion, ~n his 
otherwise wholly admirable study "The Phenomenology of Socian Encounter: the 
Gaze 11 , that in an interpersonal encounter a person 11retains his own sense of 
identity by virtue of his external perception of the body of the other and of 
his inaccessibly private kinesthetic sensations of his mvn body. 11 (Heron, 1970:253) 
This suggestion is in fact out of line with the rest of the article which offers 
strong support for the view that strictly personal self-awareness is gained 
only from the mutuality of personal relation. We shall return to Heron's 
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discussion of this when we have completed our mm description. For the moment 
it see~s enough to point out the lack of continuity between the "kinesthetic 
sensations" r~ferred to and one's sense of being precisely an agent. Kines-
thetic sensations are certainly ah;rays an aspect of an action, yet by themselves 
they simply declare the existence of movement or behaviour, not action proper. 
Furthermore 'tvhen Heron adds that they are sensations of one's own body, he in 
fact presupposes what has to be shmvn, viz. that one ~s consc~ous of having an 
o'tvn body, which implies of course that one is conscious of oneself. Against 
all this his study supplies ample foundation for the sense of identity in the 
intersubjective relation itself, in the experience of the "directed gaze". 
In experiencing -the gaze of the other, one experiences oneself as the object at 
which it is directed. 
We no~J have to enquire as to the necessary conditions for the child to become 
aware of himself as an agent in the co~~on sense of the term. In order to do 
this we shall describe a transaction between the child and the mother. It 
must be remembered that this is not a pseudo-scientific account of child 
development, and that the elements that we shall distinguish as parts of a 
process are in fact simultaneous aspects of the common experience of being an 
agent, seen ~n relation to their necessary conditions. 
In the mother-child model the child must be seen as a representation of the 
pure natural capacity for being an agent; it is a wh~lly helpless and needy 
being. The mother on the other hand is a representation of a fully developed 
person. As will become clear in the course of this study there can be a 
great deal more to such a notion than is commonly suspected. For the time 
being let us be content to envisage the mother as a mature person in a quite 
indeterminate sense of the word. The requirements of niaturity in a stricter 
sense will very soon become apparent. 
If the child has needs then either they can be met or not. The child is 
conscious. His consciousness is thus either of lack or fulfilment, pain 
(in a very general sense) or satisfaction. In the case of a simple physical 
need we can see that the child's lack is of three things: of something other 
than the child (say, food), of a state or condition of itself (being well-fed), 
and of power to get the first to satisfy the second. When the child's need 
is met by the mother consciousness of lack is replaced by consciousness of 
fulfilment. This changed state of the child is brought about by the activity 
of the mother so even if the child is conscious of the process of change there 
is nothing in that to counter his own sense of impotence. How far children 
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actually do have a sense of impotence with respect to meeting their physical 
needs, and therefore a source of dissatisfaction in addition to the physical 
needs themselves, 1s of course a question beyond the competence of a philosophical 
study. 
At this stage one might perhaps say that the child 1s conscious of activity 
\vithout an owner. Insofar as an agent is present at all in the fulfilling 
act it is certainly not the child, since his impotence, and whatever conscious-
ness he has of it, remains. To the mother how·ever the child 1s not simply a 
being of physical needs that requires her care but a person, 1n the sense at 
least of one who has personal· capacities. Her re~ognition of it as a person 
is the foundation of another sort of activity in its regard: she values it, 
and this fact too finds expression in her acts. Thus one can make a primary 
distinction in the mother's attitude to the child: it is both the object of 
her care and of her value. This distinction is not founded on two radically 
distinct types of needs, physical and personal. To see it in that way would 
be to put the cart before the horse and would involve an unnecessary duali"Sm. 
The one child has many needs, but the child itself can be seen in t"~;vO ways: 
as an object of care or an object of value. The same acts answ·ering the same 
needs can and do express two different motives stemming from two different 
attitudes. The acts that express the mother's recognition and consent to the 
child's value can be the same acts that answer its physical needs. But the 
single act has now a double function, to meet the need and to express the value. 
If w~ consider a limiting case, and refuse to postulate in an a pr1or1 way a 
distinction between physical and personal needs, a machine (or a wolf) could 
care for the child and meet its needs. The mother does that of course but 
at the same time does what no machine could do. She has a belief in the 
existence of personal capacities in the child and for that reason is able to 
value it. 
I have used the term "value" to distinguish the mother's'attitude to the child 
as a person rather than simply a being of needs. It is a very general term 
and one needs to specify it a little more in order to account for the special 
role it plays in the development of the child. By "care" I mean to indicate 
simply an activity that is directed towards the meeting of needs; the term says 
nothing of the motive of the activity. 
her child for in~olation on the altar. 
The caring mother could be preparing 
Or simply ministering to her own 
self-esteem. "Value" on the other hand refers primarily to the motive. The 
child itself is seen as valuable irrespective of any relation it might have to 
the mother and her own desires and intentions. Accordingly the caring acts 
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performed in its regard are seen at the least as duties. The person who 
performs them and \vho at the same time recognises an obligation to do so is 
express1ng 1n however minimal a degree consent to the value of the child and 
therefore to its existence and development as a person. To the extent to which 
they do this they are presenting themselves to the child as the person that they 
are rather than simply the fulfiller of his needs. Perhaps it 1s a trifle 
difficult to see this in the very minimal case that I have sketched. It is one 
that would be exemplified by an unenthusiastic nurse in an orphanage. The 
normal case is one in which this minimal sense of duty and responsibility is 
merely a structural element in more or less whole-hearted mother-love. Where 
the essential recognition and consent to the value of the child as a person is 
embodied in actual love then the active presentation by the mother of herself in 
her caring acts is much more clearly evident. In this the normal case, acts of 
care become inadequate to express the true motive of the mothers' activity with 
regard to the child. Another class of acts comes into being whose sole purpose 
is the expression of love. They have no pragmatic purpose at all, In such 
acts the mother is much more personally present, in the sense and to the degree 
that they are the expressions of a full consent to the active relation to the 
object of the act. She is thus available to be kno\vn as a person and not merely 
as a meeter of needs. This primary sense 1n \vhich she is personally present to 
the child is the most important as far as its personal development is concerned 
and should be sharply distinguished from all others, even from such secondary 
quasi-personal presences as for instance that other and often deliberate self-
presentation whose motive is the meeting of a normal mother's own need for love. 
It is 1n the mother's presence to the child as one who recognises and consents 
to it as a person that the child is finally able to discover itself as the 
person to whom her activity is directed, And this is moreover the only place 
1n the world where it can exist as an object for consciousness before it exists 
as such for itself. 
The possibility of acquiring that self-consciousness that 1s a necessary 
element in being an agent in the common sense of the term depends on the 
presence of one who recognises and consents to one as a person, That in itself 
is however not enough to make the child an agent, since this also requires that 
it be conscious of itself as having power or as being a cause of an occurrence 
1n the world. We have therefore to discover Hithin the mother-child relation 
the origin of such causality and such a sense of power, 
in the person of the mother that it must be found. 
And as before it is 
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The motive of the mother's love goes beyond consent to the mere existence 
of the child. It is after all a person only in the sense of the possessor 
of personal capacities. Its mother's love thus necessarily wishes the develop-
ment and perfection of these capacities for its own sake., so that it becomes an 
actual person in full possession of its powers. To the extent then that it 
becomes conscious of her presence and responds to it with consent of its own, 
consent that can take such various forms of fascination, adoration arid delight, 
it realises her ambitions for it. She discerns the dawn of self-consciou·sness 
~n it and the self-communication of consent. As it develops its distinctively 
personal characteristics it does the one thing needful to satisfy her love. 
No-one else has such power~ The child is thus the possessor of a special sort of 
pmver which it possesses through a combination of personal capacities and the mother's 
love. It is the cause of an occurrence in the world and through its consciousness of 
the mother's joy it has the necessary condition~ for becoming conscious of itself as such. 
It is important at this stage of our analysis of intersubjectivity to see why 
only a positive, loving attitude on the part of the mother ~s able to impart 
to the .child the consciousness of agency. First of all it is only because she 
wills the development of its personal capacities that its exercise of them is 
able to cause her joy and give the child the power over her that it has. Secondly, 
the development of its personal capacities answers a natural inclination of the 
child, has its own satisfaction for it and inevitably makes for its consent. 
The inclinations of the child's personal nature and the mother's love coincide 
so that this real mutuality of satisfaction in its development of self-conscious-
ness as an agent is able to be the necessary stepping stone to an eventual consent 
to her as a person. The child after all does not simply respond to the mother, 
it responds with grateful love. And this ~s a further degree of mutuality, and 
also a further degree of self-development. It consents both to its own develop-
ment as a person and to her existence and value as a person who exists for it. 
If on the other ha~d the mother's attitude to the child had been one of rejection 
and hostility then her consent to its existence and status as a personwould 
have been lacking, she would not have been present to the child as a person her-
self, and the whole dialectic of development would have been subverted from the 
start. 
W ver Eecke (1975) agrees with our emphasis on the necessity for a positive, 
loving attitude on the part of the other if a person is to become properly aware 
of himself as an agent. He bases his conviction moreover on a detailed analysis 
of the experimental work of Spitz and others in child development and pathology. 
Spitz's study concerned anaclytic depression and hospitalism in babies. Babies 
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who, for administrative reasons, were removed from their mothers in an 
institution showed all sorts of emotional and physical symptoms. They cried 
more than other babies and suffered from insomnia. They showed a greater 
·susceptibility to colds and lost weight. In general they showed symptoms of 
\vithdrawal and a retardation of personality growth. 
In the case of the hospitalism obser~ations, where the babies were removed from 
their mothers after the third month, the results were ever more drastic. Ver 
Eecke (1975: 231) sums them up as follows: 
"During the first three months of separation 
the symptoms \vere very similar to those of 
anaclytic depression. After the third month, 
the children shm.;red excessive motor retardation. 
They became completely passive, lying on their 
backs without being able to turn themselves 
into the prone position. Their faces had an 
imbecilic expression, eye co-ordination was 
defective, fingers showed bizarre movements 
and the children \vere sometimes subjected to 
"spasmus nutans". At the end of their 
second year, these children had on the average 
a development which \vould classify them as 
idiots." 
Ver Eecke's conclusion is the "child needs a mother or a mother substitute 
and not just a nurse". (Ver Eecke, 1975: 237) This is equivalent to our 
distinction between care and value or love. His purpose in his study is to 
counteract Sartre's notion that authentic subjectivity can exist only in 
opposition to other subjects by means of objectifying them, that, ~n short, 
genuine subject-subject relations are impossible. He concludes, ~n termin-
ology very similar to our own that "real subjectivity is only possible within 
the context of inter-subjectivity ... The other is therefore not the enemy of 
my subjectivity, he is the condition for my becoming a subject." (Ver Eecke, 
1975: 245) In the course of his study however, because he has to deal with 
the emphasis on negativity that is characteristic of Sartre's account of 
relations between persons, Ver Eecke is also able to find the proper place for 
opposition between self and other in the achievement of self-consciousness. He 
identifies opposition as a moment within a relation that is primarily one of 
mutual acceptance. In mutual acceptance self-consciousness as an agent is 
already achieved. The opposition that so often expresses this (the period of 
"No"-saying in young children) is, in the case of "healthy" development, not 
real opposition at all but symbolic opposition, an exercise of autonomy in a 
relationship of trust in an almost game-like manner. This insig~t is import-
ant for us since it provides a counter to those theorists who maintain, 
contrary toourown position, that a real struggle between subjects is necessary 
for the emergence of a genuine awareness of oneself as an autonomous agent. 
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Our account of why the mother's attitude to the child must be a positive one 
if it is to be an agent at all is necessarily incomplete at this stage. So 
far we have been trying to describe the conditions for the possibility of an 
absolute minimum of personal life. When vle come to describe the further 
conditions necessary for personal "grmvth" much more will have to be said about 
a positive intention. 
7. Critical review of the first stage 
In this chapter we have tried to develop our own account of how and \vhy it is 
that persons depend on other persons to be persons in at least a minimal sense 
of the term. He have done it on the lines suggested by ·Macmurray, though our 
method has differed in some respects from his. Is it necessary to say aga1n 
that ours is in no sense a scientific account but a strictly philosophical one? 
Our conclusions must be seen as necessary, though related to exper1ence in the 
way that we have explained. He hope to have shown accordingly that it 1s 
necessary for a person to be involved 1n a particular inter-subjective relation 
with another if their o•m capacity for being an agent is to be realised. And 
this, though inevitably taking place in an historical process, is not merely a 
contingent fact but a necessary consequence of what it is to be an agent. 
He should note that the paradox of a free act that is dependent for its exercise 
on the act of another 1s a feature of our account as well as of Macmurray's. 
In this connection it 1s perhaps necessary to stress the point that terminated 
our account: that mutuality and agency go together, stand to one another in a 
relation of direct and not inverse proportion. The child's consent to its own 
agency is bound up directly with its consent to the powerful presence of. the 
mother. There 1s a clear distinction between on the one hand the child's 
var1ous needs, the mother as the meeter of those needs and the child's satis-
faction in her as such, and on the other the child's capacity for agency, the 
mother as the one whose loving presence enables this to be realised and the 
. 
child's delight in her loving presence. The capacity to be an agent and 
delight in the mere presence of a loving mother are conceptually connected as 
well as being but two sides of the specifically personal nature of a human 
child. The fact that it is necessary that the mother should be a loving one 
must not obscure the entire absence of self-interest or pragmatism in the 
child's delight. The presence of the 'mother answers a need, if you like, but 
it is a need that is quite sui generis, the need to be an agent. At all 
events it is a distinctively personal need for another person. Perhaps it is 
not so far from Macmurray's "impulse to conununicate". 
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In view of our description of the mother-child relation it would indeed seem 
that human persons have a natural inclination or tendency towards other persons. 
Our description of the achievement of agency certainly suggests this. This 
tendency certainly has the character of a need for something that only the 
active initiative of another person can meet. This is ultimately the sheer 
presence of the person as a person for the sake of the other. There is also 
thus a personal capacity for the apprehension of and consent to such a presence, 
which consent and apprehension constitutes a minimal form of mutuality of 
knowledge and value. We can thus describe the essentially personal capacity 
indifferently as that for self-enactment ~n a general sense, or for communion 
in the sense sketched out above. 
This question of a dependent freedom will rece~ve a clearer ansHer Hhen He 
discuss personal growth. But there as here it Hill be the case that mutuality 
and individuality hang together. Indeed it ~s precisely this feature of the 
intersubjective relations of persons that reveals their spiritual nature. 
John Heron ( 1970), in the article previously referred to on the gaze as a form 
of social encounter, offers an account of the inter-subjective conditions 
necessary for personal self-aHareness w·hich is strikingly similar to our own, 
yet based on an analysis of the quite specific phenomenon of mutual gazing, 
that is of two persons gaz~ng into each others eyes. The language in which 
he sums up the results of his investigation is so expressive that I feel just-
ified in quoting him at length, especially in view of the parallel it affords 
with our O\Vn account. 
'!If there is a sense in which the inward 
streaming of the gaze o£ the other as 
received by me constitutes at that time 
the reality of my being: the gaze received 
openly and without fear can yield for me 
a profound a,,.-,areness of my body-mind 
unity. In this situation the gaze of 
the other may illuminate me as a unitive 
being with no awareness of body-mind 
distinction. Similarly, I apprehend 
the other as a unitive presence revealed 
before me. But each of these states is 
secondary to the unitive reality consti-
tuted by the relation of mutual gazing 
itself. The transphysical streaming of 
the gaze of the other interfuses my whole 
being, the transphysical streaming of my 
gaze interfuses the whole being of the 
other; but in each case this only occurs 
by virtue of the thorough interpenetration 
of the .mutual streaming - which constitutes 
the dramatic elan of true encounter between 
persons. It is the interaction of the two-
fold gazing which is a necessary condition 
of the irradiation of each by_each being. 
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This interpenetration, then, is a trans-
physical unitive reality of field - which 
is also a unitive field of consciousness -
with two poles, the irradiated being of 
each. \.Jithin this unitive field, my 
awareness of myself is in part constituted 
by my a~..rareness of his awareness of me, 
and my awareness of him is in part con-
stituted by my awareness of his awareness 
of me; that is to say, my awareness of 
his awareness of me both reveals me to 
myself and reveals him to me, and his 
simultaneous awareness of my awareness of 
him both reveals him to himself and 
reveals me to him. But further, in my 
m..rareness of his awareness of my aware-
ness, whether of myself or of him, I 
reveal myself to him; and in his a~..rare­
ness of my awareness of his avmreness, 
whether of himself or me, he reveals 
himself to me. Thus in the unitive field 
of consciousness established through the 
interfused transphysical streaming of 
mutual gazing, each is revealed to him-
self, each is revealed to the other, and 
each reveals himself to the other. 
Because the,gaze of each in· part constitutes 
the being of the other only by virtue of 
the reciprocal interaction, there is a 
sense in t..rhich each is copresent at the 
opposite pole; that is to say, each has 
internal perception both of his own 
unitive being and of the unitive being 
of the other •.. " (Heron, 1970:. 255) 
There is a great deal in this passage that is relevant to points that will be 
brought up later on in our own investigation, Here however I will confine my 
comment to the term "transphysical". In his treatment of the gaze Heron is 
forced to recognise the existence of a phenomenal reality that cannot be 
equated with any physical properties of the eyes or face. Nor can it be .. 
explained, for a variety of reasons, in terms of a projection by the observer. 
So Heron coins the term "transphysical" to refer to a property both of the 
gaze itself and the person gazing. Such a notion obviously has points of 
contact with our own notion of the spiritual. But its importance in the 
present context is this: Heron's analysis of mutual gazing suggests a basis 
for a real but non:inferential knwoledge of oneself and other persons. It 
~s pre-objective. For that reason one might be tempted to relegate the sort 
of self-awareness and other-awareness involved to the realm of sense intuition, 
to something akin to the consciousness of animals. And of course it is 
certainly true in the case of a new-born child, as indeed in the case of an 
adult, that there are var~ous levels of awareness or intuition below the fully 
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conscious or objective. The term "transphysical" hmvever rules out the 
possibility of that kind of awareness, which could be accounted for in purely 
physical terms. This is of course important in the present context, since 
our description implies the existence of the capacity for an awareness which 
although it is not objective from the start is nevertheless properly personal 
and therefore, if \ve are right, unable to be reduced to something purely physical. 
The fact, that a child's awareness of itself develops out of a prior state of 
awareness that could be called, in a general way, feeling, tends to prevent 
most writers on the subject from recognising that a genuinely personal self-
consciousness could never develop at all unless the capacity for it were there 
from the start. Instead, in most accounts it is presented as the result of a 
sort of transmutation of a pr~or biological state of feeling. S Strasser 
( 1969: 99), for instance, can say "Our knowledge of the other as an Ego" (on 
\vhich, he holds, our knov1ledge of ourself depends) "is rooted in the most 
original, the non-objectifying mode of awareness. For that upon \vhich a 
subject is first emotionally and biologically dependent is his fellow subject.'' 
As a purely psychological, that is scientific, account of the development of 
self-awareness, a statement like that is unexceptionable, As a statement of 
the necessary conditions for personal self-awareness it is however inadequate 
and indeed misleading, 
Hith that we conclude our critical rev~ew of the first stage of the inter-
subjective transactions of persons. 
the notion of self-enactment. 
We must now relate our description to 
8. Self-enactment in intersubjectivity i 
Our description of the necessary conditions for someone being an agent in the 
common sense of the term presupposes for its accuracy just two facts: that 
persons require a personal environment to exercise their personal capacities at 
all, and that such a personal environment must contain unselfish love. Both 
these facts, when understood in the terms of our description, can be seen to 
imply that persons are self-enacting beings, in the sense we have defined, as 
well as in the loose sense required by the common notion of being an agent. 
The fact that an impersonal environment will not do to enable the proper 
exercise of the distinctively personal capacities of the child points to the 
peculiar nature of such capacities. As we have seen, they are wholly non-
specific. They are not adapted to the performance of any particular task 
or the acquisition of any particular skill, except, as we have seen, that of 
communicating with the mother. This however, as should already appear, is 
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precisely not one particular skill among others. Its inclusive, global 
character ,.,ill appear more clearly as we proceed. '~'hatever the genetic 
endowment, the specific instincts or the particular natural and social 
situation of the child it has, over and above such an admittedly \vholly 
material system, a capacity for the self-consciousness and self-determination 
implied by being an agent. We know of the initial existence of such a 
capacity because of its eventual emergence and exercise. Its radical difference 
from other natural capacities is revealed by the fact that it can only be 
realised 1n dependence on other persons, and not on any pragmatic or impersonal 
activity of theirs but on their distinctively personal acts alone. 
The non-specific character of the capacity for agency is a result of the self-
referring nature of its acts. It is in fact the bare capacity for self-
reference. Whatever the particular "content" or character the self has, there 
is over and above that the reference of itself to itself in all its acts. 
This self-reference is neither consc1ous nor consented to in the case of a 
child· Yet no particular set of aspects of the child's life could lead to its 
emergence later on; it is a totally indeterminate relation of a whole to the 
whole of itself. Hence if it is not present at the start it will never be 
present at all. It can therefore only be present in the beginning as pure 
potentiality. For this reason it is wholly dependent for its exercise, 
parasitic one might even say, on the personal activity of another. 
The lack of specificity that we have remarked in the case of the child is the 
obverse of an ability to transcend its own particularity and separatedness and 
enter the self-consciousness of the mother. Were all its natural powers 
oriented tmvards specific objects in its environment such orientations would 
interfere with and prevent its picking up the mother's own self-referring 
presence. 
l'hus what could appear to the uninstructed eye as merely a lack on the part 
of the child, the concomitant of that radical dependence on others of its 
species manifested by any material being, is in fact a sign of spirituality 
in the form of universality, an openness to sharing the being of another without 
destroying it, that is precisely sharing it rather than assimilating it. 
Nedoncelle (1966) also remarks on this lack of specificity of our distinctively 
personal powers when he is discussing what he calls "the ideal self". The 
ideal self is the essential "instrument of personal singularization" 
(Nedoncelle, 1966: 104) and is contrasted with all the other powers and 
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inclinations of human persons as being that feeling for a certain sort of 
psychic "space" that permits -our being genuine persons. "But the emptiness 
tl1at always characterizes the ideal self in certain respects 1s full of 
meaning: it separates us from ourselves to make us sensitive to the appeal of 
a creativity that both assures the indetermined career of our freedom and 
already stamps our un1.que imprint on all the acts our freedom will originate." 
(Nedoncelle, 1966: 104) 
We have said that the second necessary condition for the child's becoming an 
agent is that the mother should love it as the person that it 1.s. To be 
accurate we should have said love and know. As we shall see in the descriptions 
to come, both loveandknowledge are involved but 1n different degrees at 
different stages in personal life. Here at its inception, \vhere there is 
(by definition) in the child so little to be known, love is predominant. 
The mother is by definition fully self-enacting. We must here presume, 
though we s·hall later on argue, that such a condition will issue in the whole-
hearted love of others. What is important is that the mother is wholly present 
to the child as the fully-developed person that she 1.s, and is present in this 
way for the child. Her knowledge of it (in this case merely knowledge of its 
potentialities) is complete, being derived from her own self-knowledge (as we 
shall see in the next chapter), and her consent to it (her love) is \vhole-
hearted. Hence the ideal self with which the child is presented' contains 
nothing that could prevent its appropriation by the child. Insofar as the 
child makes the ideal self its own no alien multiplicity or division 1s 
introduced into its consciousness of and consent to itself. Its self-
consciousness can be unified and simple about the intuition of its specifically 
personal potentialities that the mother presents through her expression of their 
full development in her. Its self-determination can be correspondingly complete, 
since in the system of the mother's own affective and volitional life there is 
neither lack nor conflict of will in her project for the child. Thus the self 
the child is offered as its own is strictly self-enacting. Its own self-enactmen1 
is present as the ultimate goal of its specifically personal life as a guiding 
light and a normative influence 1n the multiplicity of particular projects that 
make up a human life. 
Finally, two characteristics of the relation between mother and child are 
deserving of mention as being of peculiar significance for our attempt to 
discover an interpersonal correlate of the spirituality of persons. There is 
first of all the reciprocity between mother and child brought about by the 
mother's distinctively personal influence. The more it suffers the influence 
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of the mother, themore the child enacts itself. This sort of influence 
is not the sort of thing that even the human sciences tell us of, at least 
\vhen they are trying to be really "scientific". Is it in fact something 
that they could even possibly discover? And second, there is the "community" 
established between mother and child as a result of the transaction between 
them. The child contributes nothing to the "content" of the ideal self. 
This self, which is presented as the goal of the child's own development is 
simply the fully developed self of the mother. Insofar as the child makes it 
its own, child and mother appear to come to share a common character. There 
seems to be question here of two persons with but one personality. And again 
this would appear to contradict the logic of matter. Apart_ from this is 
there not something sinister about such spiritual osmosis? The precise nature 
of this identification between self and other in intersubjective relations 
will be further explored in the tHo chapters to come. Here it has barely 
begun so its character is hardly re7ealed. But there is already enough to 
point towards the:innnateriality of persons since it seems to involve a sharing 
of what is most interior to each, something that could not be envisaged in the 
case of physical objects. 
We have come to the end of our first description of the intersubjective 
relations between persons~ that intended to reveal the necessary conditions 
for the mere exercise of their personal pov-1ers. And the description has 
revealed that if persons are to be agents in the normal sense of the term 
then they are 1n a general way self-enacting. Further scrutiny of the necessary 
conditions for being an agent shows that they must be seen as self-enacting in a 
stricter sense, a sense in which many of the features of spirituality brought 
out by our previous analysis are already present. 
In this the first description of intersubjectivity, since we are examining the 
conditions for the mere exercise of personal powers, the dependence of persons 
on other persons 1s emphasised. We were more concerned ,.,ith the clolild than 
the mother. As we shall see, some features of the spirituality of persons do 
not show to much advantage in such a case. They will appear more clearly as we 
examine the conditions and the goal of personal growth. 
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CHAPTER FOUR. INTERSUBJECTIVITY II THE GROHTH OF PERSONAL POWERS 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter 1s to describe the intersubjective conditions 
necessary for the growth of our distinctively personal powers so as to reveal 
the spiritual nature of persons. 
The notion of growth has its mm problems and so we begin with a discussion of 
them and the consideration of a particular attempt (that of R Johann) to deal 
with the normative force that the notion of personal growth implies. 
We then take up the personal powers defined in the prev1ous chapter in order 
to re-define them at this the second stage of their enactment. (They are 
re-defined as self-knowledge and self-affirmation.) As before, there are 
essentially only two, and so we discuss the question of duality and unity in 
personal life that this raises. 
We begin our discussion of personal growth with a description of' how self-
knowledge is acquired. And so, before doing that, \ve present a detailed 
discussion of self-knowledge. This discussion is intended to explain the 
various elements of the intersubjective transaction that leads to a growth 1n 
self-knm.rledge and which are to be brought out in our description. In this 
discussion we refer to the work of many authors whose work we find especially 
helpful. 
The description of the growth of personal powers that follows is of both 
self-knowledge and self-affirmation. To bring out the most important points 
of our description (which as far as we have been able to determine has elements 
of real novelty in it) we compare and contrast it with that of L Feldstein, which 
1s the only at all comparable one we have been able to discover in the ret'evant 
literature. 
Finally we attempt to see how far our description of personal growth does 1n 
fact throw new lig~t on the spirituality of persons. 
2. The Notion of grmvth 
We now have to describe the necessary conditions for the development of our 
specifically personal powers beyond the bare minimum which entitles us to think 
of ourselves as agents in the common mean1ng of the term. In the previous 
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chapter we s~w that the exercise of those powers implied by being an agent in 
this sense, namely self-consciousness and self-determination, depended on a 
peculiar relation to another person. He also smv hmv self-consciousness and 
self-determination could be seen as different forms of what I have named as the 
defining characteristic of a person as a spiritual being, namely the capacity 
for self-enactment. In this chapter, 1n considering the further development 
of these same powers, we shall once again discover as the necessary condition 
for this a certain specific kind of dependence on another person together with a 
sort of reciprocity that did not appear in that description. Our description 
of this form of intersubjectivity will throw further light on the self-enactment 
that is the metaphysical key to the interpersonal transaction. 
It is perhaps necessary once again to remind the reader that the description of 
the interpersonal transaction is not 1n any sense a narrative. We are not 
describing a process as a process. We are giving an account of the necessary 
conditions for the actualisation of certain capacities. In spite of the 
concrete details and the psychological plausibility of the description it 1s 
neither a fictional nor a quasi-scientific one. The conditions described are 
held to be necessary. Nevertheless they can be verified by reflection on 
,exper1ence since human beings are persons and hence cannot fail to exercise 
these powers 1n everything they do. It is thus not at all the case that in 
this chapter we are describing a later period of a person's life than in the 
prev1ous one, as though having dealt with the development of the child we now 
consider that of the adult. In fact the relation bet,.Jeen the t\.JO chapters 
is this: whereas in the prev1ous we dealt with the m1n1mum exercise of the 
personal powers here we are concerned with their fullest possible exercise and 
hence with the conditions of their growth. 
At once a problem appears. Since we are dealing with the capacity for being 
an agent, in what sense can there be a minimum and a full exercise of it. 
One is either an agent or one is not. 
conscious or self-determining? 
How can one be more or less self-
There is a valid point in this objection but it concerns the possession of the 
capacity and not its exercise. A baboon either is or is not an agent in the 
sense of having or not having the natural capacity at all. As far as the actual 
exercise of the capacity is concerned, it can still be a matter of degree. I 
hope to show 1n the course of this chapter that being more or less of a person 
or an agent, or even self-enacting is not as paradoxical as it sounds. 
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If in fact the actualisation of our distinctively personal capacities ~s a 
mere matter of degree, and hence the process of their development is therefore 
homogeneous, why do I bother with t:vo (and even three) descriptions of it? 
Would not one suffice? Strictly speaking one would. All alike are simply 
descriptions of self-enactment. If however it is the case that self-enactment 
is the simple but all-pervasive enabling foundation for the 'vhole of our 
lives as persons, then different descriptions in often quite sharply different 
sorts of language can only help in adding to our understanding of their common 
object. The different sorts of language ~n which the actualisation of personal 
capacities can be described can be very different indeed. The language of 
charact~r or personality description, that of moral assessment and that of 
scientific psychology are very different from each other·, yet all must find a 
place on the continuum of self-enactment if they are to be true descriptions of 
a person. 
This change ~n language-sort will become immediately evident in the present 
chapter where we are dealing with the conditions for the growth of personal 
powers towards fulfilment. For "growth" in this context is a normative 
notion. We are not interested in increase in size, but in "personal growth" 
or "growth as a person". In our present climate of thought both scientific 
psychology and ethics can give sense to such a notion in terms say, on the 
one hand, of maturity or self-realisation or even "genital primacy", (Storr, 1960) 
and, on the other, of "rationality" or "responsibility", or some such evaluative 
term. Moral language and psychological language are certainly very different. 
Yet I would wish to locate both on a homogeneous continuum in much the same way 
as Artistotle does, for whom being a man and being a good man differ only in the 
degree to which the specifically human powers of the soul are properly developed. 
In the case of Aristotle it is a case of the proper development of reason as 
the foundation of the life of the soul, for us it will be the development of 
those powers of self-consciousness and self determination that we have taken as 
definitive of a person. 
A writer ~n the Thomist tradition who equates moral growth with the development 
of our specifically personal powers, and, what is more, describes these in 
interpersonal terms, is R Johann. I want to look at his account of the inter-
subjective conditions for the moral life more closely since it contains much 
that is helpful in terms of our own interest. 
Johann (1975: 169) takes as his starting-point our experience of moral deliber-
ation. This sort of deliberation implies the existence of ends that transcend 
the contingent wishes and desires of the moral ~ubject, namely ends or an end 
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"to \vhich the will is ordered prior to any of its commitments~" Such an end 
must be one to which we are oriented by nature. Thus our capacity to engage 
in moral deliberation implies "that our very nature as subjects is normative 
for our conduct." (Johann, 1975: 169) So far, so good. 
It is all very \vell to say that affirming my own subjectivity ~s an end that is 
somehow built in to my nature as a moral being. The trouble ~s that, like many 
another fundamental principle of morality, such an end lacks concreteness and 
can hardly serve to guide my action in the world. Johann acknowledges the 
emptiness of the form of this imperative but goes on to give it a content. 
Its content must come from something other than our own subjectivity; Johann 
(1975: 170) tries to deduce that this something other m~st be other persons. 
He presents his deduction as follows: 
"To experience reality as making demands on 
us antecedent to choice, and therefore regard-
less of our intentions, is to experience it, 
not simply as the object of our own intending 
and relative to us, but as intending us and 
absolutely other. It is to experience our 
involvement with the other-than-self as more 
than one with something determinate and manip-
ulable; it is to experience ourselves as 
involved with an initiative which transcends 
our own, a determining source which addresses 
us and expects an answer. It is to be conscious 
of the other as that to which our very actuality 
as subjects, our own intentional life, is essentially 
a response; as that to which.we ourselves are 
relative. It is to be conscious of the other as 
You, and of ourselves as constituted by a relation 
to You. In other words, my very being as I ~s an 
intention of You, and interest in You as the 
ground of my life." 
The logic of this is obscure, but seems to turn out something like this: 
Human nature has many tendencies and needs. They only become ends by being 
willed by a subject. My moral experience demands that I act in terms of an 
. 
end that transcends my own contingent desires. Hence I must act in terms of 
an end willed by another. 
wills me to be or do. 
But to be an end for me it must be something he 
Even if this is the gist of Johann's thought it is not clear how an end willed 
for me by another can be equivalent to something "to which the will is ordered 
prior to any of its commitments", since. in the one case one is talking of an 
orientation of my nature as a moral subject while in the other one ~s talking 
about the.will (albeit for me) of other persons. And I certainly can't be 
ordered by nature to just any end other persons happen to will for me. 
Perhaps what Johann really is trying to say is that I am by nature ordered to 
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a certain sort of relation with other persons and that it is 1n virtue nf 
this orientation that I am and can experience myself to be a moral subject. 
That this is indeed 1:..rhat Johann ( 1976) wishes to say is I think borne out by 
a second article on this topic ;-:ritten a year later. And in the 'course of· it 
some light is also thrmvn on what sort of relation 1:vith other persons it :ts 
that both grounds our moral subjectivity and is the ultimate norm for our 
moral grmvth. 
Norality differs from technology in that the intentions of our actions are 
important for their mm sake. From the point of view of getting things done, 
even intellectual projects, it matters not at all whether a particular act was 
intended or not. And it is only in the dialogal relationship that intentions as 
intentions have significance. "If you knock my hat on the ground, it may be 
an accident or it may be an act of aggression. The change in the external 
situation is identical either way; the hat 1:..rhich was on my head 1s now on the 
ground as the result of your movement. But whether or not you meant to knock 
my hat off can make a 1:..rorld of difference in our relationship." (Johann, 1976: 52) 
The dialogal relation is thus one in \vhich meanings can act as causes; without 
the intentional system of meaning called language there is simply no dialogue 
at all. Johann fastens on this feature of the dialogal relation to show that 
it is the necessary condition for morality since it is the necessary condition 
for our freedom as moral subjects. At the same time the dialogal relation 
turns out to be the ultimate norm for our moral activity. 
That the dialogal relation with other persons :ts the necessary condition for 
our freedom as moral subjects follows from the eausality of meaning we have 
already remarked on. Being a free subject is for one's intentions as intentions 
to have a causal effect, and this they do, and can only do, in the dialogal 
relation with others. In the experience of communication with others our 
intentional nature is both revealed to us and is effective in bringing about 
modifications in the relation in which we stand towards another. Thus we 
experience ourselves as causes of a unique sort, as freely originating changes 
in our relationships with other persons simply by means of communicating with 
them, revealing our minds to them. For Johann, unlike Aquinas and Aristotle, 
morality is strictly a feature of interpersonal relations. A solitary person 
could not have a moral life. This would seem a strange position for a Thomist 
writer to take up, were it not for the fact that Johann believes that the 
relation to other persons is somehow part of human nature. 
the situation in which he must act. 
It is not simply 
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It is because a certain kind of orientation to others is part of human 
nature that a certain kind of relation with others can act as the ultimate 
moral standard. Johann tries to deduce the dialogal relation as the ultimate 
moral norm from the fact of it being a necessary condition for our subjectivity, 
a condition which is therefore prwr to any actual ,.,ish or choice. 
"The ground of choice, in the last analysis, 
cannot be constituted such by any exercise 
of choice, but only by its own nature as 
ground and the nature of the subject as such, 
i.e. antecedent to choice. On the other 
hand, nothing can be the final ground for 
choice unless an exercise of choice is 
essential to its accomplishment. No 
observable state of affairs as such requires 
choice for its accomplishment. Only the 
transobjective relation of subjects .... 
requires choice for its acomplishment. 
The world of transobjective relationship, 
then, as that alone \vhich can ground 
subjectivity (the capacity to choose), ~s 
the End to which being-as-subject is 
ordered by nature." (Johann, 1976: 57) 
To make the relation with others normative for our acts as moral agents could 
seem a vacuous achievement, especially as such a relation is unavoidable for 
moral subjects. But Johann says enough to make it clear that he sees the 
relation as a good. It enables the development of our distinctively personal 
capacities. Further, there are two attitudes we can take up towards it. 
We can say "yes" to it or "no". We can "commit" ourselves to building it up, 
or we can in spite of needing it reject it. In ways such as these Johann tries 
to give the bare idea of the dialogal relation with others a concrete content. 
In ou~ opinion, in spite of the generality and tentativeness of his account of 
moral experience, Johann does enough to link the notion of morality. with our 
nature as persons and with our relationship with other persons. I have more 
or less the same aim as he has, but it is our hope that by covering the same 
ground in greater detail and more concretely we can make his conclusions more 
secure. In our terms, we have to connect the notion of personal growth both 
with those powers ,.,e have identified as stemming from our nature as persons 
and also with an essential relatedness to other persons. Let us now begin 
by taking a closer look at the nature of those powers and their full development 
so as to have a clearer idea as to what can be meant by speaking of their growth. 
3. Unity and duality of personal powers 
As has been pointed out already, the self-consciousness that is an essential 
element of action is as a capacity or power quite devoid of content and without 
any determinate orientation to any sort of object \vhatsoever. This is the 
condition of it being a capacity for the objective presence of any object at all. 
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It 1s however determined in one way, and uniquely so, as to its structure. 
It 1s self-referring. \\TJ.1atever content it gains through the consciousness 
of objects is referred to itself. And ~.;re have seen why it is necessary that 
it be conscious of another person if it 1s to have the degree of self-conscious-
ness necessary to be a proper agent. This minimum self-awareness we described 
as the bare m.;rareness of its existence as a distinct origin of effects 1n the 
world. Clearly once it has that grasp of its mm existence there can be no 
question of a further grmvth :i..n this awareness, since there cannot be any 
growth in existence. We exist in time however, and change; hence the content 
of the self will change, expressing to a greater or lesser degree its nature as 
a person. And we can grow in our awareness of this. We shall have to 
investigate the nature of this awareness more fully presently. But one can now 
see what sort of growth one envisages for self-consciousness. I shail refer 
to it and the term of its completion simply as self-knowledge. 
Similarly in the case of self-determination there is the indeterminateness of 
a capacity characterised solely by its self-referential structure. In self-
determined activity, in addition to the specific object of one's act, one is 
concerned with oneself as the origin of the act- and not at all in a purely 
cognitive way (though of course self-determination presupposes self-consciousness) 
but practically, in that one makes oneself to be the origin of the act. Many 
different words can be used to refer to this "making"; the one that we shall 
chiefly use is "consent''. And clearly there can be different degrees of 
consent. Can there also be such a thing as a grmvth in consent? I think 
there can and hope that the fuller description to follm-vr will substantiate my 
vle\.;r, For the moment let it simply be noted that I shall use the term 
"self-affirmation" to designate the growth of the power of self-determination 
towards completion and for the term of the process as well. 
We are thus going to be talking about the conditions for the development of 
self-knowledge and self-affirmation in the life of a person. Hhy we should 
concern ourselves with just two, and not one or three or ten, powers 1s a 
·question important both to ask and ans,-vrer. This duality, which also appeared 
in our previous chapter, is not an arbitrary one. Aquinas himself has an 
interesting "deduction" of a fundamental duality 1.n our experience. His 
starting-point is the nature of action as such. He comments as follows: 
" .... (S)ince an agent must be joined in some 
fashion with the object it acts on, there are 
two aspects of the relation between the soul 
and that extraneous object of its activity. 
First, inasmuch as it is its very nature to be 
joined to the soul and to be in the soul ' 
through the medium of its own likeness .••• 
Next, under the second aspect, the soul is 
inclined and drav.rn to the external object." (1.78.1) (Thoma~ Aquinas, 1963) 
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In action there 1s a relation bet~-1een two terms, and thus two possible 
"directions" to the relation. That of the object to the subject grounds 
a set of powers that could be called apprehensive in a broad sense. Chief 
among these are the senses and the intellect. The orientation of the subject 
to the object likewise grounds a set of powers that can be called appetitive 
1n a broad sense. This class includes the will, the emotions or passions, 
and the power of locomotion. 
Clearly our m..m. duality of, on the one side, self--consciousness and self-
knowledge, and, on the other, self-determination and self-affirmation can be 
seen to fit Aquinas' division. Nevertheless he lists more pm.;rers than two. 
A further principle of selection is clearly required. Aquinas provides this 
too. In the same passage he makes, within the a]Jprehensive poHers, a further 
distinction, resting on a difference in the objects of their acts: 
"And in this respect there are two kinds 
of pmver, the senses bearing on the more 
restricted object, bodies subject to 
sensation, and the intellect bearing on 
the least restricted object, universal 
being." (1.78.1) (Thomas Aquinas, 1963) 
Within the appetitive powers a corresponding distinction 1s made between the 
passions and the will. Thus two, and. two only, pm.;rers surJive the double 
filter: intellect and will. 
from our nature as persons. 
And these are for Aquinas the powers that flow 
Our duality too, also a duality of personal 
powers, would therefore. seem to be well-founded, More however needs to be 
said about this duality lest a misunderstanding of its nature appear to 
threaten the unity of the human person, and alsc to clarify the coming 
description of the way both powers function in the growth of the one person. 
The needs of clarity that require a distinction between intellect and will 
also demand that one treat of them one at a time. Scholastic philosophers 
speak indeed of an act of intellect and an act of will, and this is perhaps 
misleading. (Phillips, 1956) Whenever there is question of the act of a 
person both intellect and will are sirrultaneously involved, The judgement of 
the truth of a proposition is the carrying out of an intention just as the 
exercise of a deliberate choice entails the grasp of ground and consequent and 
the apprehension of a contingent truth. Nevertheless the imagination can 
become prone to depict the intellect and '"ill as it were "in parallel", as two 
horses pulling the same cart. A corrective to this image is to see them as 
it were "in series". The truth in this image is that personal acts consist 
in two moments, one of which is logically prior to the other. The 
intellectual moment 1s logically primary since it is through it that a world 
is present to the agent at all. But the act only attains completion through 
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the will by means of which the world is modified. That at least is an 
approximate way of putting it, a way that does serve to indicate the lack of 
symmetry between the two relations in which the subject stands tm..rards the 
But this is perhaps brought out more fully if, instead of speaking 
of intellect and will, one speaks of self-know'ledge and self-affirmation. 
Here the difference in fundamental structure bett..reen the t\vo moments of 
action is clearly seen. Self-knowledge and self-affirmation can be seen 
as successive moments in self-appropriation. Knowing oneself is a sort of 
self-possession. But the self known is an object of consciousness. So one 
possesses oneself as an object. The possessing act of knowledge itself, the 
very subjectivity of consciousness, is not possessed by knowledge since it 
cannot be objectified without ceasing to be itself. The self-possession of 
self-affirmation (1.vhich is that of will) J.S otherwise. It is able to affirm 
both all that the self knows of itself and also itself as affirming. It is 
the known self that is affirmed, and so it is affirmed as object; it is the 
known self that affirms, and so affirms itself as subject. An a.ct of intellect, 
self-knowledge, is taken up into an act of will, self-affirmation, so that in 
the latter case it is a "richer'' self that both affirms and is affirmed. 
It is as a matter of fact co1nmon enough for Thomist philosophers, having once 
distinguished between intellect and will, to stress the total interdepencence 
of the two pmvers. They do not usually however go on as we have done to see 
them as two aspects or moments of our distinctively personal, and hence self-
referring, life. An except ion is C Cirne-Liina ( 1965: 117) 1..;ho writes as follov1s: 
"The personal is the single source from 
which the theoretical and the practical 
spring immediately. It is the place in 
which the theoretical attains its perfect-
ion and in which the practical exists in 
its original fulness. The personal is 
an act in which understanding and will 
mutually constitute one another without 
losing their own specific character, 
that is, without passing over into the 
other. It is not an act of the under-
standing into which the will is taken up. 
Neither is it an act of the will in which 
the understanding exists as an essentially 
volitional reality. It must be an act 
which is constituted by understanding and 
will, but in 1...thich understanding exists 
as understanding and will exists as will." 
The question about the nature of persons J.S closely bound up with that about 
the sort of unity they possess. In this chapter more than in the last this 
question of unity will come to the fore. From the foregoing it can already 
be seen that a purely mathematical or logical notion of unity will not do 
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justice to the unity of a person. The unity n1 question 1.s one that is 
reflexive, it "has to do with itself". And it seems that in such a case 
a distinction of relation must arise ~vi thin the substantial self, a distinction 
that can be described in various metaphors, but ~vhich answers actually to the 
human experience of intellect and will. 
Our description of personal growth will therefore treat of the conditions for 
the development of self-knowledge and self-affirmation. With the foregoing 
in mind we shall start with a consideration of self-knowledge. We start with 
self-knowledge rather than self-affirmation for two reasons. The first is 
simply, as we have said, that when considered "in series" the intellect and its 
act has a logical priority over the will. The second is that we are primarily 
interested in the growing person and not so much in the fully developed one, 
and as we shall see self-knowledge has a certain priority over self-affirmation 
here. As we shall also see, however, talking about self-knowledge will 
involve talking about self-affirmation, and hence though we begin with the one 
we shall be making an inevitable transition to the other. 
4. Self-knowledge 
As was the case 1.n the last chapter, our actual description of the necessary 
conditions will require a rigour inimical to a helpful "realism11 of treatment. 
Accordingly we will preface it by a detailed but informal account of, firstly, 
the ingredients of self-knowledge, secondly, the conditions usually favourable 
to its acquisition, and thirdly, the reason why it is often reckoned (justly) 
so hard to come by. A concrete account of these matters is not really just 
"an optional extra" to a proper description. It provides the necessary link 
with experience by means of ~·1hich alone the description itself can be t·e·sted 
for adequacy and truth. Our intersubjective descriptions are intended to 
reveal the essential characteristics of persons as such, whereas our experience 
is ~lways and only of human persons, namely persons involved in materiality. 
Hence it is impossible to present the descriptions without referenc~ to 
details that are only really applicable to human persons. Regarding the 
essential unity of persons, for instance, our description must take into account 
that human persons can only realise and express this unity in a multiplicity of 
acts of different kinds. Hence the unity will always be a unity of structural 
rather than one of monadic simplicity. For these reasons our preliminary 
account of self-knowledge and its acquisition is the necessary key to the 
final one, 
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4. 1 The ingredients of self-knowledge 
\Vhether it is oneself or another, 'vhat 1s it that one gets to know as one gets 
to know a person? Consulting one's curiosity it would seem fairly certain, 
from the evidence provided by both biographies and gossip, that a major target 
of one's interest 1s the actions that a person has performed, what he has 
actu:1lly done. But even the most scholarly biography 1s not simply a cata-
logue of past events. Tl~re is inevitably an attempt to order them 1n some 
way. Even the division of a life into periods shows that in the study of a 
person's life it is a 'vhole that one is concerned with, a more or less "organic" 
structure, and not just a completed series. If one asks what sort of whole it 
is, one 1s tempted to reply with terms like "significance" or "meaning". Not 
that it should be the case that it is possible to sum up a person's life as 
the expression of a particular purpose or project, or the exemplification of a 
certain moral truth or value. Not even that there should be in a person's 
life tl~c sort of dramatic unity that one finds in a novel or a play. The 
notion of "character" hmvever is surely important. In seeking knowledge of a 
person it would seem that one's goal could well be described as "character" or 
even "personality". 
ive of this. 
One is interested in actions insofar as they are express-
In getting to kno·w a person's character it is important to be able to see the 
world as he does, 1n the sense of having some access to his "mental" Horld. 
I 
The very idiom of speaking of different "worlds" bears 'vitness to the very 
different beliefs and theories about matters of fact that people have. \-le 
could not say we knew a person unless we were fairly intimately acquainted with 
the way they understood the world. It would also be necessary in this regard 
to be able to grade each belief according to the degree of conviction with which 
it was held. Not all classes of beliefs would be of equal importance however 
for getting to know the person. Of crucial importance would be his beliefs 
about what, precisely, was important or worthwhile, in other words, his values. 
Perhaps even more important than knowing a person's beliefs, even his beliefs 
about what is truly valuable, is to know what he feels. How a person feels 
about things, his emotional life, is a very sensitive and pervasive indication 
of character. Feelings however are always related either positively or 
negatively towards their objects and thus contain an evaluative note. To 
understand the way a person feels about things is at the same time to know 
his likes and dislikes. 
If these informal remarks are well-founded it would seem that it is in the 
sphere of value that the two aspects of a person which we drew attention to 
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above, the apprehensive ;md the appetitive, come together. If action in the 
broadest sense is the fullest express1on of a person then it follows that the 
apprehensive sphere should be centred on or culminate in the judgement of 
value. Before one can choose what is good to do one must knmv the facts of 
the situation 1n ~vhich one must act. And the most important class of facts as 
far as action 1s concerned are facts about what it would be good to do. The 
appetites themselves have inevitably to do wjth value since at bottom they 
simply are a tending towards or away from certain sorts of object. 
The notion that it 1s the sphere of value that is crucial for unifying the 
elements of the personality gains further support when one considers the role 
of the will. Clearly the will's role is definitive where action is concerned. 
It can give o;r- 't·lithold cor..sent to both the judgement of the in':ellect and to 
the promptings of the feelings, and this in varying degrees. 
will cannot be separated from that of value. 
The notion of 
If it is the case that the life of a person, intellectual, emotional and 
volitional, centres on the sphere of value, then it can be said that we know 
a person only when we knmv 'tvhat he both judges and feels to be good and the 
degree to which he consents to these judgements and feelings. Whatever else 
it might be interesting or useful to know it would seem that this is the 
crucial area in which the various dimensions of a person's life are focussed 
and in relation to which other aspects can alone be properly understood. 
Having said that, one must immediately qualify it with the distinction bet~veen 
what has become habitual in the life of a person and what has not .. In fact 
it is the case that judgements are related to insights which eventually become 
habitually held beliefs. Indeed it could be argued that a belief simply is 
a habit of insight. In knowing a person it is even more important to know 
the underlying habits of understanding than to be aware of a particular 
judgement. Then there are systems of habits. Habits of insight into what 
is valuable art: inevitably hierarchically graded. And this all in the purely 
cognitive sphere. There are of course systems of habits 1n the emotional and 
volitional spheres as well. And equally is it there the case that what is 
habitual is more important to one's knowledge of a person than particular acts 
as such. 
So we have some sort of an answer to our question as to what it is one knows 
when one gets to know a person. It is these patterns of systems of habits, 
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cognitive, emotional and volitional, relating to what 1s valued, that form 
the foundation of knowledge of a person. 
It migltt seem that in thus listing the elements in the knowledge of a person, 
1n spite of the fact that we have judged the sphere of value to be in some 
sense a unifying factor, we have nevertheless not done justice to the unity 
of personality. 
There is of course ahvays the possibility of disunity among the elements of 
the person. Intellect and feelings can of course be in opposition. But so 
can intellect and will, as when I judge I ought to stay in bed to cure my cold 
but decide to go to a film because I want to. And so can the vrill and the 
emotions, as ~:vhen I decide to stay in bed although I want to go and see a film. 
The possibility of unity would thus seem to depend on two forming principles, 
that underlying the hierarchy of values within each system and ti1at bringing 
about the integration of the different systems. As an example of the first 
consider the system of value judgements within the purely cognitive sphere. 
There is a question as to which values are more fundamental or important, and 
what facts are relevant to deciding the issue. Clearly there is the possibility 
of conflict and incoherence in the system of one's value judgements, as well as 
the possibility of unity where fundamental values are recognised as fundamental 
and less fundamental ones are related to them in an orderly way. With regard 
to the second forming principle it 1s easy to see that the hierarchy of value 
in the sphere of feeling might not correspond to that in the sphere of the 
intellect, nor that of the will's consent to either. It would seem true to 
say that the possibility of unity within the systems depends on the intellect, 
whereas that of the systems in relation to one another depends on the will. 
Intellect and will thus do represent two forming principles within the systems 
ofthe.person, and as we have seen, this duality is not an absolute one. Indeed 
will could almost be defined as an appetitive principle that tends to consent 
to the intellect's judgement. So the foundation for a true unity of the 
person would seem to be present 1n the ingredients of the personality as we 
have listed them .. We will have to return to examine the unity of a person 
later on in this chapter' but \-le cannot do this with proper rigour until we have 
dealt with the question of personal growth. 
It is hoped that our preliminary account of what one comes to know when one 
comes to know a person, of the self of our self-knowledge, has a prima facie 
plausibility. We are ~ncouraged to believe that such plausibility 1s 1n this 
case a reliable indicator of truth when we compare our account with the 
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extremely detailed and extended account of the self that forms the centre of 
Austin Farrer's classic of natural theology, Finite and Infinite. 
He too sees the self as a system of many elements. The system 1s moreover one 
of acts; hence Farrer (1979: 229) defines it as follows: "the self 1s a continuous 
intellective and creative activity which proceeds by concentration into success1ve 
particular acts." As such the self has a unity and enduring identity which is 
absolute (Farrer, 1979: 227) and the paradigm for the unity and identity of any 
natural object it may come to know. (Farrer, 1979: 227,245) The principle of 
this unity of elements in the system of the self is the will. The will reveals 
its reality and pmver especially in the circumstances of moral struggle, where 
in the war between the inclinations the weaker may somet\mes prevail. Farrer 
(1979: 119) calls will the "self-actualising potency of a project", and describes 
its relation to the self as "will, taken in its extension, we call the self; 1n 
its focussed expression the \vill." (Farrer, 1979: 220) He then sbciws its 
centrality to the self by bringing Oilt the connections between will and the other 
elements in the system. 
The relation bet\veen will and intellect is, as we have seen, so close that he can 
describe it as internal. (Farrer, 1979: 144) Hill, in fact, is simply the 
active side of intellect (akin to Kant's practical reason). Thus it shares 1n 
intellect's universality. The universality of the will and hence also of its 
project Farrer connects with its self-referential character. (Farrer, 1979: 1l!9) 
It is because of this universality of scope that any particular project it may 
entertain can be assimilated within and referred to the same self engaged in it. 
At the same time as it enacts the intellect the will 1s subject to the continual 
solicitation of emotion. This emotional ingredient of the will's life emanates 
from its bodily base. Farrer doesn't limit the scope of will to what it is 
explicitly conscious of; for that reason too the will is not absolutely free. 
The body is both what particularises the will in time and space and gives it 
a continuous particular content in the form of a changing pattern of'inclination 
and emotion that provides the material for choice. 
Thewill is not reducible to the elements it synthesises. As the real potency 
behind allthe projects of the self, it has its own absolute and enduring unity. 
This unity of the will shows up in the life of the self as a tendency towards 
unification of the self-system. (Farrer, 1979: 157) The psyches of even bad 
men can exhibit a terrifying consistency. Nevertheless the unity of good men 1s 
both more comprehensiveandmore complete, since the consistency in the life of a 
bad man is radically divorced from the real needs of human nature. 
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We have said enough, I think, in th:i.s short sketch of Farrer's theory of the 
self to shmoJ its essential similarity with our own. The similarity of emphasis 
on the unity of the self, both as an antecedent potentiality and as a consequent 
goal inherent in its psychic life, we find especially striking. That he speaks 
only of \oJill, whereas we identify both intellect and \·Jill, as the principle of 
unity in the self, is I feel only an apparent difference. Surely I have said 
enough to have shmm how the duality in our psychic life is contained within 
its unity and is merely the expression of its self-referring character. And the 
foundational character that Farrer accords to will is one that we also allow. 
Farrer does not of course concern himself explicitly with personal growth (at 
least not in connection with his writings on the will) and therefore the question 
of how our relation to other persons affects the constitution of the will and 
determines the nature of its projects is not dealt with. There are however one 
or two places where we find him using express ions that suggest that vJere he to 
deal with these topics he lvould do so ~n a way not too dissimilar to our own. 
Awareness of the unity of the self seems to arise especially in interaction 1oJith 
other persons: "When I expen.ence myself as coming into act ion against another 
self, substantial unity is something I am aware of." (Farrer, 1979: 221) And on 
the question of the nature of the project that could absorb the energies of a 
self possessed of a \vill with universal scope he comments, "Only on the hypothesis 
that the world alre2dy contained more fully determined selves for this self to 
assist and to explore, can \oJe assign him any intelligible ends." (Farrer, 1979: 178; 
Having considered the self that is knov.rn in self-knowledge we must now go on to 
consider the nature of the knowledge one can have of it and how it is to be 
acquired. 
4.2 The acquisition of self-knowledge 
As we have seen personal knowledge is primarily concerned with the realm of 
value. Self-knowledge will accordingly be insight into oneself in this respect. 
One will have insight into \vhat one judges to be good and why, and know too the 
degree to which one consents to these value judgements, One will finally be 
aware of one's feelings and how far they correspond to one's value judgements, 
Put like that this last condition sounds simple enough. That is however not the 
case. Knowing one's likes and dislikes is only a simple matter if the field under 
consideration is a restricted one. When it is a case of the whole system of 
one's desires and aversions then it is a very different matter. It is often 
very difficult to determine what one really wants, The truth of the matter is 
that when one has to answer such a question it is not simply the intensity of a 
particular feeling that has to be measured against another, a question of a purely 
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quantitative kind. Rather there is the complication of a difference in quality 
between wants of one kind and another. The point I am trying to make is well 
made by D H Lawrence. (1931: 52) 
"All that matters is that men and women should 
do ~.rhat they really 1-vant to do. Though here 
as elsewhere we must remember that man has a 
double set of desires, the shallow and the 
profound, the personal, superficial, temporary 
desires, and the inner, impersonal, great 
desires that are fulfilled in long periods of 
time. The desires of the moment are easy to 
recognise, but the others, the deeper ones, 
are difficult. It is the business of our 
Chief Thinkers to tell us of our deeper desires, 
not to keep shrilling our little desires into 
our ears." 
It is not only that one may have desires that one does not know about, but these 
desires may be deeper in another sense, in the sense of more far-reaching or 
fundamental. It is difficult to say precisely what the qualitative difference 
is. H McCabe (1968: 61) makes a distinction between remorse and regret which 
does, I think, throw some light on it. 
"Regret means realising that you ~wish you 
had not behaved in a certain r,my; remorse is the 
realisation that you did not really wish to behave 
in that way at the time, that the behaviour was 
contrary to your deepest desires, your need to be 
truly yourself." 
This distinction underlines the possibility of doing what one really ~oes not 
want to do. It is not merely a quest ion of what you want now and \vhat you 
wanted then being different, but of two simultaneous desires being opposed, 
one of which though more powerful was in a sense more peripheral, while the 
other though perhaps scarcely adverted to was both more enduring and in a sense 
more central to the self-system. One could speak of desires that were rooted 
in human nature rather than those merely evoked by a particular culture or 
education. But even in the sphere of natural desires there would appear to be 
a hierarchy of importance. There would appear to be some desires upon the 
satisfaction of which thewhole psychic balance and integrity of the person would 
depend. Aquinas (1963) lists such desires as the desire to know the truth and 
the desire for the society of other persons. (Summa Theologiae, I.II.94.2) 
It is on knowledge of these desires above all that true self-knowledge ultimately 
depends. 
Even that is an inadequate characterisation of self-knowledge in the sense in 
which I am using the term. One needs also to say something about the kind or 
mode of knowledge that is involved. Knowledge of the deepest springs of one's 
own behaviour, of one's emotional foundation, is not scientific or even 
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theoretical knowledge. Certainly it must be based on exper1ence. But so is 
scientific knowledge. This experience is of an altogether peculiar kind. Not 
merely that it is accessible only to introspection or reflection (that is 
probably not in fact the case) but that it actually depends to some extent on 
the \vill. The connection betHeen the emotions and the will in the appetitive 
sphere of the personality is so close that some feelings can hardly exist at all 
much less reveal themselves for what they are '>vithout the exercise of the Hill. 
I do not wish to imply that the consent be deliberate or considered, but rather 
that something like a censor will tend to operate. And if consent is involved 
in having the feeling it is certainly even more so when it is a question of 
bringing the feeling in question to consciousness and judging of its value. 
It is clearly the case that one will often resist revelations of one's true 
character, since various conflicts could result between the different elements 
of the person, feelings against will or feelings against intellect or will 
against intellect. It is also, and more importantly, the case that there is 
a resistance to knm.;ring what my "de.ep" desires really are, what that is to say 
I really want. We shall have to deal with the reason for this presently. In 
any case it can be seen that the sort of self-knmvledge that we are interested 
1n depends for its acquisition on the will as well as the intellect. To sum 
up then the self-knowledge we are concerned with is a knowledge both of the 
particular character one actually has developed and of what one would really or 
"deep down" like to be and of the difference between them. Thus self-knowledge 
of this sort has a general as well as a particular character. I know both what 
I happen to value and why and the extent to which I consent to this. And that 
knowledge is particular. Then I know what the deep desires of my nature are. 
And this is general knowledge since my nature is not something I just happen 
to have and~ furthermore, it is in principle shareable with others. It must be 
stressed h~wever that although this knowledge is general it is gained from myself 
and referred to myself. It does not have the aspect of generality. It is not 
seen as the acquisition of a general truth about human nature. It is the 
discovery that this is what .!_ (who happen to be human) really most want. The 
fact that it is something that is concomitant to human nature may never be 
adverted to. It 1s a value judgement but in the form of an insight into myself. 
Cirne-Lima has analysed the knmvledge of persons, whether oneself or another, in 
great detail from a Thomist point of view. For him personal knowledge is the 
cognitive aspect of an attitude and presence of the whole person to a person as 
a whole. It is therefore cfosely connected with the attitude of the will of 
both knower and known, Full knowledge of a person as a whole depends on the 
consent of the will both of a ki1ower and the known. 
108/ ... 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
- 103 -
As a consequence of these two determining factors, personal knowledge has some 
peculiar features of its m-.rn. Because it is the knowledge of a person as a 
whole it is not made up of a series of judgements nor is able to be adequately 
expressed in concepts. Nor, en the other hand, is it given in experience as a 
set or sequence of sense-images and feelings. The very simplicity of this 
knowledge, the fact that it is a grasp of a person as an undivided whole, is what 
differentiates it both from all sense-knowledge and also from the conceptual 
knowledge of the intellect. 
characteristics as follows: 
Cirne-Lima (1965: 44) presents its distinctive 
"If we ask someone about a friend of his, or 
ask what kind of person this friend really is, 
he finds himself quite at a loss for words. 
He knows his friend very well indeed, and is 
deeply attached to him. Truly it is for this 
very reason that he cannot express '"hat he 
knows in words, even if he is an experienced 
author. He knows his friend so well that to 
describe him at all appears at first sight 
quite impossible. If he tries to describe 
his friend, he realizes how jejune his des-
cription is, how colourless are his concepts, 
and how inexact is the information he is 
giving. The extent and depth of personal 
knowledge in a case like this becomes there-
fore the reason for a kind of inability to 
express its contents adequately in judgements 
and in concepts." 
He decides in the end to call this sort of knowledge an intuition, which he 
characterises as follows: 
"It is - in contrast to the judgement - a single 
unity, in which there is no distinction between 
subject and predicate. It is a purely intell-
ectual "image" which presents to the mind a whole 
object in a single unity, It is a knowledge 
\·Jhich - in contrast to the concept and to any 
type of sense-knotvledge - is a\vare of its own 
truth." (Cirne-Lima, 1965: 45) 
To call personal knowledge intuition in this way is an essentially negative way 
of defining it. As such it is a useful corrective and complementary to our 
own more analytical positive account. Nor do I think it is incompatible with 
what we have said. Perhaps it is best to see Cirne-Lima'a account as concerning 
primarily the mode o.f personal knowledge, whereas my mvn concerns primarily its 
content, And in personal knowledge more than in any other mode and content 
are intimately related, 
I hope I have said enough about self-knowledge to give an at least approximate 
characterisation of it and to suggest how it could possibly have the centrality 
109/ ••• 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
- 109 -
1n the growth of a person that I wish to accord it. It is in fact the 
foundation of strictly personal identity, and as we shall see, because a person 
is a self-enacting being, a person's identity 1s not a datum distinct from the 
knowledge of it and hence self-knowledge is not merely an expression of a prior 
identity but a constitutive element of it. 
4.3 The difficulty of self-knowledge 
I must now say something more about the difficulty of acquiring self-knowledge 
in the way we have defined it. This difficulty is an inevitable one and both 
highlights the predicament of personal life and the need that persons have of 
others if they are indeed to develop their specifically personal capacities to 
the full. 
There is a sense 1n which persons automatically grow as they grow older. 
Personal life is a continuous exercise of the cognitive, volitional and emotional 
dimensions of the personality. Hence there is an automatic growth of increase 
of content or experience as far as the personal capacities are concerned. 
There is however not a similarly automatic increase in self-knovJledge. The 
reason for this concerns the role played in the acquisition of self-knowledge 
by the will. Because the crucially important self-knowledge 1s still to be 
gained the consent of the will to the system of desires is badly guided. The 
result is it will consent to a notion of the self that is antipathetic to true 
self-knowledge. There will be both a lack of consent to the deeper desires 
~-Jhich self-knowledge would reveal and to the project of self-knowledge itself, 
especially as it tends to set up conflict between a dimly intuited ideal self 
and the actual self that has been consented to. This is especially true if it 
is indeed the case that the desire for self-knmvledge itself is precisely one of 
those deeper desires we are talking about. And that is not all. If we are 
right in identifying the specifically personal capacities, then the desire for 
self-affirmation is also one of these deeper desires. This could be re-
formulated as the desire to give complete consent to the self in its whole 
unified pattern of value-systems. Even when this desire is not adverted to 
it can be expected to persist as a tendency to give an unjustifiably complete 
consent to whatever values happen to be most approved of at the moment, The 
position thus is as follows: because there is a lack of self-knowledge consent 
is misplaced and thus also lacking to the project of self-knowledge; because 
self-knowledge depends on rightly placed consent it cannot be acquired. Never-
theless because the capacity for self-knowledge is one of the basic powers of a 
person it persists as a desire although it is not recognised or satisfied, The 
self therefore remains in a state of disunity and conflict, both because a 
central desire is unsatisfied and also because self-knowledge is the forming 
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principle on which the coherence of the value-systems of the self depends. 
However total the consent of the vTill appears to be to a particular state of 
the self, the disunity of desires and the lack of knowledge make it an unstable 
and unsatisfactory state. The inbuilt tendency of the will to follow the 
intellect is violated and there results what can only be called a division of 
the \vill. ~vhat precisely underlies such a metaphor, whether a real division 
of consent or an inability to give full consent to any alternative, \ve cannot 
go into here. It is enough for our purpose to grasp the reality of the 
predicament and its seriousness for the balance and integrity of a person's life. 
In the face of the foregoing it mustbepointed out that however vicious the 
circle might appear its occurrence is not ~trictly speaking inevitable. There 
is no logical reason why consent could not be given to the deep desires from 
the start and to the desire for self-knowledge. To be sure, it never seems to 
happen in that way. But even if it did, there would be a need for the presence 
of another person if the process of growth were even to begin. We shall see 
why this is so when our description of the conditions for personal growth has 
been completed. 
Perhaps we can already begin to see this necessity from the description of 
self-knowledge that has been g~ven. It is of course a \vell-tried rule of thumb 
that in coming to know others one lays oneself open to an increase in self-
knowledge. This is probably because others usually know the basic structure of 
one's value systems better than one does oneself. It is true that one has 
access to more data on one's own actions than other people have, but a lot of 
it is not especially revealing. When it is the basic structure of·one's insights, 
feelings and consent concerning what is valuable that is in question, others have 
as much "data" as one has oneself s~nce this structure is revealed in every one 
of one's actions. What is more, because others are not subject to the feelings 
and will that create bias and self-stultification as regards self-knowledge, 
they are actually in a better position to see the structure clearly. 
As we have seen however the crucial element in self-knowledge ~s something that 
~s not in fact particular to oneself, the set of deep desires that everyone must 
have. Knowledge of others can help one to discover these in oneself simply 
because they are:common, but also if their actions happen to reveal them more 
clearly because they have in fact been consented to, At all events it would 
seem that some sort of knowledge of "what is in man" does result from relations 
with other persons, and this rather general knowledge provides a way of structuring 
and evaluating one's detailed knowledge of one's own particular character. 
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Knowledge of this sort 1s by no means scientific, in the sense of sociological 
or psychological, nor would it seem to depend on having acquaintance of a 
great number or a \vide variety of people. It would seem rather to be the 
fruit of intimate and enduring relationships with just a few, 
5. 1 The Gro~.Jth of Personal Powers 
We are now ready to describe as strictly as possible the necessary conditions 
for the growth of self-knowledge as we have defined it. Once again they will 
turn out to be the presence and activity of another person, and one 1n whom the 
strictly personal pm..rers are fully and properly developed. And once again I 
am indebted for my general plan of attack to Hacmurray. In the last chapter I 
adopted his mother-child model; here I shall use his "community" model, 
envisaging two "adults" 1n relation to each other, and describe the transaction 
in \vhich self-knouledge on the part of one is achieved. (Macmurray, 1959: 1 06-166) 
There is no attempt at realism, s1nce the "community" must be lim~ted to two if 
the essential role of the other 1s to be revealed. 
grow only in relation to a host of others. 
In real life of course we 
In my two-person model one person (to be referred to as "I") must be envisaged 
as having the.exercise of his personal powers (as was described in the previous 
chapter) but as yet having not begun to develop them at all towards their natural 
fulfilment. The other person (to be referred to as "he") must be envisaged as 
one 1n whom these powers/have (as was the case with the mother in our previous 
model) been fully developed. 
is completely self-affirming, 
Concretely, he has complete self-knowledge and 
The essential condition for me to ga1n self-kno,..rledge is that I make his self-
knowledge my own by coming to know him as he knows himself, It should be clear 
from what has already been said about self-knowledge that the essential core of 
it is something that is common to all persons, though for that core to constitute 
self-knowledge it must be experienced as one's own. So in coming to know him 
as he knows himself, although my knowledge will include those particular details 
of his history that distinguish him from me it will nevertheless be centred on 
those elements which he judges to be most crucial to his own identity, and these 
are precisely those· fundamental values that answer to the deepest desires of our 
common nature. Knowing him as he knows himself involves discovering and under-
standing those value judgements that represent his grasp of what he really wants 
or what he desires most. Sharing in his understanding of the values that are 
most central to the personality is the essential basis for knowledge of myself. 
We must now consider how such cognitive contact at this deep level is achieved. 
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Hithout his consent it is impossible for me to come to share in the self-
knowledge that he has of himself. Because of the role played by the will in 
gaining self-knowledge it would be clearly impossible for me to share in it if 
the will tha.t had completely accepted the values that lay at its foundation had 
at the same time rejected me. Knmvledge of the orientation of his will is an 
essential aspect of the shared self-knowledge that I aim at and this is denied 
me if his will is turned away from me. It must be stressed again in this 
connection that the knm-1ledge aimed at is not simply notional or theoretical; it 
is empirical and it involves the will. I get to know him by experiencing or 
"sensing" his way of living. It is this sort of knowledge that is in question 
here, a knowledge of identity that is gained by a process of identification. 
Cirne-Lima's account of personal knowledge is helpful at this point, As we 
have seen his definition of personal knowledge as an intuition, identifies it 
as the cognitive component of the presence of a whole person to a person as a 
whole, The other major component in this personal presence ~s of course the 
\.Jill. In describing hm-1 personal knowledge in its fulness is acquired Cirne-Lima 
presents us \vith concepts that are helpful in understanding how the identification 
between self and other \ve have spoken of is achieved, 
Cirne-Lima notes first that every free decision of a person is a form of self-
determination, that is to say it is reflexive and so deals with and modifies 
the person as a whole. A free decision regarding another person must moreover 
be either positive or negative; "we either accept the Thou in his concrete 
personal being or we reject him." (Cirne-Lima, 1965: 131) In the case of a 
positive free decision for another person, this other person is included in the 
personal life of the self in a quite distinctive way. 
"Through this self-determination of the Ego, 
\.Jhich takes place in every decision, the Other 
becomes a partial element of the personal life 
of the Ego. For as object of the decision it 
is a partial element of a personal attitude, and 
as such becomes a partial element of the truly 
personal life of the Ego." (Cirne-Lima, 1965: 129) 
He specifies this presence of the other in the personal life of the self further 
by saying that, "In this form of knowledge the other is knmvn not only "objectively' 
but also "subjectively." (Cirne-Lima, 1965: 130) What this "subjective" know-
ledge of another amounts to, and how precisely it becomes an element in the personal 
life of the self, is finally clarified by Cirne-Lima's (1965: 131) saying that 
personal knowledge of this sort is "a partial element of personal decision itself," 
This is the point at which the knowledge of the. other "enters" the personal life 
of the self, as that which specifies the content of personal decision, And as 
personal decision is always self-determination, the intuition of the other thus 
determines the "content" ,or character of the self as well, 
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Thus if Cir.ne-Lima' s theory of personal knmvledge is Hell-founded '"e have a 
'"ay of explaining hm-1 in knowing the other as a person the self becomes like 
him or, as ~.;re have said, makes his self-kn<..Tit<ledge his own. In any case 
Cirne-Lima's account of personal knowledge confirms our o~m insistence that it 
is only achieved by virtue of the will's consent. Our mm consent is required, 
and we shall consider that ~n a moment, But so is the consent of the other. 
And as that is the necessary (though not, alas, the sufficient) condition for 
our m.;rn, '"e must consider it fi·rst, 
The necessary form that the other's consent must take ~n my regard is the consent 
to be known by me. This consent to be knmvn by me is however a way of consent-
~ng to me, He, having full self-knowledge, does not need me in order to acquire 
it. Hence if he consents to me it is for my sake alone. And it is precisely 
this sort of consent that I need. For it ~s not simply self-knowledge that I 
lack. I also lack the will to achieve it. As was pointed out earlier on, 
'"ithout self-knowledge I am incapable of \vhole-hearted self-affirmation. I 
have a divided will. So ~n addition to an·adequate object for my cognitive 
power I require something to move my will, So it is not enough that the other 
person be capable of complete self-affirmation, He must also affirm me. That 
is to say he must '"ill me to share in his self-knm.;rledge for my sake, in order 
that I may affirm myself as a fully developed person. This will to be known by 
me, which is also the \vill that I achieve full self-:-knm..rledge, is thus also a 
will to be affirmed by me - again for my own sake. It is in fact the formula 
for true interpersonal love, of the sort that was seen to be necessary in the 
mother-child model as well. My lack of consent to him is no barrier to his 
love since it is gratuitous, Ashe is by definition fully developed, he does 
not need me in any Hay so that he can develop. Ny lack of consent to him ~s 
even no real barrier to his knowledge of me. Of course he cannot know me fully 
without my consent.? But in his oHn full self-knowledge he already ~s aware 
of n~ deepest desires, even if I am not aHare of them myself. And this provides 
the essential cognitive component in his love for me, He is able to under-
stand the particular aspects of my personality that are revealed on the basis of 
his insight into the fundamental determinants of my behaviour. So his love 
is able to be quite clear-sighted about my actual degree of development and 
hence to be genuinely directed at me and not at some figment of his imagination. 
Such an attitude is necessary on his part if I am to be capable of a Hilling 
response to his offer of se If-knowledge. Let us see why this is so. 
I have the capacity, and hence also the deep desire, for self-knowledge and 
self-affirmation. As yet, due chiefly to my lack of consent, these capacities 
lack an adequate object. His love of me hm.;rever is informed precisely by 
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that self-knowledge and self-affirmation that answers to my deep desire. 
Other things being equal my will will tend to give its consent. There can 
of course be no question of coerc1on. I remain free to withold consent. 
Nevertheless the chief barrier to consent, the absence of the adequate object, 
has been removed. Previously the lack of consent to the deep desire for 
self-knowledge meant that the reality of this desire was hidden and its power 
was not felt. Now both the desire for and the fulfilment of self-knowledge 
are given me in the consent of the other person. Of course since my will is 
divided there can be no question of my seeing him as he really is at first. 
To the extent that I give partial consent so will partial self-knowledge be 
achieved. Nevertheless the condition for full self-knowledge is present and 
I have the natural capacity to make it my own. 
To sum up then. By consenting to his consent to me I participate 1n his 
self-knowledge and so grow in knmvledge of myself. His consent to me is the 
express1on of his own self-affirmation, In consenting to that I affirm myself 
as well. At the same time I consent to his affirmation of himself. Thus 
1n the case of self-affirmation, as with self-knowledge, I do not affirm myself 
m opposition to him but in union with him. 
hand in hand. 
Personal growth and mutuality go 
It should be clear from the foregoing that in the process of acqu1r1ng self-
knowledge I also come to affirm myself. What I principally affirm are of 
course the same deep desires that are the foundation of self-knowledge. I 
consent to the judgement that these represent what I most fundamentally want. 
Thus far we have spoken of these deep desires only in the most general ~.;ray. 
We must now discuss them explicitly since grasping their nature is essential 
to understanding the nature of personal development. 
The shortest possible formula for these deep desires on which I have laid so 
much weight would be this: the desire for a personal relationship with another 
person. Remembering Aquinas' s twofold division of our powers, one could 
then expand this into the desire to know and love another person. It is not 
too difficult to see the connection between this and the desire to be known 
and loved by another person. A natural mutuality would seem to be involved. 
Yet a further specification is possible. One's desires go beyond just any 
person, Implicit in the desire to be kno\vn and loved by a person whom one 
knows and loves oneself, is the desire that he be truly lovable, And implicit 
in that is the desire to be worthy of his love: 
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It is surely plausible to claim a peculiar status for such a desire for other 
persons. There is a sense in which it is not simply one desire among others. 
Certainly if it is true that persons need others to exercise, develop and fulfil 
their distinctively personal powers, then the fundamental character of such a 
desire is manifest. The desire for a personal relation with another person 1s 
as it \vere the setting for all one's other desires since one's own being a 
person depends on it, and this, as one's distinctive and all-encompassing 
essential mode of being, affects every dimension of one's life. The desire 
for relation with another person 1s 1n fact the obverse of the fundamental 
desire to develop as a person. The description of our deep desires given 
above, more plausible perhaps because more concrete, is only the obverse of the 
desire to realise one's own personal powers, namely the·desire to knm..r and love 
oneself, or, in the more technical language that I have been using, the desire 
for self-knowledge and self-affirmation. It 1s these, 1n sum, that are the 
deep desires of which we have been speaking. Speaking of our deep desires in 
self-referential terms is perhaps confusing since this is not the form in which 
we in fact feel them. As a matter of actual experience they are always referred 
to others, rather than to oneself. But speaking of them at this level of 
abstraction does serve to bring out a distinctive feature of personal reality, 
namely its reflexivity. 
This conclusion should not surprise us in v1e'"' of the stress that has been laid 
on the reflexivity of our personal powers. They are, inevitably, both subject 
and object of the process of personal development. If the central and found~ 
ational tendency of our nature as persons and hence our most far-reaching and 
ineradicable desire is that for self~knowledge and self-affirmation then one 
can only develop as a person by at once knowing this of oneself and consenting 
to it with an undivided heart. 
5.2 Feldstein's Account of Personal Growth 
We have come now to the end of our description of the intersubjective conditions 
for personal ~rowth. Our task is now to make explicit what the description 
reveals concerning the nature of the personal powers involved so as to see to 
what extent and 1n what way they manifest the spiritual nature of persons. 
Before we do so hm..rever I wish to compare our account of personal growth with 
another, that of L C Feldstein.(1976) There are striking similarities between 
his account and ours. Much of his terminology is similar. He stresses the 
need for relationships of a certain sort with other persons. He even brings 
out the self-referring character of personal powers. For all that we find 
his account inadequate in certain respects which we shall mention. It is our 
hope that a critical survey of Feldstein's account of personal growth will high-
light the distinctive characteristics of our own. 
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Feldstein (1976) treats of personal growth as a growth in freedom. He even 
uses the terms "self-possession" and "self-affirmation" to describe such freedom, 
and speaks of it as the search of the self for "an adequate Imago of itself", by 
which he means some sort of self-mvareness or self-knowledge. Freedom itself 
is described as being "atvare of oneself as actively orienting oneself toward 
oneself in relation to an object" and as "the mutual attunement of self and 
other." Further, grow·th in freedom is seen as the overcoming of the "contin-
gencies" of character and situation, and the disorientation and flux attendant 
upon them, and the attainment of an "active state of peace." Peace l.S a 
harmony of the various elements of the self as \vell as harmony between self and 
other. Thus the whole process of growth could be described as a growth in 
integration of the self, both with regard to its internal powers (Feldstein 
uses the term) and its external environment. 
Feldstein discerns three stages 1.n the self's growth in freedom, and he explicates 
these by means of two triads of ideals, the Christian triad of faith, hope and 
love, and the Greek triad of truth, goodness and beauty. The Christian triad 
he sees as presenting ideals of activity for the subject, whereas the Greek 
triad picks out corresponding qualities of the object. 
From the start the self is conceived as situated, and consc1.ous of itself as 
being so situated, in an environment. The first stage of the self's growth 
consists 1.n relating itself to the world in faith. In this relation the self 
is passive, being experienced as dependent on an objective world to which 1.n 
order to live in faith the self must give itself up. The result of this 
surrender of self to world is truth. The self discovers the lawlike character 
of reality and discriminates between levels and classes of things. Instead of 
being in a state of flux the world appears as orderly and enduring. This grasp 
of its position in an orderly world, the grasp of truth, is the first stage of 
freedom. "Thus freely giving itself up to truth, the self comes to own 
itself more securely." (Feldstein, 1976: 83) 
The second stage of the growth of freedom grows out of the first. Initially 
the world was seen as fragmenatry, and in flux; now it is grasped as ordered and 
enduring. It is as a consequence controllable. Faith thus breeds confidence 
in the self, confidence in its own powers to affect the world. This active 
consciousness Feldstein calls hope. Its object is accordingly the good. 
The world is seen as a possible answer to the needs and desires of the self. 
And whereas in faith the self was especially aware of the powers of the world, 
now it is especially aware of its own, and aware of them as good. The self as 
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the subject of hope is moreover a fuller self. 
"Initially, a passive self is counterposed to 
a dynamic object. In truth, the self relates 
to itself as essentially passiue in its relation 
to an active world ... Now, the self dynamically 
relates to itself as it dynamically relates to 
a passive world." (Feldstein, 1976: 77-78) 
The third stage of the growth of freedom results from the inadequacies inherent 
.1n the first two. 
"Absolute trust, hence truth, threatens self-
pulverization, the subjectivity of the self 
being consumed by objective relationships; 
absolute hope, hence goodness, threatens a 
vacuously expanded self confronting an in-
substantial reality." (Feldstein, 1976: 78) 
Faith and hope clearly have a provisional quality about them. Yet \vhen seen 
as but complementary aspects of the further attitude of love their value 1s 
preserved. In love subject and object stand in relation of "mutual eo-
adaptation". Because there is mutuality there is also parity bet>veen self 
and other. This relation tends therefore to be fully personal, both self and 
other being persons. Freedom is realised 1n a perfect harmony of invitation and 
response, and this harmony is beauty. Feldstein sums up his account of the 
dialectic of self-possession as follows: 
"As soon as the self becomes mvare of itself as 
a potential shaper of ideals and of the other as 
a manifold of lawful connections, it experiences 
itself as a manifold of lawful connections and 
the other as, in effect, the shaper (or, at 
least, the presenter) of ideals. In brief: it 
develops the power to apprehertd both itself and 
the other as analogously constituted, hence 
capable of being brought into reciprocal dynamic 
relatedness. Thus, the self comes to possess 
itself in relation to another which (or \vho), 
immanently or explicitly, likewise comes to 
possess itself - each as reflexive activity, 
potential or actual. In consequence, self-
possession in relation to another analogously 
conceived leads the self to an attitude of 
love. By this attitude, the beauty of an 
harmonious eo-adaptation of powers, each to 
each, may be shaped." (Feldstein, 1976: 84) 
Feldstein stresses aga1n and again, that the growth of personal freedom can only 
take place properly 1n a strictly personal environment. Certainly it can only 
achieve fruition in a relation of persons. He does not however argue for this, 
or even explain how it is that "To lay the groundwork for the self's articulation 
of its powers, evidently the collaboration of other persons is required." 
(Feldstein, 1976: (") It is indeed a very special sort of personal presence 
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that is required if the self is truly to grow in self-possession. He refers 
to it as a "witness" of the self's development, "an inclusive, enveloping 
presence", "an enveloping personal witness". 
beyond the world". 
It is moreover "a 'something' 
"And so I am step by step led to root my searching 
activity in a "something" which lies beyond that 
activity. Yet this "something" cannot be, ulti-
mately, my mm self. It surely cannot be the world 
about me. For both are in flux and upheaval; both 
are in perpetual transit. My searchings are always 
enveloped by a beyond beyond those searchings. 
They are haunted, embraced, and tendered by that 
beyond. It can be no material beyond. Quite the 
contrary. It is a beyond which is personal. Yet, 
no person. It is a beyond which is experienced as 
in concernful relation to me." (Feldstein, 1976: 71) 
Nowhere hmvever does Feldstein explain v7hy such a personal being is necessary 
for the self's growth. There is nothing in his many descriptions of the self 
that directly implies a need for it. 
Feldstein's account of the growth of the self in personal freedom is both 
original and evocative. Yet because there is no attempt to justify the 
descriptions of the stages in that growth, no attempt to root the perceptive 
psychological language in a more systematic metaphysical framework, it has the 
appearance both of arbitrariness and, oddly enough, of vagueness. The use, and 
i1~deed the correlation, of the two triads seems merely the imposition of an 
alien frame~vork on the data of personal development. This is a pity as there 
would seem, to my mind, to be a definite connection between the two triads, and 
between both and the fundamental powers of a person. Yet Feldstein has much 
to say about personal development that is of value. And in the course of that 
he also says much of value about the nature of the self that is developing. 
He depicts the self as existing only in a reflexive activity that has always 
to do with itself. "I find my roots, my only roots, within the very I which 
is 1n quest of those roots. I secure myself in the very act by which I 
search for my security." (Feldstein, 1-976: 71) The distinction between the 
subject of the activity and the activity itself 1s very fine: "the self takes 
hold of successive. options, organizing its choices into patterns ,.,hich, seen 
retrospectively, are foci in the searching activity - an activity unfolding 
within perspectives which become ever more inclusive." (Feldstein, 1976: 70) 
This distinction is elaborated in discussing the relation of the self to the 
body: "associated with every body of sufficiently complex organisation is the 
self. Indeed the self is that body insofar· as it is implicated in the world. 
It is the totality of feelings, perce1v1ngs, sensings, willings, desirings, 
believings." (Feldstein, 1976: 79) This makes the self sound very like Hume's 
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bundle of perceptions. But that would be a mistake. For Feldstein (1976: 80) 
goes on to say, "in the last analysis, self expresses the animation of body; 
it is at once the principle governing bodily organization and the expression of 
that organization." Here self sounds more like an Aristotelian soul. 
this is a better comparison to make, for Felclstein (1976: 80) concludes 
"In consequence, neither body nor self may be 
conceived independently; sufficiently examined, 
each concept discloses itself as entailing the 
other. Indeed at bottom, body as a matrix of 
intentional activities and self as the form of 
those activities are one and the same. For 
form and matrix are indivisible. Self is that 
uriity in its reflexive aspect; body is that 
unity in its aspect as the most intimate and 
proximate object of reflection.'~ 
And 
Once again the final emphasis is on the self~ s reflexivity. It is both the subject of 
the reflexion and the reflexion's content, as content it is subject and vice 
versa. 
There are three chief points on which we find Feldstein's account of personal 
growth instructive. Firstly there is the idea that personal growth is a 
growth in unity by means of an integration of the distinct dimensions of the 
self. Secondly there is his emphasis on the personal self's reflexive nature. 
Thirdly there ~s his way of depicting the influence of others on the development 
of the self. The "mutual eo-adaptation" he speaks so frequently of does, it 
seems to us, pick out a crucial characteristic of the way in which persons can 
influence other persons so as to augment rather than diminish their freedom. 
As such it is a clear sign forus of the spirituality of persons. Feldstein 
fails to follow up his insights. They stand unconnected to each other in his 
analysis. What attempts he does make to systematise them seem to us rather 
superficial. Having said that much it is now up to us to see whether we can 
show that our notion of self-enactment is capable of bringing order into the 
multifarious phenomena of personal growth. 
6. Self-enactment in Intersubjectivity II 
Our second description of the intersubjective relation of persons, ~n which 
we have been concerned with the intersubjective conditions for the growth 
rather than the mere exercise of our personal powers, does g~ve ua a picture 
of persons as, in a general way, self-enacting. We have seen that the goal of 
personal development can be described in terms of self-knowledge and self-
affirmation. In addition to the self-referential ch~racter of both there is 
the interdependence of each on the other. To the extent that we have opened 
up by analysis the self of persons we have revealed its internal structure. 
And this makes. it clearer than in our first description, and in greater detail, 
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how persons are in a general way self-enacting. He must noH try to drmv out 
of the description itself in a more careful way the elements of self-enactment 
1n the strict sense that it manifests. 
6.1 Personal causality 
The first sign in our description that we are dealing with beings that are 
self-enacting in the strict sense is the phenomenon of what I shall call 
"personal causality". It \vill be remembered that we noted in the first 
description how the "personal influence" of the mother led to an augmentation 
of the child's pmver of self-enactment rather than inhibiting it. ~\Tell, this 
feature of interpersonal relations is much clearer in the second description. 
Here it 1s the case that the more the other p-erson fosters my personal develop-
ment with his disinterested love, and the more he manages to reveal himself to 
me, the more I come to possess myself in clear-sighted self-knmvledge and the 
more I am able to consent to my desires with an undivided will. 
Many writers 1n the Thomist tradition discern this feature of inter-personal 
relations and, moreover, recognise it as a sign of our spirituality. The name 
best known in this regard is that of Maurice Nedoncelle. He actually uses the 
terms 11 intersubjective causality" (Nedoncelle, 1966: viii) and "interpersonal 
causality" (1966: 107) and even "spiritual causality". (i966: 11) His 
descriptions of this phenomenon are expressed in such original and evocative 
language that I feel it worthwhile to quote some from among the many that 
appear in his writings. 
An intersubjective relation between persons 
" ..... tends toward a dialogue in which each 
person returns to his partner ~he gift he 
receives from him after stamping his mark on 
it. Mutual causality ceaselessly alters and 
amplifies a process that is a creation of self 
by self, thanks to a creation of self by the 
other. It succeeds in uniting apparently 
divergent notions of initiative, influence, 
and community. It is, in a word, the only 
example at our disposal for understanding the 
coincidence of being and freedom, or of the 
same and the other." (Nedoncelle, 1966: 94) 
As a result of this kind of causality freedom can actually be communicated 
from one person to another so that "The autonomy I give myself is ontolog-
ically proportionate to the presences I have received." (Nedoncelle, 1966: 93) 
Thus personal causality must be contrasted with other ideas of causality: 
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" .though interpersonal influence is not 
total, it does constitute a fact so decisive 
and disturbing that we cannot liken it to a 
simple removal of obstacles. When we exam~ne 
our past we know very well that our initiatives 
proceed from personal contacts that did not act 
on us from without but by a strange intussuaception." (Nedoncelle, 1966: 119) 
It results in a kind of community of identity bet\veen self and other: 
"Ny encounter with a radiant, free being is 
already my liberation and my own freedom; to 
perceive it is to be what it wants me to be; 
I am at once by it and by myself, not in 
imitating it as an exterior model (vlhich 
Hould be the mere contagion of example), but 
in awakening to myself within the perspective 
of our encounter; there the gift it offers 
meandthepositioni take are identical." (Nedoncelle, 1966: 119) 
Nedoncelle even coins the phrase "heterogeneous identity" to define the relation 
between two persons in intersubjective contact. 
In spite of his grasp of the phenomenon of personal causality we do not find in 
N~doncelle a metaphysical account of its possibility. It is our opinion that 
it can be adequately explained by our notion of spirituality as self-enactment. 
It will be remembered that one of the features of this notion was the self-
transcending capacity of a person~ Because of this, two persons in relation 
are not opposed to each other or external to each other as two particulars 
would be. (Human persons are of course, but then not precisely ;:tS persons 
but as material beings.) Indeed the personal causality of the other person 
on me is in part made possible by my capacity of self-transcendence. His 
causal effect on me on the other hand is an instance of his own self-transcend-
ence. 
In our analysis of spirituality it appeared that a person's capacity for self-
transcendence, as indeed his capacity for self-enactment, was derived from his 
openness to being in its infinite scope. It is thus this feature of the 
spiritual that is the ultimate foundation for the phenomenon of personal 
causality we have uncovered. Personal causality shows itself even more 
clearly for what it is in our third description, that of the relation between 
fully developed persons, in the phenomenon of personal community. And we shall 
then relate it directly to a spiritual being's orientatio~ to infinite being. 
For that reason we will not go into this aspect of self-enactment any further 
here. 
Before we leave this topic however it will be well to point out something that 
Nedoncelle stresses continually in his writings on inter-subjectivity. This 
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1s that personal causality has an in-built tendency towards reciprocity. In 
fact Nedoncelle always speaks of "interpersonal" or "inter.subjectivP." and even 
"reciprocal" and "mutual" causality, It is this feature of reciprocity that 
leads to the culmination of the relation between persons in community. In our 
description of personal growth it ha~n't yet reached that stage. Nevertheless 
it is much more in evidence than in the description of the mother and child. 
It 1s clear, for instance, 1:vhat the growing person needs to do to enable the 
fully developed person to enable him to develop. He has to open himself, 
cognitively and volitionally to the influence of the other, And in so doing 
he is able to enter into the other's personal life far more completely than 
the child. In contrast to the first description the element of dependence on 
the other has diminished and its place has been taken by genuinely personal 
self-transcendence into the intimate personal depths of the other. In fact the 
fully-developed person is now more dependent on the growing person's response 
for communicating his own influence than before. 
From this discussion it does seem that in the phenomenon of personal causality 
as it appears in our description of personal growth we do have a manifestation 
of the spiritual nature of persons. Put from the other side, we have in this 
phenomenon a distinctively personal, and interpersonal, correlate of this 
aspect of our metaphysical notion of persons as spiritual beings. 
There is, we feel, another way in which the spirituality of persons manifests 
itself especially in our description of personal growth. This is in the 
distin~tive unity that our description showed attending the development of a 
person, underlying it as its principle and haunting it as its goal. He must 
now take a closer look at this unity to determine its nature more precisely. 
6.2 The Unity of a Person 
We spoke first of the unity of a person when discussing the duality of 
apprehensive and appetitive powers in each individual. We saw there the way 
in which the two spheres were ordered to each other as two logically successive 
stages in the expression of the self. We referred also to the unity of a 
person when we distinguished the different elements in personal knowledge and 
raised the questiort of unifying principle. We now propose to see whether, and 
if so in what sense, personal growth can be interpreted as a growth in unity. 
The description of per·sonal growth revealed more clearly than the previous 
description that a person cannot adequately be conceived of as an individual 
in a simple arithmetical way. An impersonal object can be conceived in this 
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way s~nce it stands in relation on'ly to \vhat is other than itself. A person 
however has an internal relation to himself. And this relatedness is part of 
the individual being of the person, not something secondary, something that 
merely happens to it. 
To say simply that a personal self is a relationship to itself is obscure. 
Translated into terms of self-knowledge and self-affirmation, as has been_ done 
above, makes it seem less so. Yet between a description in terms of being 
(being a person) and one in terms of activity (knowing and affirming oneself) 
a great gulf seems to be fixed. Perhaps a bridge can be provi~ed by the 
notion of unity, a term that is expressive of both metaphysical and psychological 
notions. 
Personal growth is growth in self-knowledge and self-affirmation. As we have 
seen self-knowledge consists in knowledge of vlhat one re::tlly wants and con-
stitutes a system of value judgements unified by these basic wants. So clearly 
gro~vth in self-knowledge will mean a growth i~ the unity and coherence of one's 
value system. It will also ~ssue in a correspondence between the self one ~s 
conscious of and the self as it really it. As far as self-affirmation ~s 
concerned, that consists in consent to the self as known. And to the extent 
the system of value judgements is unified about the fundamental desires of the 
self so ~vill the possibility exist of a complete consent, that is whole hearted 
and single minded, not reduced to partiality by conflicting or contradictory 
desires. 
follow. 
The desires acted upon will correspond to the desires judged best to 
The unity that follows on self-knowledge is thus a unity of principle (a person 
with self-knowledge is consistent), the unity of self-affirmation is that of 
wholeness or undividedness. 
As has already been pointed out self-knowledge and self-affirmation appear in 
two different roles. They are considered both as the distinctive powers of 
a person and as fundamental desires, which are in fact what are known ·~nd 
affirn1ed in the process of self-knowledge and self-affirmation, in other 
words the proper objects of the powers concerned. 
In the second sense, namely when one 1s talking of the deep desires for self-
knowledge and self-affirmation which are in fact what we come to know and 
affirm in the growth of self-knowledge and self-affirmation, there is really 
only one basic desire, a desire that could be called the desire to give full 
consent to a full knowledge of oneself. Alternatively this could be called 
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the desire for self-knowledge and self-affirmation to grow to completeness 
together. Thus the desire that forms the foundation of the system of value 
judgements has an essentially unitary object. 
constitute a unity and can be known as such. 
The value system thus does 
The personal powers that underlie the development of a person thus form a 
potential unity; to the degree that they are known and consented to, this 
unity is realised. The powers themselves form a whole and can be knm..rn as 
such, and in self-affirmation they are wholly consented to. The self that 
consents and the self that is consented to are identically the same, a \vhole 
that wholly acts upon itself. In the groHth of the personal powers there is 
thus a growth in unity, both as regards integration and as regards completeness. 
What we have here but now more fully expr:-essed in concrete psychological terms 
is the same structure of self--enactment that \vas revealed in the previous chapter. 
Initially there 1s of course unity of an arithmetical sort: the human individual 
must be regarded as a single set of potentialities or tendencies, manifested in 
a single set of desires. Within this set of desires are the distinctively 
personal ones. Let us now group them together under the name of the desire for 
self-enactment. To the degree that this desire is fulfilled the total set of 
desires ·becomes a single unified system. And as it does so it is referred 
ever more completely to and operates ever more \vholly on itself. In this 
sense the self grows 1n unity_, realising its distinctively personal powers 
in a distinctively personal unity. 
Let us nmv sum up lvhat can be said of the unity a person has as a self-enacting 
being, as it appears from our description. It seems that in our account of 
personal growth we have revealed the unity of a person as reflexive or self-
referring in the way required by Rahner's notion of self-possession and Aquinas' 
of reditio in seipsum, (Chapter 2, Section 2) as indeed by the notion of self-
enactment that emerged from our discussion of Lewis' argument against the 
determinist. (Chapter 2, Section 5.2) Here however, the unity appears in 
genuinely personal perms. We speak of self-knowledge and self-affirmation. 
And the unity they achieve exists at two levels. There is first the fact that 
the self that is known is the self that is affirmed and vice versa. And thus 
the powers are united. But the full reflexivity and self-reference is establishet 
at the second level, since the self that is known and affirmed is precisely a 
unity of self-knowledge and self-affirmation, This cannot be insisted on too 
strongly, since the absoluteness of the unity of a person depends on it. It lS 
indeed this final reflexivity that gives the unity of a person its peculiar 
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absoluteness. The secret of this reflexivity 1s that the distinctively 
personal powers, self-knowledge and self-affirmation, constitute both the 
actuality and the content of the person's self-enactment. As the actualisation 
of the distinctively personal powers they are simply the subject, the person, 
1n act. And as the central tendencies, the ultimate values, of his nature they 
are the object, the content, of this act. There is a formal distinction, to be 
sure, between act and content, or subject and object. But it is only that. 
The self-enactment is thus an occurrence in the sphere of being and not only 1n 
the sphere of ideas; the self-knowledge and self-affirmation constitute the 
person's self-enactment of his nature. 
If we can indeed accept the growth of self-knowledge and self-affirmation 1n a 
person's life as self-enactment in the strict sense then this constitutes a 
real advance in our understanding of personal development. The metaphysical 
understanding of spirituality, which refers to all cognitive and volitional acts 
indiscriminately, though justified in absolute terms, is too abstract to guide 
our understanding of the actual dynamics of personal development. In particular 
it leaves the content or object of self-enactment open and undetermined, so that 
there is no way of assessing or assisting the actual development of a person. 
Our description gives self-enactment a concrete content but without limiting it 
1n any way so as to disturb the freedom and creativity of persons. In many 
ways it comes close to Nedoncelle's notion of the "ideal self" that we have 
already referred to. He does not describe this ideal self in the concrete way 
that we have. In one place however he makes this distinction: "Strictly speak-
ing it would be necessary to distinguish the ideal self, which is a process or 
a framework, from the value-self, which is a possible content of the ideal self, 
but not necessarily attached to it." (Nedoncelle, 1966: 106) This distinction, 
't-Jhich is very similar to our own, makes me think that Nedoncelle had a very similar 
conception of the self-referring unity of a person to our own. 
6.3 Conditions of Completeness 
We have said enough now as to how our description of personal growth manifests 
the spiritual nature of persons. Perhaps however what has been said about the 
distinctive unity of persons will throw additional light on the necessity for a 
relation with another person, and on the role played by them in personal growth. 
Before we present our final description, that concerning the fulfilment of 
personal powers, we must say something about this, and in this precise context 
- namely that of the conditions for the complete development of a person. 
As has been said it is a unity that can only be brought into being by the 
full exercise of the personal pmvers of self-knowledge and self-affirmation. 
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Yet these powers cannot be completely exercised unless the unity already 
exists. The \vhole-hearted consent that alone could establish the unity in 
question depends on its prior existence in order to be given. Thus quite 
apart from ignorance, bias and ill-will, quite apart from any divisions in the 
person that arise during the course of its history of seeking completeness, there 
is an absolute need of another person in >vhom this integration of self-knowledge 
and self-affirmation have already been achieved. This need springs simply from 
the nature of the capacity for self-enactment. Because a self-enacting system 
is as it were a closed circle. It can't simply develop from potentiality to 
completeness by acting on what is other than itself, but only by acting on itself. 
Yet it can only be enabled to do this by means of the peculiar personal causality 
of another self-enacting system 'ivith which it interacts. How such a causality 
might operate in actual personal relations, I hope our description of the inter-
subjective transaction has given some idea. 
The peculiar nature of personal identity, the way it depends both on a correct 
insight followed by a freely given consent, and the peculiar nat~re of inter-
personal causality, the vJay in which dependence enables rather than prevents 
a growth 1n freedom, seem bound to be connected. It is as though a relationship 
bet\·leen t'i·lO self-enacting beings has a certain sort of lack of mutual exclusive-
ness or opposition, of the kind that one would find 1n the realtion between two 
material or physical beings. In each case the identity consists in a uni-
fication of many elements. It is not the different particular details of their 
different histories that give each his unique personal identity, but precisely 
what is common to both, namely the unifying structure of self-enactment. It 1s 
as though their common participation in this peculiar kind of act or mode of 
being is \vhat gave each that unique self-possession that makes the different 
histories their own. 
·In our two-person model of intersubjective interactions one person has been 
envisaged as fully self-enacting. This was, as was said, for clarity's sake. 
One might indeed question whether one was ever in the presence of such a person. 
At all events such completely self-knowing and self-affirming persons are not 
typical. Yet this much one is bound to say: if one is to develop as a person 
at all one's environment must include personal capacities that have been developed 
to some degree. Even then a problem would seem to exist. If our description 
of the necessary conditions for the development of personal powers 1s correct 
then one's development would be limited by the level to which the most developed 
person in one's environment had developed. In that case, how does the general 
process of development get off the ground at all? And is the most developed 
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person unable to develop further himself simply because he is the most developed, 
and not because he is 1n fact fully developed? At any·rate if anyone is to 
develop fully then an already fully developed person must already exist in order 
for them to do so. 
Another query of a factual sort could be raised. We have seen that in addition 
to knmving and affirming himself a fully developed person must both >vill my own 
development and v1ill to be known and loved by me, if I am to gain a share in his 
self-knmvledge and self--affirmation, Is there any reason to suppose that a 
fully se}f-enacting person would tend to will the self-enactment of another and 
to \vant to be known and loved by him? It would appear that the contrary is the 
case, since by definition a fully self-enacting person would not need anything 
that another could give him. And if he was not completely self-enacting,and 
so loved me and desired to be known by me out of need, then in any case he 
could not help me towards self-enactment. 
Our final study in the various fundamental modes of intersubjectivity will· thus 
concern the activity and attitude towards others that a fully developed person 
could be expected to have. We are concerned, that is to say, with the kind of 
behaviour that would be most expressive of personal completeness. It is to be 
hoped that our description will give further content to our central notion of 
self-enactment, while the expressive behaviour concerned will be able to be seen 
to be a natural culmination of the activity of a self-enacting being. 
128/ ... 
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CHAPTER FIVE. INTERSUBJECTIVITY Ill THE FULFIU1ENT OF PERSONAL POWERS 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the intersubjective conditions 
necessary for the fulfilment of our distinctively personal pmvers so as to 
reveal the spiritual nature of persons. 
Because a description of fulfilment has certain logical differences from a 
description of conditions necessary for achieving it, this chapter b~{ngs 
with methodological remarks in order to situate it vis-a-vis the preceding two. 
J 
The description of interpersonal love with which this chapter deals is based on 
Aquinas' theory of love. So our methodological section also explains the reason 
for this and introduces his theory. 
Aquinas' theory was chosen for its connection with the metaphysics that forms the 
whole basis for our notion of spirituality. But since in its original form it 
is some\vhat lacking in detailed personalis tic insights, being expressed in rather 
cosmological terminology, we present an analysis of it by tvJO contemporary 
Thomist vlriters, Jules Toner and Robert Johann. A detailed consideration of 
their treatment of his theory forms the bulk of the chapter. These two writers 
were chosen for detailed consideration because of the way 1n which their \·mrk 
both dovetails nicely with each other and also covers thoroughly those aspects 
of Aquinas' theory of love that are most relevant to our interests. By means 
of a critical analysis of both writers we are able to combine their insights for 
the purposes of our own work. 
Having considered the phenomenon of a person's love of other persons, we consider 
the.intersubjective situation of mutual love, both in order to preserve the 
parallel with the previous chapters but also for the sake of special features 
that are evident in this case. 
tve conclude this chapter, as the two previous ones, with an attempt to see how 
far our description of personal fulfilment throws light on the spirituality of 
persons. 
2. An Excursus on Method 
There is at the outset a question whether the· fulfilment of personal powers will 
indeed manifest itself intersubjectively. The question arises from the 
1~9 / •.• 
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very way 1n -,...hich the goal of personal grm..;·th has been described, as self-
knowledge and self-affirmation. Our descriptions have shown that intersub-
jective conditions are necessary to achieve such complete self-enactment. 
But the very self-referential character of thes~ constitutive elements of the 
ideal end-state of personal growth seems to rule out any reference to other 
persons \vhatever. In the state of fulfilment there is by definition no longer 
any question of a further need of others. Hhy should the perfection of our 
personal powers show itself in activity directed at others at all? And if 
indeed it does so, "lllhat form will that activity take, and \vhy? 
To ga1n clarity here, it must be remembered that we -are considering a situation 
that is doubly ideal. It is first of all ideal in the same way as all our 
descriptions of intersubjective relations are ideal: He simply exclude Hhat He 
judge to be irrelevant and assume perfect conditions for the interpersonal 
transaction. But the description of personal fulfilment is ideal in another 
sense. We all have experience of the exercise of our personal poHers, and He 
are entitled to believe that He have some experience of their growth, if not 
1n ourselves then at least in others. 
of their fulfilment, in any one at all? 
But Hho would claim to have had experience 
Perhaps the following consideration Hill be enough to forestall at least certain 
kinds of confusion regarding the analysis contained in this chapter: We are not 
in fact describing the temporal conclusion of a process of personal groHth, 
though it can be visualised as such. Instead He are attempting to describe the 
activity that \vill be expressive of groHth rather than that Hhich leads to it. 
In other words, we s~all be describing a permanent feature of intersubjective 
relations in which personal growth occurs. 
When it is put like this it is much easier to see that it is at least highly 
probable that activity expressive of personal fulfilment Hill be other-directed. 
Personal groHth occurs in a groHing intersubjective intimacy. Is it conceivable 
that at the same time a dynamism of a totally contrary kind, a sort of progressive 
self-absorption, is being set up, in Hhich the growing person, precisely because 
he needs the other less, progressively withdraws from intimacy Hith him? Such 
a situation is not conceivable, especially when it is remembered, as Has pointed 
out in the previous chapter, that although the goal of gro~th Has described in 
terms of self-knowledge and self-affirmction, this was primarily as seen from a 
third-person vieH-point interested in the theoretical question about the nature 
of personal powers, and-not from the point of view of the growing person himself . 
............. J 
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His dominant motive is certainly not the introverted one of achieving self-
knm.rledge and self-affirmation, though he may Hell see that that is \vhat is 
required, ~n a moment of critical self-reflection. As our descriptions have 
sufficiently shown he is conscious of and concerned primarily Hith the person of 
the other. 
Thus our task ~n this chapter is to describe the relation with the other that is 
expressive of personal fulfilment. It ~s a task required of us in any case by 
our prev~ous descriptions. In each of them the person of the other was 
envisaged as being fully developed. Whether or not this is a necessity if 
personal powers are to be exercised and to grow in this world is a matter we 
still have to decide. At all events the contribution of the other to the inter-
subjective transaction requires that he has developed, and therefore it is 
necessary to investigate the issue of Hhat, to the extent that he h~s developed 
his personal powers, his attitude tcwards another person will be likely to be. 
The descriptions that we have so far completed give us a concrete starting-point 
for the present one. In each case so far it has been the love and knowledge of 
the fully developed person of the other that has enabled first the exercise and 
then the growth in the self of his distinctively personal powers. And we 
have also seen that the couple, love-and-knowledge, is not an arbitrary one. 
Accordingly our task will be to see \·lhether this t>vofold attitude to the other, 
can indeed be expressive of the fulfilment of personal powers. I propose how-
ever to limit my taks still further. In the previous chapter, though we 
considered both of the distinctively personal powers, both sides of the growth 
of self-enactment, it was nevertheless self-knm.rledge that we concentrated on. 
And this was appropriate in the context of personal growth since, as we 
explained, self-knm.rledge has a certain logical priority to self-affirmation 
considered from the side of the subject. When considering the influence of 
the fully-developed person however it is his self-affirmation, his love, that 
bridges the gap, as it \vere between him and the other and makes his .influence 
felt and efficacious. Accordingly ~n this chapter we shall concentrate on 
describing love rather than knowledge. It must be remembered however that 
knowledge, both self-knowledge and knowledge of the other, is at all times 
presupposed. And what has been already said about the reciprocal influence 
on each other of love and knowledge still applies. 
The present chapter will thus centre on a description of interpersonal love in 
order to discover the necessary conditions for its realisation. Love of 
another person is being considered as a candidate for the activity expressive 
1 '"J 1 I 
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of personal fulfilment, and so our description of its necessary conditions can 
be expected to throw light on the nature of the personal poHers involved, and 
indeed on those personal powers when developed to the full. 
We will first consider the love of another person as such and then the special 
case of mutual love. As we shall see the love between a fully developed person 
and one who is not, raises a problem of mutuality, a problem ,,7hich in fact 
throws further light on the nature of persons and their distinctively personal 
pmv-ers. 
As the basis for our consideration of personal love we shall once agaLn consider 
the work of modern Thomist writers. There are two reasons for this. Aquinas' 
theory of love is a powerful expression of his metaphysics, and it LS his 
metaphysics \vhich we feel can best express the nature of persons. On the other 
hand his theory of love is somewhat lacking Ln the personalist insights of more 
modern writers. His Aristotelianism still retains its biological bias. 
Aquinas' theory of love has two roots, one Ln Augustine, the other 1n Aristotle. 
Augustine (1944, 1958) compares the love of a person to the '"eight of a physical 
body; weight is the source or ground of movement, what makes falling possible. 
So love is the source nf desire or appetite; it is not identical with either. 
(Confessions Bk.13, Chap 9; The City of God, Bk.11, Chap 28) Aristotle (1877) 
on the other hand saw love primarily as benevolence: "To love is to wish good to 
someone." (Rhet. ii.4) Aquinas, in the Question on the definition of love in 
the Summa combines both ideas in a masterly way. He distinguishes forms from 
parts of love. Both desire and JOY are forms of love, desire love for what 
is absent, joy love for what is present. Love itself is neither; it is indeed 
something so elusive that Aquinas can't decide which of many terms is the best 
for it. In the Question concerned (1.11.26) he uses at least the following: 
proportio, coaptatio, ~ptitudo, connaturalitas, consonantia, immutatio, intentio, 
complacentia. Gilson ( 195 7: 16 7) sees the notion of affinity as common to all 
of these. There LS some ontological connection or orientation between lover 
and loved. This 1s the Augustinian element in Aquinas: this affinity is the 
foundation of the whole appetitive life. 
Love as affinity has however two distinct parts which correspond to the two parts 
of Aristotle's definition. There is first of all the affinity for the person 
who is loved, whether oneself or another. This Aquinas calls amor amicitiae. 
Then there is the affinity for some particular desirable object (whether thing 
or state of affairs or activity) which constitutes the good you wish for the one 
you have amor amicitiae for. And this he calls amor concupiscentiae. This 
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twofold affinity is love as it is actually experienced. 
Aquinas' theory of love is a masterly synthesis of diverse elements, I propose 
to consider the phenomenon of personal love largely on the ·foundation of these 
elements. In particular I shall deal with the work of t\vO writers one of whom, 
Jules Toner, presents us Hith a more thoroughgoing analysis of the element of 
affinity that Aquinas sees as lying at the root of all love. Toner calls this 
"radical love". The other author, Robert Johann, bases his work on the 
Aristotelian definition of the parts of love. Between the two I hope to exploit 
all the riches of the Thomist theory while at the same time relating it to its 
pervasive metaphysical base. 
3. The 'form' of love: J Toner 
Toner approaches his own definition of love by means of what he calls a 
"descriptive analysis of experience." He accepts the insights of the class-
ical writers on love as a guide to understanding the experience of love, and 
expects the various elements to find their place within the whole concrete 
experience of loving. What he 1s looking for, however, is what he calls 
"radical love", namely the central notion or prime analogate in terms of which 
all the various elements can be seen as aspects of love. To find this is only 
possible by critical attention to one's own concrete experience of love. And 
this attention is required as much of the reader as of the writer: "all that the 
writer can do is to stimulate the reader to recall his own concrete experience 
and to see if what is being said is justified by it and helps him to see clearly 
what was not attended to before." (Toner, 1968: 65) Toner is critical of a 
certain sort of phenomenological philosophy that seeks to .capture the c.oncrete 
in its actual, inevitably very general, descriptions of common features of 
experience. This is a mistake. A philosophical analysis is inevitably 
abstract; the concrete is only achieved by the actual activity of reflection on 
one's own experience by both writer and reader alike, "The only intelligible 
meaning of ·concrete philosophical \vriting is that in which the writ~r keeps his 
eye on experience instead of merely analysing concepts and keeps referring the 
reader to the latter's own concrete experience." (Toner, 1968: 65) The similarity 
bet\veen such a method and our own in this study should be obvious. 
3.1 Radical love 
Toner begins his descriptive analysis of the experience of love by locating love 
in the affective sphere of experience. He holds that the whole person is 
involved in love but looks for the essential root of the experience, what he 
calls "radical love". "Affection-" is an intentionally broad term. It is 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
- 133-
contrasted both with cognition nnd with purely bodily reactions. It appears 
to be almost synonymous with Aquinas' appetitive sphere, except that it excludes 
explicitly free responses such as choice and consent. Nevertheless it 1s 
meant to include the spiritual appetites as well as the purely sensuous such as 
emotion, feeling, or passion. 
Toner's description of love concerns the personal love of another person. For 
the sake of clarity it is unilateral throughout except for the final section on 
communion, where mutual love bet,..reen persons is considered. For the sake of 
such clarity I will refer to the object of love, although it is intended to be 
a person, simply as its object. 
Radical love is essentially a response (and 1n this sense a passion) made 
possible by its object. As such it is "an indeliberate, unfree" (Toner, 1968: 96) 
respons2, in spite of the fact that it can later on "be brought to a free decision 
and in choice can be negated or ratified and transformed into a freely given, 
fully human love." (Toner, 1968: 96) Nevertheless it is not simply caused in 
the lover by the object. Hence it presupposes a capacity or power for precis~ly 
that sort of act in the lover from the start. This pm..rer reveals its presence 
in the experience of the 'release of energy' that love brings with it. Toner 
(1968: 163) calls this, in a phrase that will become clearer as the analysis 
proceeds, "the affirmatory energy of the act of being." So although it is 
essentially a response, love is also a true act of the lover's. 
The object of the response of radical love is not the qualities of the loved 
object, or him under any specific description; it is his actuality as a person. 
Toner has a notion of the human person that can be grasped by contrast with that 
of Hume. A person 1s "not merely a collection of different perceptions, but 
a flow of acts, all of which are his acts, or rather himself_ in act.'' (Toner, 
1968: 101) The unified flow of acts, all of them mine, is "the self in act." 
The principle of this unity is the self's "act of being." It 1s this to which 
the response of love is directed. One can get a clearer idea of this object by 
contrasting the response of love with a response to an object as the bearer of 
qualities that make him pleasing or useful to me. Although I only know another 
person by means of his personal (and pleasing or useful) qualities "I can respond 
to him as this unique person experienced in his uniqueness.'' (Toner, 1968: 103) 
Even when all I know of him is that he is a person and know none of his personal 
qualities (say the victim of a road accident) I can respond to his personal 
uniqueness, his actuality. 
The affective response to the actuality of another person achieves a certain 
sort of union of presence that is beyond and more complete than either physical 
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or cognitive presence. Physical presence is the weakest form of presence 
for persons since it need imply no distinctively personal attention or interest. 
Cognitive presence is both personal and, in its various modes, necessary to 
affective presence. Yet affective presence goes beyond it in that it comm-
unicates the personal centre of the lover more fully and openly. The affection 
of love does this more than that of hate or indifferer:.ce because of its 
consonance with the object, his life, his interests and his needs. A union of 
presence is accordingly set up ~vhereby the lover is ll1 the object and the object 
in him. The relation of interiority is not of course a physical one. It can 
best be understood as constituted by the giving of self and the acceptance of 
the other on the part of the lover. The lover lS thus .in the object as given 
(or as gift) and the object in the lover as accepted. Both giving and accepting 
refer not to completed but to continuous acts. 
The effect of this mutual indwelling of lover and object (it must be remembered 
that this description continues to be entirely unilateral; the mutuality in 
question is one set up by the lover alone when the object of his love neither 
knows of his love nor loves him in return) set up by the lover's affective 
response to the object, is a certain identification of lover and object. It is 
opposed both to psychic subjection to or domination of the object by the lover, 
and must not be confused with what lS referred to by the term in psychoanalytical 
usage. It should be called affective identification and can best be understood 
by considering the concrete sign of it in personal experience. The sign is the 
phenomenon of participation in another's life as my mm. Affective participation 
in another's life must be distinguished from a cognitive one, which is seelng 
things from his point of vie'"• as well as from the mere sharing of his feelings, 
though this can be the consequence of an affective participation. Both of 
these forms of participation can exist without my experiencing the other's life 
as lived and owned by me. They are participation in the life of the other but 
do not involve experiencing his life as mine. 
Such an expression can suggest that the distinction between self and other 
has been obliterated, at least as far as a structural element in the experience 
of participation. But that is not the case, as can be seen in those 
experiences of affective participation in the life of another "in which a loved 
one's success is more satisfying than the same success for self. If I did not 
experience my ·loved one's success as mine it would not be a participation ln 
his life; if I did not experience it as his it would be impossible for me to 
find more satisfaction in his success than my own." (Toner, 1968: 134) 
In affective participation the lover experiences the life of the loved one both 
as his and as the other's at one and the same time. 
1'H: I 
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As has been said this participation 1n the life of another is the concrete 
sign of an affective identification between lover and object. 
is the nature of this? 
Hhat precisely 
The act of being of a person, the "self in act", is an act of self-affirmation. 
"By my act of being I establish, found, myself firmly in the \vorld for as long 
as I exercise being." (Toner, 1968: 147) It is not an act, precisely, of 
self-creation, but rather one of inescapable self-ratification. It is the 
inevitable contribution that consciousness of self must make to one's mm 
existence. It is this, ontological, self-affirmation that underlies and makes 
possible and 1s expressed by affective self-affirmation. Affective self-
affirmation is the formula of that natural love-of-self that is the basis for 
the whole appetitive life of a person. Hhen I love another with radical love 
what I do is, essentially, to affirm him affectively as I affirm myself. 
Because of the mutual indwelling set up by love this can be expressed from the 
opposite point of view as well: "In the act of radical love I affirm him as 
he affirms himself, making him the term of the basic affirmation by which I 
affirm myself." (Toner, 1968: 142) Hence it can be seen that an affective 
identification has been made between his own act of being and mine. Once more 
it must be said that there is no obliteration of the otherness of the object of 
love. In affectively affirming his being as I do my own, there is no confusion 
of or fusing between the two acts of being, his and mine, but the transference 
of my act of self-affirmation in all its peculiar imperiousness, pervasiveness 
and absoluteness, to include him as well. He and I remain distinct but the 
act by 1v-b.ich I affirm myself i$ the very act by which I affirm him. 
It 1s thus the act of affective affirmation that is the essence of radical love. 
We have come to the end and reached the root of Toner's descriptive analysis 
of the experience of radical love, 
analysis in the following formula: 
He sums up the various elements in the 
" ... radical love is a response 1n which the lover 
affectively affirms the beloved for the beloved's 
self (as a radical end), in himself (on account of 
his intrinsic lovable actuality), directly and 
explicitly in his personal act of being, implicitly 
in his total. reality, by which affirmation the 
lover's personal being is consonantly present to and 
in the beloved and the beloved present to and in him, 
by which the lover affectively identifies with the 
loved one's personal being, by l-Jhich in some sense 
the lover is the beloved affectively." (Toner, 1968: 183) 
3.2 Mutual love 
Having provided a definitive description of radical love Toner applies it to 
the reciprocal relation he calls communion, This is an intersubjective relation 
1 'l I 
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1.n \vhich each of two persons knm.;rs and loves the other. He considers the most 
intense form where the knm-1ledge is not merely notional but experiential; each 
knows the other as the unique person that he 1s, with the fulness of knowledge 
made posssible by love. (Toner, 1968: 187) The situation between the lovers 
(whom I shall now refer to as "I" and "You") can be made precise as follows: 
1) We both love each other. 
2) We each know we are loved by the other. 
3) We each know that the other knows that he is loved. 
Applying Toner's definition of love to this situation we get the following 
detailed analysis of communion. In this analysis He are only concerned with 
love and not knowledge. 
1) I affirm you as I affirm myself. 
2) You are affirming me as you affirm yourself. 
3) I know this, and so I am affirming you (as I affirm myself) affirming me 
(as yoli affirm yourself). 
4) But as you also know that I love you, you are in fact on your part affirming 
me (as you affirm yourself) affirming you (as I affirm myself). 
5) If I then, in addition to knowing that you love me, also know that yo~ know 
of my love for you, then my love for you amounts to me affirming you (as I 
affirm myself) affirming me (as you affirm yourself) affirming you (as I affirm 
myself). 
6) You have the same knovJledge of me as I have of you and therefore are engaged 
1n a love of me of equivalent complexity to 5). 
What emerges from this form of intersubjectivity are the following t-.;.;ro conclusions 
relating to interpersonal love. 
If 3) is considered it can be seen that by loving you I am actually loving 
myself. I am affirming your own act of self-affirmation, which is in fact an 
affirmation of me. This is not of course the motive of my love, but simply 
the resultant of the intersubjective situation. The object of my affective 
affirmation just happens to be identical with myself, while at the same time 
being you. Notice in this connection the difference between affirming you as 
I affirm myself, which is the definition of love, and this previously unrealised 
truth that by affirming you I affirm myself. There 1s a natural self-affirm-
ation which is not at all mysterious and that is the root of all love. The 
self-affirmation that occurs as the result of my affirmation of you is something 
quite different and not at all an obvious phenomenon of personal life. 
The complementary insight, that in this intersubjective commun1on when I love 
myself I am ipso facto loving you, emerges from a consideration of 4) and 5). 
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4) 1s simply the correlative of 3): by loving me you are actually loving your-
self, for the reasons equivalent to those set out above, In 5) it appears that 
I both knmv and affirm your affirmation of me, the affirmation that makes your 
love of me love of your self. By thus making your affirmation of me my ovm 
I begin to love ~~self in a ne~-J Hay, from your point of vie\v as it were. But 
affirming myself in this T..vay, as you do, is identical \vith affirming ycu, since, 
as in L•), by loving me you are loving yourself. 
am loving you. 
Hence by loving myself now, I 
From this it follows that in the intersubjective situation of commmnon whoever 
I love, the other is simultaneously loved; the love for s~lf and other is identical. 
And of course this applies as much to you as it does to me. As has been said, 
this analysis takes for granted complete mutual knowledge of another by both 
participants. lfuere that is lacking, and to the Jegree that it is', the identity 
of the object and the act of each lcve will be correspondingly less complete. 
I have presented the situation of intersubjective commun1on 1n as schematic a 
way as possible for the sake of clarity. But lest by doing this I obscure the 
singular nature of the union and identity between the two subjects I will now 
quote at length from Toner's description of it. 
"To begin 'A7ith, He can note that in communion all that 
was said above about the union established by unilateral love 
is doubled from the side of the loved one, vJho nm·J is lover 
as well as loved. And all we said about being loved is 
doubled from the side of the lover T..vho now is loved as vJell 
as loving, I knm..r and love you in and for your unique 
self. You know and love me in the same way. My act is 
an act of union and for me an increase of conscious life. 
Your act is an act of union from your side and for you an 
increase of conscious life. My being loved by you is in 
some sense an expansion of my being into your conscious 
life. So also your being loved by me is in some sense an 
expansion of your being into my conscious life. 
All this is so even if neither of us is a,.;rare of the other 1 s 
love. But, in that case, the doubling and the union con-
stituted by it does not enter the conscious life of either 
of us. Ea~h actualizes in his own consciousness only one 
side of the reality of love, his mm love. Neither of us 
actualizes in consciousness the other's love or his own 
being loved. Wt1at is missing is easily seen by noting 
what happens when we do come to know of each other's love. 
Because I love you, I already experience an increased 
fulness of life by union with you. Now when I discove·c 
that you love me, my consciousness is flooded Hith a new 
experience of fuller life in more complete union with you. 
I become aware of what already was; your love, your greater 
fulness of life in union Hith me, my expanded existence and 
doubled union with you in your love. What was reality 
before I became aware of it was conscious reality only in 
1P./ 
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your life. Nm.; it enters my conseious life 
also. And because I affirm myself, all that 
I nm.;r experience from your side enters my con-
sciousness as my life, not only the expansion 
of my being by being loved, but also your increased 
fulness of life in loving me. I was already you 
affectively. Now your conscious life, which is 
mine by reason of my love, begins to enter my 
consciousness. The ~.;rhole experience is paralleled 
from your side. r: (Toner, 1968: 191) 
Up to this point Toner's account is concerned with the relational structure 
of communion where, although each loves the other and knm.,rs that he is loved, 
neither knows that the other kno~.;rs that he is loved. When this final con-
clition is met, according to Toner, (1968: 192) "the reciprocal conscious acts 
of love so deeply interact and interpenetrate as in some sense to constitute 
one composite mutual act." And again, "The acts are mutually actualizing and 
form one total mutual act." (Toner, 1968: 193) This is his way of describing 
the final identity between the objects of the acts and the acts themselves 
brought out by our schematic outline of his theory. The degree of mutuality 
present ~n commun~on of this kind is to our mind most po1JJerfully and most 
accurately expressed by saying that when, in this state of intersubjectivity, 
I love you it is myself that I am loving, and vice versa, my self-love is love 
of you. 
3.3 Critique of Toner 
We must now review Toner's account of love to see what conclusions we can draw 
from it that will be relevant to our own special interests. If this ~s indeed 
vlhat personal love consists ~n, what then must persons be ~n order to be able to 
love like that? And if we can answer that question will we then have a better 
idea as to what part such love is capable of playing ~n a person's life, how 
central or important it will be? 
Although Toner's account of personal love is avowedly descriptive and not 
metaphysical, it ~s shot through with metaphysical expressions of a Thomistic 
type which at least at one point seem to constitute a metaphysical formulation 
of what it is to be a person, He contrasts the affective self-affirmation 
that is the root o~ all radical love with a more fundamental self-affirmation 
of a person which is "his very act of being." (Toner, 1968: 147) This is 
"A declaration and affirmation of self which is actually and actively constitutive 
of self in reality." (Toner, 1968: 148) And again, a person's "act of being is, 
as it were, an exclamatory affirmation of self, an actively constitutive exclam-
atory affirmation." (Toner, 1968: 147) Thus it does seem as though Toner 
is working with an essentially self-referential notion of a person such as that 
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involved 1n our notion of self-enactment. As to whether his theory of love 
actually entails such a notion, I think that, in vie\v of his repeated insistence 
that the affective self-affirmation that is idP.ntical with personal love i~ what 
most deeply and fully expresses, reveals and communicates what the lover 1.s, we 
can give an affirmative answer. 
There is another instance \vhere light is thrmvn on the notion of the person 
implied in Toner's theory of love. He makes a distinction between two senses 
of "self", only one of which is adequate to the notion of self-affirmation 
implied by his theory of radical love. 
"If by self is meant the egocentric self, the self 
who is only for self and not for others, the self 
who sees any giving to others as a loss to self, 
who sees all things ultimately as for self alone, 
this self gives rise to a selfish self-love. The 
denial of this self and this self-love is really a 
correlative of radical love for others. One cannot 
love self in this way and sti}l love others with 
radical love. The lover has to make a choice between 
self or the other. There is, however, a second 
meaning of self, which is that of the personal or 
interpersonal self. Self in this meaning is only 
actualized in loving others \vith a genuinely radical 
love, an affirmation of the other for the other's 
own sake. The denial of this self makes genuine 
radical love of the other impossible." (Toner, 1968: 143) 
This distinction bet\.;reen a "personal" self and an "egocentric" self 1s not very 
precisely expressed here, nor is it further elaborated elsewhere. It could 
indeed be taken as a description of two possible attitudes to oneself rather 
than two constitutive aspects or elements of a human self. Nevertheless it 
does suggest that there are two aspects to a person that can be the objects of 
two corresponding attitudes, only one of which can serve as the foundation of a 
self-affirmation which can be transferred in its wholeness and integrity to 
another. Indeed such a self-love is so little opposed to love of others that 
it would seem, according to Toner, to require it and to feed off it. If such 
a self-love is truthful, as Toner insists it is, then a very singular notion of 
. 
a "personal" self is implied, a notion that appears very similar to the one that 
we have been developing in this work . 
. More 1 ight is thrmvn on Toner's notion of a person by another feature of his 
description of intersubjective relations that occurs frequently. This 1s, 1n 
his own words, "the very puzzling but clearly observable fact, that not only is 
participation in the beloved's life, as described, in direct ratio to the intensity 
and purity of radical love, but so also is the realization of the distance and 
unique personal reality-of both the loved and the lover." (Toner, 1968: 134) 
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The development of individuality and mutuality 'vould appear to go hand in hand: 
the- more a person "enters into union, i.e., affective identity, with other 
pe1:sons, the more he is himself." (Toner, 1968: '136) This process of course 
reaches its culrn.ination in co1nn1union. Regarding this Toner (1968: 194) says, 
"It is a striking fact that this union of persons J.n a mutual act composed of 
their reciprocal loves is such that the more they are one in their loves the more 
they are distinct as persons to each other, not separate nor even separable, but 
distinct Union and distinction turn out to be in direct instead of inverse 
proportion.'' The general idea of personal individuality is clear: it 1s non-
exclusive in character, intrinsically shareable. As such it must be contrasted 
with another sort of individuality, the sort associated with material things. 
Material individuals can react with others of the same sort; there can even be 
reciprocal interaction. But there can be no identification between them; the 
more they merge the less they retairi their mm identity. With persons, at least 
insofar as they are related by mutual love, exactly the opposite is the case. 
To sum up then, it would seem that Toner's account of love does involve a notion 
of the human person similar to that give~ in our theory of self-enactment. 
Radical love in fact implies a fundamental self-a-vmreness and self-affirmation as 
its condition of possibility. Further, such love insofar as it achieves an 
affective identification T..Jith another in his most personal depths also implies 
the transcendence of the limitations of particularity on the part of the lover. 
Not only does he participate cognitively, volitionally and emotively in the 
life of another; he also lives his own life from the other's point of view. 
More accurately perhaps, he occupies a point of vie'v and affirms a value that 
includes both himself and the one he loves and includes both in the uniqueness 
of their distinct personhoods. 
That the union and individual self-affirmation should increase in direct and 
not in inverse proportion in radical love is another feature that 1s consonant 
with our analysis of persons 1n terms of self-enactment. And it is of a piece 
with the identity-in-difference of communion as described by Toner. If the 
description is true then it would appear that a causality 1s involved in this 
intersubjective relation that is radically different from that of any physical 
determinism. Here it appears to be the case that the greater the influence of 
the one on the other the more the self-determination of the other is enhanced. 
The individuality that grows in the relation of love is not an individuality of 
isolation and exclusion. It is an individuality of increased self-possession, 
and the relation of two self-possessed beings leaves each the freer the more 
complete the self-possession is. Such at any rate is the way we feel bound to 
interpret Toner's description of communion. These are preliminary remarks 
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however, since Johann's account of love based as it is on tltc distinct parts 
of love, is as we would expect, ln many \vays a development of Toner's. The 
degree to which he confirms the broad outlines of Toner's theory \ve shall see. 
4. The 'parts' of love: R Johann 
In his study on love, The Meaning of Love, Johann (1966) notes the lack of and 
the consequent need for a treatment of love that integrates phertomenological 
accuracy with a systematic metaphysical base. Such a metaphysical base is, 
he believes, provided by Aquinas' metaphysics vlith its distinctive theory of 
being. Aquinas hm.;rever, for all the profundity of his treatment of love, lacked 
the detailed grasp of human subjectivity provided by modern Thomists and others. 
So Johann (1966: 17) concludes that the key to understanding love lies, we think, 
~n a synthesis of Thomist thought, as furnishing the metaphysical framework for 
a philosophy of intersubjectivity, with the insights of contemporaries into the 
mystery of intersubjectivity." He accordingly develops his own theory of love 
out of Aquinas', with nevertheless certain criticisms and additions. 
His starting point ~s Aquinas' Aristotelian definition of love: to love is to 
\vish good to someone. As we have pointed out, this definition establishes two 
irreducible parts of love: amor amicitiae and amor concupiscentiae. The first 
Johann renames direct love, the second he calls simply desire. The expression 
"direct love" for amor amicitiae seems amply justified s~nce, as is clear from 
the definition, the act of love terminates in the person for whom ~;.;rhatever is 
desired is desired. It also of,course avoids the confusion of the usual English 
translation, "love of friendship", with friendship (the relation) itself. "Desire1' 
en the other hand need not cause confusion with desire as a form of love since 
Johann does not talk of the forms of love at all. And in English at any rate 
this is in fact the -.;.;rord we use to refer to what Aquinas means by amor 
concupiscentiae. Nothing of course·especially to do with sex! 
4. 1 Direct love 
Let us consider now the two parts of love. They are distinct but inseparable. 
We desire the goods we desire for the sake of the one whose good we have at 
heart, whether oneself or another. To fprestall confusion, the distinction 
between desire and direct love is not that between love of things and love of 
persons. Persons can be desired for the sake of other persons. Nor is the 
distinction that between egoism and altruism, or selfish and unselfish love. 
Direct love can be either for oneself or another. 
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Desire is a subordinate type of love as it 1s always referred to someone's good. 
Its character as a deficient form of love lS seen in the fact that it does not 
extend to the thing itself of which it is desire. This needs explanation. 
Something is desired because it J.S felt to contribute to the happiness or Hell-
being of a person. It is seen 1n relation to a person's needs and desired 
because it is the sort or kind or class of thing that will meet them. It is not 
desired 1n its very particularity as a separately existing thing. This is not 
to say that it may not be desired for qualities \vhich it and it only does possess. 
But one must distinguish bet\veen such qualities and its actuality as a separately 
existing being. Thus I am able to desire salami and especially perhaps the sort 
containing whole pepper-corns. What I am not able to desire 1s its existence 
quite apart from any relation to the needs of persons, myself or others. If I 
do Hill its being thus, simply, then it is by virtue of direct love and not desire. 
Whether Aquinas, even as a Neapolitan, would have admitted to the possibility of 
direct love for salami is doubtful. He would probably have put salamis in the 
class of irrationalia for whom direct love is only possible in a metaphorical 
sense! The point however is that the object of desire, even if it is the only one 
of its kind, is not desired for its own sake. It is not the sheer fact of its 
existence that is loved but the fact that it is a being of such and such a type 
or even, in addition, that it has such and such unique qualities of its o\~. 
Direct love on the contrary does will the being and the well-being of the beloved. 
Thus direct love and desire differ both as regards their relation to the lover and 
as regards that aspect of the beloved that is loved. In desire the lover is 
concerned with his or someone else's needs and their satisfaction. In direct 
love he is affirming someone's worth, though not with regard to any virtue they 
might have or anything else that distinguishes them from other persons. Nor 
even in regard to their human nature. It is simply the fact of their existence 
that is celebrated. Direct love affirms that it is a good thing that they 
exist. It wills the good of the beloved, not 1n the sense of desiring some-
thing additional for them (though of course it does that too because it wills 
their good) but in the sense of willing their full development or perfection, 
the complete flowering of what they have it in them to be. It is difficult to 
catch in non-scholastic language what Aquinas means by that "being", which, 
beyond all essential character and accidental quality, is the term of direct 
love. Johann tends to conceptualise it as power, or activity: every existing 
being of whatever kind is the embodiment of a certain power and is actively 
being itself and no other being. 
According to Aquinas the primary object of direct love is oneself. Johann 
accepts this axiom, which is integrated into Aquinas' whole theory of being. 
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Just as the formal object of love is the very being of an individual, so it 
1s part of the integrity of an individual being to love its own act of being or, 
u1 Thomistic language, to knoH it and >-lill it as good. 
The mnom 1s of great importance in an account of interpersonal love that is 
based on a Thomist metaphysics, s1nce an account will have to be given both of 
the principle and the motive of the transference or sharing of this fundamentally 
self-referred love 1vith another. On the other hand rooting a theory of inter-
personal love in the being of the individual 1n the way that Aquinas does has 
the virtue of establishing love as a natural power and not simply a c:1ltural 
epi-phenomenon. There might be a tribe somewhere in Africa where self-love 
(and the love of others too by all accounts!) has so atrophied under the pressure 
of the natural and social environment that it has to all intents and purposes 
died out; nevertheless this is a real perversion or deviation of a natural impulse 
and will show itself in the psychic pain o.nd disintegration of tl-:e individual 
members of that society. 
Johann follows Aquinas in taking the principle of transference of self-referred 
love to others to be some sort of likeness, similitude or community between 
lover and beloved. "If I love another as directly as myself, it is only because 
the good which I love in myself 1s somehow shared by him." (Johann, 1966: 32) 
Since the object of direct love 1s the beloved's act of being, any lesser form 
of likeness will be inadequate to found direct love of another; only a likeness 
or communion of acts of being \vill do. 
fs we shall see the notion of a likeness or commun1on of this sort 1s elusive 
and Johann criticises Aquinas for substituting another kind for it 1n many 
places in his writings. This is likeness of nature of various kinds, most 
commonly the likeness of both being human. This sort of affinity between 
members of the same species (or nation or family or race group or whatever) could 
certainly act as the foundation of various forms of altruism (an obvious modern 
variant would be Kantian "respect") but never as that of direct love itself. 
Here a likeness between what for each person is most distinctively his own, his 
incommunicable individuality, is required; "we have to find a community such that 
the other in his very uniqueness is still somehow one- -v1ith myself." (Johann, 
1966: 36) Working this problem out takes Johann to the very heart of his 
metaphysics of love. In so doing he presents us with a view of persons and the 
nature of their fulfilment that is extremely helpful for our own purposes. 
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4.2 Jhe being of persons 
If a being is to be capable of direct love of another it must first be capable 
of direct love of itself. Johann follows Aquinas in holding that it is only 
persons that are capable of this. "A being that is absorbed, as it were, in 
a material nature, never really conscious of its own proper subsistence is 
equally and strictly incapable of really loving itself." (Johann, 1966: 41) 
Persons, on the other hand, are present to themselves as subjects of thought and 
action, and hence to their m·m unique act of being, ,.,hich in terms of the theory 
is the only proper object of direct love. Johann's description of the way 1n 
which a person is present to himself 1s so rich and revealing, and also fits in 
so well with the concept of a person as self-enacting that 1s being developed 1n 
our descriptions of intersubjectivity that I will quote it at some length. 
"The subject is present to himself as the secret 
and profound source of his activity. This is to 
say he knows himself precisely as subject, He 
experiences himself concretely from within as really 
existing, as exercising a true initiative. He has 
a living and experimental consciousness of himself 
as an "I". This self to which the subject is 
present is thu.s ineffable and incommunicable, 
It is not an abstract concept. The concept of the 
self remains exterior to that '"hich it Hould signify 
and of which consciousness affirms the presence. 
Abstractly, the self is a characteristic common to 
all men. But the self of \vhich there is here question 
poses itself in its unique exercise of existence, 
manifests in its singularity its responsible causality, 
renews itself incessantly in its identity in an act 
that is concrete and lived. It is a subsistent pleni-
tude revealed to itself in its own immanent activity; 
a generous abundance of being open to itself, not 
indeed as a pure datum of introspection, capable of 
being isolated and determined by a collection of 
attributes, but as affirmed and attained in the act 
by which it poses itself. This profound source is 
therefore unequaled by the knowledge had of it ,, . 
And it is this original and subsistent value, seized 
in the existential act of giving itself to itself, 
that I love \vhen I love myself. Willing good to 
myself, I give and devote myself explicitly to the 
full unfolding in being of this intimate value, this 
unique subjectivity to which I am present in myself, 
and which as in me is myself." (Johann, 1966: 41) 
There are so many felicitous phrases in this description that detailed comment on 
it could well present us with the picture of the person that we ourselves are 
trying to provide. We prefer however to let the full picture emerge through the 
descriptions of intersubjective relations. There is always a danger, in such 
fulsome descriptions, of expression outrunning understanding, due to the 
obscurity and simplicity of what is being described and the difficulty of veri-
fication. One thing however that this description does bring out very well and 
which requires comment in our present context is the repeated insistence that the 
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self of personal self-consciousness is not simply a content of consciousness, 
a concept, idea or experience, but a reality. Nor, at the same time, is it some 
objective entity, in principle observable if only by ::ome extraordinary form of 
introspection. Philosophies tltat only recognise these two classes of referents, 
ideas and observable entities, must therefore dismiss it as a mystification or 
at best a metaphor. Johann on the other hand, identifies it with Aquinas' 
"act of being", too interior to all our activity to be experienced or conceptual-
ised as an object but instead the existential principle of such acts of self-
r~flection. 
Since persons are present to themselves ln the above sense they are present 
to their own act of being and hence are ln a position both to love themselves 
directly and so, any further necessary condition being met, to extend such direct 
love to others. Both Aristotie and Aquinas use the expression "another self" 
to refer to the formality under which self-love is extended to another. A 
quotation will give an idea of the ~·my in v1hich this mysterious expresslon lS 
used: "When a man loves another Hith the love of friendship, he wills good to 
him just as he wills good to himself; wherefore he apprehends him as his other 
self, insofar, namely, as he wills good to him as to himself." (1.11.28.1) 
(Thomas Aquinas, 1963) Such an expression begins to raise a question about the 
adequacy of Johann's account of the necessary conditions for the extension of a 
person's self-love to another. Both he and Aquinas hold that it is indeed only 
other persons that can be loved directly. And this seems reasonable since if 
the principle of extension of self-love is similitude and only persons can love 
themselves it would seem logical that they can extend this love only to others 
like them. But like them in what respect? As we have seen, likeness of 
nature is inadequate to found direct love of another. We are required to love 
that in the other that constitutes his very uniqueness, namely his act of being. 
We have just seen what this act of being is in the case of a personal being, 
namely the self of the presence-to-self peculiar to persons. Clearly such a 
presence to one's own act of being is necessary for direct love of self. But 
Johann has said nothing to show why it is sufficient for a similar love of others. 
Because as far as their actofbeing ~s concerned two persons are simply different; 
if that were not so they would not be two persons. So if I love my act of 
being simply because it is mine there is no way that I can extend my self-love to 
another, since his act of being is irreducibly his. 
We would seem to have reached an impasse, Either the extension of self-love 
to another is impossible and the whole Thomist theory is flawed or else one will 
have to discover something else in the notion of the self-love of a person that 
has not yet been brought out, 
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In fact we are already in possession of the solution to this apparent 1mpasse. 
In spite of its richness, Johann's account of our experience of being a self is 
lacking in one respect. As we saw in Rahner's systematic analysis of spirit-
uality (Chapter 2, Section 2) it is only because I am, cognitively anc:l volition-
ally, open to and oriented tm.;rards being as such, namely being in its limitless 
scope, that I am capable of the sort of cognitive and volitional self-possession 
that is characteristic of a personal being. Conversely, insofar as I am present 
to myself or with myself 1n those peculiar modes of life characteristic of 
persons as such, I am by that very fact present to and dealing with being in its 
limitless scope. In particular the exercise and affirmation of one 1 s uniqueness 
that 1s experienced in direct love can only take place against the background of 
love of being as such. 
It is precisely this that makes it possible for me to love another person 1n his 
very uniqueness, as distinct from me, and at the same time for my love of him to 
be an extension of self-love. If I loved myself just because I was myself in 
the sense of being different from him, then there -.;.;rould be no way in vJhich this 
love could be extended to him. But the uniqueness loved in self-love is really 
a unique participation 1n being as such, and this is also what I love in him. 
If, to speak more metaphorically for a moment, one thinks of "being 11 as a sort 
of, very fundamental, activity, then one could say that what I love in loving 
myself or him is this activity of "being". The peculiarity of course about 
such "activity" is that when he does it he is himself -.;.;rhereas when I do it it 
makes me me. To speak less metaphorically, when I love myself with the direct 
love that is only possible to personal, spiritual beings, it 1s not just being 
myself that I love but being as such, to the degree to which I participate and 
realise it in my mm being. Insofar as I am a spiritual being my m.;rn self-
enactment, in knowledge and love, is the enactment of being as such, a par-
ticipation 1n and affirmation of being in its limitless scope. And insofar as 
it is that, it is also an enactment of the other, since he too is a perspective 
on and a participation in being as such. Because of the limitlessness of the 
being that grounds each person's unique being as a person there can be no 
opposition between them ~.;hen they are loved as such. Hence a person's love 
of self does not exclude and can be extended to another. From this it can 
be seen why non-persons, even if they could per impossibile, love themselves 
directly could never extend such self-love to others. Hence the ability to 
do so is a manifestation of the truly spiritual nature of persons. 
Note that although it is because they have a certain nature that only persons 
can either love or be loved directly, it is not as possessors of a certain 
nature that they are loved. Even the similitude that makes the extension of 
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self-love possible, though it is present only 1n those who share a personal 
nature, is not this similitude of nature, but of a conmton participation in 
infinite being, which found both likeness and difference. 
Johann himself understands this notion of being. He se'es that "the idea of 
being does not express only that in beings in \vhich all communicate, but also 
that by ~,rhich each one is itself incommunicably." (Johann, 1966: 37) He even 
sees that this is "'hat I really love in loving myself. 
of limit: he refers to it as the Absolute: 
To emphasize its lack 
"Since, therefore, what I love in being 1s the presence 
of the Absolute, I can love it in the other as well as 
111 myself. And since as in myself it is myself, and 
1n the other it is himself, so my mvn proper good, loved 
J.n myself, can be found by likeness in the other in the 
very trait that irreducibly distinguishes him from me, 
his proper subsistence." (Johann, 1966: 39) 
He neveL however relates this capacity for the Absolute to the self-presence he 
so finely describes, and so never seems fully to grasp how it is by virtue of our 
spirituality that we are able to extend our self-love to other persons. 
We come now to the final condition forthe extension of self-love to another that 
Johann stipulates. This is simply that the other person must be present to me. 
Though obvious, this condition is not as simple as it looks. For if I am to 
love the other as a "second self", he must be present to me in some sense as I 
am present to myself. Direct love reaches to the beloved's being, 1n this case 
the very subjectivity of another person such as Johann has described. Hence a 
purely notional or general or even superficial knowledge of the other ~ill not 
suffice for the transference of direct self-love. Indeed the sort of knowledge 
of the other that is required is beyond the reach of even my most devoted efforts 
without reciprocity on the part of the one whom I love. Here Johann takes over 
the work of N~doncelleon the reciprocity implied by personal forms of conscious-
ness. He does not elaborate on it but simply affirms that "direct love implies 
between two persons a state of reciprocal consciousness.'' (Johann, 1966: 45) 
Such reciprocity is a matter of degree but, as N~doncelle (1966: 19) has shm-m, 
genuine love implies an ideal completeness of reciprocity. Johann does not 
deal explicitly with the question of the necessary conditions for the achievement 
of reciprocity and its growth as N~doncelle does but he is quite clear that its 
possibility is founded on the identity between true self-love and love of the 
Absolute, or being in its infinite scope. By loving the Absolute in myself I 
am open to its presence in the other and so too, presumably, to the self--love of 
the other which if genuine will have the same object as my mvn and hence tend to 
reveal itself to me. 
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4.3 Critical remarks 
Aquinas (1963) himself 1s too good a metaphysician to overlook, as Johann does, 
the connection between spirituality and the love of others. He notes it 
explicitly and in so doing reveals the fundamental ambiguity of the notion of 
self-love. 
"Love of self is common to all in one Hay; 1n another Hay 
it is proper to the good; in a third way, it is proper to 
the wicked. For it is common to all for each one to love 
what he thinks himself to be. Now a man is said to be a 
thing, in two ways: first in respect of his substance and 
nature, and in this way all think themselves to be what 
they are, that is, composed of a soul and body. In this 
way too, all men, both good and wicked, love themselves, 
in so far as they love their own preservation. 
Secondly, a man is said to be something in respect of 
some predominance, as the sovereign of a state is spoken 
of as being the state, and so, what the sovereign does, 
the state is said to do. In this way, all do not think 
tltemsel ves to be \vhat they are. For the reasoning mind 
is the predominant part of man, v7hile the sensitive and 
corporeal nature takes the second place, the former of 
which the Apostle calls the imvard man, and the latter, 
the outv.rard man (2 Cor. iv, 16)-:-- Nmv the good look upon 
their rational nature or the inward man as being the 
chief thing in them, vrherefore in this v1ay they think 
themselves to be what they are. On the other hand, the 
wicked reckon their sensitive and corporeal nature, or 
the outHard man, to hold the first place. ~·Therefore, 
since they knmv:not themselves aright, they do not love 
themselves aright, but love what they think themselves 
to be.· But the good know themselves truly, and therefore 
truly love themselves." 
The distinction between types of self-love is established by reference to cliff-
ering types of self-knowledge. In each case the knowledge in question must not 
be understood as abstract or theoretical, but rather as the sort of self-kno\v:ledge 
that is based on one's ordinary everyday experience of self and is present as an 
essential ingredient in one's choices and one's acts. Thus the first sort is 
not the self-knowledge of one who has a particular theory of human nature, 1.e. 
that human beings are composed of two principles, a formal and a material, but 
the ordinary awareness of self of any normal person. With regard to the self-
knowledge of the good it can be seen that it is nothing other than the sort of 
sel £-knowledge expounded 1n our m-m previous chapter. It is centered on a 
value judgement regarding the relative importance of the various capacities that 
make up human nature. And because the value judgement is right, the lover is 
able to love himself as a whole as he really is. This in contradistinction to 
the previous, natural love where what is loved, though a true, is nevertheless 
but a partial, aspect of the whole man. The wicked on the other hand have got 
the hierarchy of values wrong and hence their self-love, taken as a whole, does 
not love themselves as they by nature are. 
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In terms of the general thesis of this work it 1s instructive t.o see Aquinas 
linking self-love to self-knowledge and, furthermore, insisting that only the 
good person can truly love himself. It 1s even more instructive that he should 
describe the principle of such true self-love concretely as "rational nature" and 
"the inward man". He 1s indeed even more explicit in another place 1:-1here he 
Hrites, "a 111.:1:1. is said to love hims8lf by reason of his lovin8 himself with 
regard to his spiritual nature." (Thomas Aquinas, 1963) Jchann, in spite of 
his emphasis on subjecti·Jity fails to bring out the genuinely spiritual character 
of that subjectivity, in the way that we have come to understand it in the 
present work, and so fails both to properly explain how self-lo~e can be extended 
to another and 'tvhy only the self-love of a good person can be extended in this 
way. Aquinas' theory of love, which in this respect is consonant with our own, 
provides an adequate explanation of this and so justifies the co~~on usage where-
by "selfishness" is a pejorative term. 
In any case it 1s true that for Johann, as for Aquinas, my goodness or perfection 
1s bound up with my ability to love others directly. Since direct love of 
others is only possible because it is included in love of the Absolute, and love 
of the Absolute implies a true self-love, direct love of others is the visible 
sign of the genuiness of one's love of self and therefore of one's development 
and completeness as a person. Johann's (1966: 52) description of what happens 
to me v7hen I love another with direct love reveals the role played by this 
seemingly abstract element in true self-love in extremely concrete terms: 
"\.Jhen I love another directly, I break the 1 ittle 
circle I form \vith myself where I would lodge the 
other simply as an idea. I discover a new exist-
ence; I am present to a new and transcendent revelation 
of that value I love in myself. And by that very 
fact, I cure myself of the exclusiveness, the poverty, 
the solitude that are my lot and my curse when, 
through egoism, I constitute myself the center of the 
universe and the absolute. Here for the first time 
I am open to Value in all its infinity and mystery. 
So long as I love myself exclusively, I fail to 
realize the transcendent and absolute character of 
the value present in myself; it is loved precisely 
where its participation in plenitude is interrupted, 
precisely as detached and alone. The only way to 
fathom the depths of the value which I am in myself 
is to turn towards and be open to that same value 
where it exceeds the bounds of my proper subjectivity. 
I cannot really love myself without loving other selves. 
Only when drawn into communion with other selves is my 
own person confirmed in being and my own love equal to 
the perfection to which it secretly aspires." 
The direct love of others is thus a condition of the true love of self and thus 
of one's growth as a person. Nevertheless, as Johann points out, my self-
perfection is not precisely the motive of direct love of others. To be worthy 
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of the name, love cf another must be lo,.re of him for his own sake, unselfish 
H1 the common meaning of the term. How can such a love be related to the 
natural dynamism tmvards self-perfection Hhich. as ,.,e have seen, underlies even 
the true love of self? Surely at this point love of self and of another must 
be seen as simple contraries? 
4.4. 'J'he Nature of Other-love 
Thus far we have dealt with Johann' s treatment of the _principle of the direct 
love of others. The question we have just raised is a question not about its 
principle but its motive. And Johann deals with the question of the motive of 
direct love of others in the final part of his treatise on love ,.,here, having 
treated direct love and desire separately in order to clarify the peculiar nature 
of direct love, he now treats them together, in relation to one another as 
complementary ingredients in the complex but unified activity of human love. 
The two parts of love, desire and direct love, correspond to two aspects of a 
person called by Johann "taleity" and "ipseity". By "taleity" he means a 
person's nature, in the case of human persons their humanity with all its 
natural capacities and needs, includingthose that make human beings also 
persons. By "ipseity" he refers to the act of being itself, the self of 
personal beings, that is the subject of the individual nature and its acts. 
Now as. taleity, as having a particular nature, a person necessarily desires what 
is perfective of that nature, what will develop his personal capacities to ful-
filment. He desires his mvn perfection. On the other hand as ipseity, as a 
subsisting subject, he directly loves and values himself for his 0\v'll sake. 
As a personal being however his very subjectivity is constituted by an openness 
to and an orientation to being in its infinite scope. And this term and 
foundation of subjectivity, though not, as \¥e have seen, different from the 
subject himself, because it is the ennabling and originating condition for the 
subject's very subjectivity, must be experienced as other than the self. Insofar 
as there is an experience, of whatever kind, of what is genuinely infinite, 
involved ~n a person's own self-awareness, there 1s also an experience of one's 
own finiteness and hence of the unique otherness of the infinite. In other 
words, there ~s an experience of a non-identity with being as such. The other-
ness is said to be unique because its presence is what constitutes the subjectivity 
ofthe.self; it is no way opposed to the self as one human person is to another. 
As we have seen it is the active orientation and adhesion to being ~n its infinite 
scope that makes possible the extension of self-love to another. At all events 
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it is because of this characteristic of a person that his direct love of self, 
as well as being the deepest and most interior form of love has also an ecstatic 
character. It is directed more truly to the term and foundation of the self 
than to the self as such. Indeed, as the self's mm love, it is from this 
foundation that it most truly emanates, and hence to it that it naturally returns. 
Johann sums up the two aspects of a person as follows: 
"For a subject that is really a self, there would 
seem to be a twofold dynamism, a double finality. 
As a nature it tends to its full re;::lization and 
desires what '"ill contribute to that fulfilment; 
as ipseity, an "I", its dynamic orient.:ation is 
tmvards a "Thou", towards Absolute Subjectivity, 
the transcendent Source of all personality, the 
total existential Plenitude of T..vhom its own finite 
self is but a participation." (ML, 70) 
This twofold dynamis~ underlies the two parts of love. The one, desire, is thus 
both relative and exclusive, seeking what is perfective of a person's nature, 
the other, direct love, is absolute but ecstatic, unconcerned with the needs and 
fulfilment of the self and thus radically open and non-exclusive, 
In human persons the two parts of love coiPbine. Desire seeks the perfection of 
our personal capacities. And it finds in the society of other persons the 
necessary means to this end, Direct love seeks to express its infinite scope 
by giving itself to other persons, valuing them for their o\m sake without 
thought of reward, communicating the goodness of the self simply and not as a 
means to a further end. If the end of desire ~s self-fulfilment, the end of 
direct love is the gift of self for another's fulfilment or simply in adoration. 
The two parts of love are moreover iritrinsically related. In human persons it 
is only insofar as they achieve the perfection of their natures that they are able 
to know and love themselves as persons and hence become capable of an ecstatic 
love that expresses itself in the generous ~ndunself-seeking gift of self. 
Similarly it is because they are persons that perfection of nature will show it-
self in the love of other persons for their own sake. Such love will seek to 
communicate the perfection of the self, either in order to bring about the 
perfection of the other if it is lacking, or in simple celebration of it if it ~s 
already present, 
The question about the motive of the direct love of others has now been answered, 
Its peculiarity consists in its selfless character, We can now see it as the 
attempt to express a value that is infinite. This takes the form of a direct 
love of other~ because of the finiteness of human persons. The love of others 
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expresses the transcendence of the confines of that material individuality 
which can be the object of an inadequate love of self. Johann emphasizes very 
strongly the desire for un1on with anoth~r on the part of finite persons. Such 
a desire goes beyond the desire for self-perfection; it parallels, as it were, 
the direct love of others that in fact brings about such a un1on. It lS becat.tse 
human beings are persons that they are capable of a disinterested love that trc.ns-
cends the distinction between self and other; it is because they are finite that 
they have a natural desire to love in this way. Such a desire goes beyond that 
for self-perfection, yet self-perfection is the necessary condition for its being 
met. 
5. Comparison of Johann with Toner 
Having critically analysed Johann's account of the parts of love, we are now 1n 
a position to compare the contribution of Johann with that of Toner$ to our under-
standing of personal love. As we have seen he bases his theory of love on a 
vie\v of the human person that is in essential respects the same as ours. There 
is the self-reference of subjectivity. And there is the orientation to being 1n 
its infinite scope. Johann does not appear to appreciate fully the intrinsic 
connection between these aspects of spirituality, but he is quite sure that they 
provide the necessary conditions for c. genuine love of other persons for their 
own sake. In this he goes beyond Toner in providing an adequate metaphysical 
base for personal love. His theory also goes a long way toHards shmving why 
the love of others for their m·m sake is both perfective of human persons and 
the natural express1on of a perfection already achieved. 
A feature of Toner's account that is lacking in Johann' s 1s the detaile'd treat-
ment of reciprocity. Johann admits that direct love of others is impossible 
without a minimum of reciprocity and that it can only grow to the extent that 
reciprocity does as well. But he offers no explanation of what the necessary 
conditions are for such reciprocity to exist and to grow. In fact toner also 
omits any consideration of this but he nevertheless supplies an extremely 
detailed account of the dynamics of reciprocal love. 
The most useful result of Johann' s analysis of love from our point of vJ_ew is-
perhaps his connecting the generosity and unselfishness of direct love of others 
with what we can now recognise as the spiritual side of human persons. His 
emphasis on this is much stronger than Toner's and more in accord with the import-
ance that we ourselves would attach to it. 
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From the 'wrk of Toner and .Johann we can riow see that a Thomistic theory of 
love shows that the love of others for their m-m sake is indeed made possible 
by the spirituality of human persons and thus a manifestation of their spiritual 
powers. Both Toner and Johann showed that the personal love of others implied 
a vie'..r of the human person that \vas in a general \vay self-referential. That this 
general reference-to-self was in fact self-enactment in our sense of the term was 
revealed by Toner's demonstration of the non-exclusiveness of personal communion 
and personal causality, a non-exclusiveness that meant that union and self-
identity increased in direct and not inverse proportion. It was also revealed 
by Johann's emphasis on the gratuitousness and unselfishness, the ecstatic 
character, of direct love, that went beyond all desire for self-perfection while 
being at the same time founded on it and expressive of it. In each case the 
limitlessness of the personal self's basic orientation, which is the essential 
foundation of self-enactment in our sense of the term, was revealed. 
6. InterpersonaJ Con~union 
Having completed a fairly thorough analysis of love He must nm.,r consider the 
special case of mutual love to see Hhether, as we should now expect, the nature 
of personal powers in their fulfilment will be revealed with an even greater 
clarity. 
In Toner's work on love the spirituality of human persons was revealed by the 
way in which personal individuality and interpersonal union were developed and 
I 
perfected together and how in the state of cornnrunion complete identification of 
self and other was achieved. In Johann it \vas the gratuitousness and generosity, 
the unselfishness, of love for the other that most clearly showed the person's 
spiritual nature. As Hill be seen, these various aspects of the lo~e of persons 
come together in the phenomenon of mutual love. An accurate description of the 
dynamism and finality of mutual love will reveal the spiritual nature of persons 
more clearly than ever. 
In the phenomenon of mutual love we are in fact considering the situation 
described by Toner in his section on communion. We wish, however, to incor-
porate into that the distinction examined by Johann between direct love and 
desire. In other words the love that is expressed between the partners in. 
communion l.S twofold. There is the love of each for the other and for himself. 
And then there is the good that each desires for the other and for himself as a 
consequence of that love. The first love is the foundational love, called by 
Johann direct love, and. is as we have seen in Toner's analysis, an affective 
affirmation of and identification with the loved one's act of being. The second 
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has as its most general object tl1e perfection of the nature of the person loved 
and hence all that is necessary for that perfection. Insofar as that perfection 
1s still to be achieved this subsidiary love will take the form of desire; insofar 
as it has already been acquired it will take theform of joy. And such desire 
for and joy in perfection \vill be referred both to the self and the other, to the 
degree, of course, to \.Jhich the basic self--love has been extended to the other. 
We are now in a position, having set out the ground-plan as it were, of mutual 
love, to see that the tendency and goal of personal love and its fullest expression 
is the communion constituted by full mutuality. 
If I love another as myself I consequently wish for him Hhat I \.Jish for myself, 
namely the perfection of his nature. Now, as we have seen, the perfection of 
a person nature is most properly and completely expressed in the direct love of 
other persons. As Johann put it, even the desire for self-perfection of a 
personal being goes beyond a merely immanent fulfilment of its personal powers, 
-
but culminates 1.n an ecstatic movement twoards another, towards nn1on. Hence 
---·- ---
my goal for the other whom I now love as myself lS that he should love me, not 
for my sake but for his. Of course I wish him to love me for my sake too; but 
that is the goal of my mm desire for self-perfection that follows from my love 
of self. And we are conside:dng what follm.;rs from my love of him. There is a 
further consequence too, this time affecting my attitude tovmrds my own desire 
for perfection. I now desire to be perfect not only for myself but for him, so 
as to constitute his fulfilment. 
It can be seen from this description how both object and motive of my love for 
myself and my love for the other merge, And this is true of both aspects of 
personal love. Just as the object and motive of direct love of self and other 
come together in communion so do the object and motive of the subsidiary love 
Johann calls desire. Indeed the object of each is nothing other than the complete 
mutuality of personal commun1on. In loving this communion, I love both myself 
and you as the unique persons that we are. In wanting this communion for myself 
and for you I simultaneously express my own desire for fulfilment and your own, 
Thus communion of this kind expresses the complete goal of all aspects of personal 
love and is what ultimately grounds its finality. One should however add one 
thing more for completeness' sake. In talking of mutual love I have used such 
words as "wish" and "want" to express thesubsidiary element in personal love, 
namely the love of the good that you wish the person ~ou love to gain. This 
was simply to distinguish it from the love of the person himself, Wor·ds like 
"wish" and "want" sound more like "desire" than "joy", but of course what we are 
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talking about is the love that underlies both desire and joy. It takes the 
form of desire when ,.,hat is loved is not yet achieved, of joy when it is. Now 
~n the case of personal communion clearly it can take both forms. Completeness 
of communion goes hand in ha·nd with the perfection of personal nature. Before 
this has been achieved both aspects of personal love will manifes the note of 
desire; '\.Jhen it is achieved desire will give way to joy. (In parenthesis it 
should be said that "faith" and"hope" are better terms than "desire" to express 
the note of futurity and incompleteness, as far as the foundational love of persons 
themselves is concerned. Perhaps "adoration" is the appropriate term for the 
state of completion.) 
The commun~on that is express~ve of mutual personal love can thus be seen to unite 
the special objects of both parts of love. Such a conclusion ~s expressly cor-
roborated by G Gilleman ( 1959: 1L;4) in his work The Prin~acy of Charity in Moral 
love considered as personal coF~union lies beyond the distinction 
between love of concupiscence and love of friendship." (PCM, ) It also unites 
the natural desire for self-perfection and the selfless love of others, the 
age-old dichotomy of ex:_os and a&ape made notorious by Nygren. (1944) This 
aspect of communion needs further comment since it brings out a distinctive feature 
of the love of persons very clearly. It is brought out especially clearly 1n the 
work of M Nedoncelle and is indeed a consequence of that feature of personal 
relations for the study of which he is best known, namely reciprocity. 
Nedoncelle (1966: 32) defines the communwn constituted by the reciprocal love 
of persons as the "heterogeneous identity of the.!_ and thou." He explains this 
striking expression in a way entirely consonant with Toner's account of identi-
fication: 
"It does not rest on the similarity bet-v7een its 
participants but on their harmonious originality. 
Certainly it leads us to state, without fear of 
presumption, that the I is the thou, but only in 
the perspective in which it causes the thou to be, 
and is itself willed by the thou. By this will, 
the subjects identify with each other, and do so 
only in the measure in which they become different." (Nedoncelle, 1966: 33) 
It can be seen from this that the communion of persons is the result and culmin-
ation of that distinctively "personal causality" that \.Je noticed in the previous 
chapter. Nedoncelle's distinctive contribution is to show that from start to 
finish it is characterised by reciprocity. This is so because all personal love 
contains the intention of reciprocity even when it is not explicitly reciprocated. 
And this is as true of agape as it is of eras. 
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"\.Jhat does it mean to give oneself to another? 
Is it to commit oneself to be concerned about 
him, to make him exist more fully? But the 
lover would deny the worth of his love did he 
not desire the beloved to sha-.r:e it and be loving 
in his turn. To will that the other be loving 
is to \vill that the love in me Hhat makes me able 
and \villing to love him; it is to ~·1ill that he 
love me." (Nedoncelle, 1966: 22) 
He concluded that "there is an eros of the agape, a need to possess the spirit of 
dispossession, a desire to find one's soul losing it," and that "the contrast 
proposed by Nygren is a psychological error.'' (Nedoncelle, 1966: 18) One could 
add that, similarly, there is an agape of the eros, also revealed in the love of 
of communion. I both V.7ill the other to love me for his perfection and I will to 
be perfect in order to love him as I ought. In any case it is clear that in the 
COmUlUnlOn of personal love both the desire of my OW11 perfection and the self-
forgetful love of others can find a common goal. 
\\That does this feature of coffil-nurnon tell us about personal love, and hence about 
persons? That the love expressive of the fulfilment of personal powers is 
universal in its scope, and is not specified by the particular person or persons 
whom a particular person happens to love. For the sake of clarity we have taken 
the couple as our model for mutual love and commmuon. But this is misleading 
if it should be taken to imply that the love of a fully-developed person is 
adequately expressed as love only of some particular person or other. We have 
pointed out its lack of exclusiveness. This must not be taken to mean simply a 
lack of exclusion within the couple, namely that the loved one 1s not excluded 
from the self-love of the lover. It has to be understood as an absolute lack of 
exclusiveness. In principle no-one is excluded from the love \vith which I love 
myself. Conversely I only truly love myself, and any particular other person, if 
my love is in principle open to everyone. Speaking of the love of communion 
Nedoncelle (1966: 60) 'tvrites: "vJe cow.mit ourself to make the other and ourself 
utterly lovable and loving. But for a consciousness to be so it must embrace 
the whole universe and strive for the promotion of all ot~er centres of con~ 
sciousness according to the same value system. The human love of one person leads 
to the love of all persons." The communion of mutual love which is the common 
goal of all personal love and the expression of the fulfilment of personal powers 
is thus a universal communion. And this at last explains the paradox of personal 
love, unselfishness, of how it can be a natural and valid expression of self-love 
that I love the other more than myself, that I sacrifice myself for him. What is 
being affirmed in true self-love as well as in the self-sacrificing love for 
another is the communion of mutual love that includes us both but in its essence 
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goes beyond us. In all genu1ne love it is this universal value that is 
affirmed in the desire for self-perfection as Hell as in the generous love of 
others. 
The universality of the conunun1on that is the object of personal love is in fact 
a clear sign of the spirituality of cur personal powers. It is the syniliol as it 
were, as well as the actual result, of our affirmation of a really infinite value 
111 our particular loves. When vJe sacrifice our own interests for others who are 
as finite as we are, ~ve are not simply being irrational but rather 've are both 
expressing our desire for fulfilment in a communion that transcends our own 
particularity, and our adoration of something of absolute value for its own sake. 
The orientation towards being in its infinite scope that characterises persons as 
spiritual beings is most clearly shmvn for what it is in the conunun1on of mutual 
love of persons. On the other hand it is in our attempt to bring about the 
communion of mutual love that we enact ourselves as spiritual beings. As 
Tallon (1973: 74) puts it in his article on the dialogal philosophy of :t:fartin 
Buber, "Person and Cormnunity", "to someone v1ho asks "How am I to become a person'?" 
the ans,ver remains "Enact counnunity." (Philosophy Today, Vol 17, 1973, pp 62-83) 
Nedoncelle too, isin no doubt that this understanding of the a1ms and dynamism of 
personal love entails a very definite notion of a person. Speaking of human 
persons he defines being a person as "the condition of the self that obliges it to 
seek its progressive fulfilment by itself, according to a perspective at once 
unique and universal. 11 (Nedoncelle, 1966: 60) It is the comhination of uniqueness 
and universality that is so characteristic of persons. Commenting on the defin-
ition, he says that it implies "a self-creating continuity, that is the presence 
of a free causality 1n the self. And ... it establishes the self in a vocation 
to totality; it recognises in the self, by that very fact, the highest form of 
finality and value.'' (N~doncelle, 1966: 60) He recognises the paradoxical 
character of a definition that juxtaposes two such contrary ideas as universality 
and un1queness or totality and individuality, but holds that an understanding of 
the phenomencn of ·love such as we have· presented can overcome this apparent contra-
diction. The two elements of personality are reconciled once one "analyzes the 
fact of love: in it, and in it alone, we understand that the self can keep and 
increase its singular self-awareness by becoming universal; for the self, by 
loving, wills to promote other selves and reach the entire universe of the spirit 
through them.,." (Nedoncelle, 1966: 62) 
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We have come to the end of our description of interpersonal love. The resources 
of a Thomist theory of love seem to have been adequate for our purpose, since it 
would appear from the analyses based on it that the love of others for their own 
sake is indeed expressive of the fulfilment of personal powers. Furthermore the 
notion of a person involved, rooted in the metaphysics of Aquinas, is consonant 
with and indeed augments our own notion of self-enactment. 
how this is so. 
7. Self-enactment in Interusbjectivity Ill 
He must now set out 
Our third description of the intersubjective relations of persons, namely that 
Hh ich is expressive of the fulfilment of personal powers, does indeed shm·l us 
persons as being in a general way self-enacting. The unselfish love of others 
for their own sake is an activity that is not only entirely unmotivated by any 
need on the part of the subject, but is expressive of a state of personal fulfil-
ment that has gone beyond distinctively personal needs. The person whose self-
expression manifests itself in this way is quite unconcerned with satisfying its 
personal needs sirice it has no such desires that are not already satisfied by the 
interpersonal situation it 1s 1n. In this sense it is quite self-possessed and 
self-contained. 
In the prev1ous tvm chapl~ers the need that persons had for other person.s 1n order 
to develop their specifically personal powers was stressed. In the present 
chapter we have considered the enactment of personal powers precisely as going 
beyond the need of others. The intersubjective context of the self-enactment of 
persons is nevertheless, as we have seen, retained. But what was previously 
revealed in a limited and some~..rhat negative form is here revealed in a full and 
positive one. 
In the unselfish love of others for their own sake there is a complete transcendence 
of one's m..rn particularity. One identifies wholly with the person one loves and 
enacts him as one enacts oneself. The content and the act of love of• self and love 
of the other are simply identical. 
At the same time, 1n loving them as oneself one is loving Hhat is the common 
interior ground of one's being as a person, the infinite term of one's orienta£ion 
on being as such. This means that (in view of the fact that one 1s a finite 
person) one is loving oneself precisely as a spiritual being, in the very meta-
physical ground of one's spirituality. One's activity is thus at the furthest 
possible remove from determination by what is material in any way. 
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Finally, the personal causality that was a feature of the two preceding descrip-
tions reaches its culmination here in the full reciprocity of personal communion. 
It 1s this form of personal mutuality that is the fullest possible manifestation 
of the lack of limitation in the orientation and capacity of a person, that is 
the ground of their self-enacting pm.;rers. Unselfish love of another person for 
his own sake and the enactlllent of personal communion are t~·JO sides of the same 
co1n. Unselfish love 1s an attitude and activity that is unconcerned with the 
fulfilment of need but 1s oriented to the affirmation of an infinite value. 
The unselfish love of another for his own sake to the point of self-sacrifice is 
expressive of the affirmation of a value that transcends the actual value of any 
particular person considered as such. They are loved .Cand so too is the self) 
as participants in a universal communion of mutuality which 1s the ultimate produc 
and symbol of the self's orientation to infinite being. 
To sum up then: the description of the unselfish love of another person for his 
ovm sake, especially when expressed in the mutuality of personal communion, 
reveals the fully developed person as self-enacting in the fullest possible way: 
in the self-transcendence of particularity, the freedom from external physical 
causality, the personal causality, and especially in personal communion we are 
presented with a personal analogue of self-enactment. In this, our third, 
description of the intersubjective conditions for the exerc1se, growth and fulfil-
ment of our personal powers, it 1s especially the phenomenon of personal communion 
that manifests the spirituality of the powers involved. The mutuality of communio 
would be manifestation enough of the full development of the personal causality 
tl1at is the interpersonal expression of self-enactment. In addition to that 
the universality of communion, a universality that in principle extends beyond 
the participants, however many they may be, makes this what I have called a 
symbol of the finite person's orientation to infinite being. It is important to 
see that the co~~unity is in principle open to all possible participants. Its 
universality is not simply a matter of being more than tt.;ro, but of being completel 
open to all. This follows from the non-exclusiveness which is a quality we have 
seen to be involved in the unselfish love of any particular person. It is not 
therefore really a question of numbers, of how many an unselfish love can 
accommodate, but of the intrinsic character of that love whether it is in fact 
directed at one or many. 
We have called this commun1on symbolic, but the conditions for its realisation 
have implications in the real world. And these we must now consider. 
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Our description of love has revealed a dynamism present 10 all love towards 
mutuality. And ou·c description of mutual love revealed that the full mutuality 
of communion depends on the perfection of the natures of the persons involved. 
Each participant must have complete self-knotvledge and be completely self-
affirming so as to be able to know and affirm the other completely. 
ench participant must be completely self-enacting. 
In a \vord, 
From this it follows that the necessary condition for the exerc1se and growth of 
a person's distinctively personal powers is the personal presence of a person 
\vhose development is complete. The goal of cow.munity that is present in and 
gives its distinctive character to our personal pm.;rer·s 1mposes this requirement 
on us. So it appears that the personal perfection of the "other" in our diff-
erent models for the personal life of the "self", \vas not an "unrealistic" 
feature of the description. It may of course be unrealistic in the sense that 
no sue~ person actually has ever existed or ever will. But it is realistic 
1n the sense that it is the necessary condition for the fulfilment of capacities 
which, (if \ve grant the substantial truth of our descriptions of personal inter-
action), persons undeniably have by nature and \vhich, moreover, (if Vle grant that 
these capacities add up to a capacity for self-enactment in the sense that we 
have defined it) make them spiritual beings. 
If we admit this conclusion then it \vould seem that vle are bound to admit another, 
that would seem to folloH from it. The tHe-person model is inadequate to express 
the reality of intersubjective relations. The reason for this inadequacy 1s 
simple. If I require the presence of a fully developed person in order to develoi 
as a person, then he must have developed to personal completeness in relation to 
someone other than I. If he relied solely on his relationship with me, Hith my 
incomplete self-knmvledge and imperfect love, for the mutuality that could 
express his perfection, it simply could not be expressed. As it is, if we admit 
the existence of a third, and. fully developed, person, the other's ovm perfection can 
find proper expression in relation t9 him: And his relation to me can be seen as an ex ten· 
sion qf the relati9n of full mutuality he enjoys Hith this ·third. It is in a context 
such as this that the importance of the radical non-exclusiveness, the univers-
ality, of the love of commun1on can be seen. Thus a more accurate picture of 
the necessary conditions for my development as a person Hould show me in the 
presence not of a single other person but of a communion of persons. It 1.s thus 
my integration into an already existing communion that provides the means to my 
development as a person. We should really begin at the beginning again and 
repeat our descriptions Hith this in mind. Or should we? 
1 1 
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Is it not apparent that we are in fact confronted by a problem of infinite regress? 
How did the third member of our modified model of intersubjectivity reach his 
personal fulfilment? Certainly not in relation to the, by definition, undeveloped 
second. So \ve must postulate a fourth. But even 1:hat \vill not \vork since we 
shall always need another as the necessary condition for the neYl member's develop-
ment. In fact ~vhat \ve need to complete the original model is not simply a 
third, fully developed, person but a person who, in addition to being fully-
developed, did not depend on another person for such development. 
\..Je could have come to the same conclusion by a shorter route if \ve considered 
not the ideal conditions for personal development but the actual situation of 
human persons. What \·le are actually confronted Ylith ~n our personal life ~s 
a situation in Hhich persons at various stages of incomplete development are 
present to each other. And in such a situation if it is the case that I need 
you ~n order to develop as a person, and you need me in precisely the same way, 
and if my personal development is conditioned by yours, then there is no poss-
ibility of any development at all. This abstract sounding analysis can be 
expressed in concrete terms ~n order to show its pertinence, If we have a 
natural capacity and a need as personal beings to love unselfishly, and we can 
only exercise this capacity if and to the extent that we are unselfishly loved, 
and if all persons are in the same boat, then this need can never be met, and 
such a love although a possibility will never develop. Unless there is a person 
with just such a capacity, b-ut,,;;-ho doesn't depend on others for its development. 
If this is the situation of actual human persons in relation to one another then 
four possibilities obtain. i\fe do not have the capacities and hence the needs 
that the account of persons 111 this ;..mrk maintains we do. We have precisely 
those capacities but we do not depend on others for their de~elopment and ful-
filment. We have those capacities and we do depend on others for their develop-
ment and thus they remain for ever undeveloped. We have those capacities and we 
depend on others for their development, and moreover we have undeniable experience 
of such development, and hence the necessary conditions for such development must 
exist. There is consequently a question as to which of these possibilites is in 
fact realised. I incline to the last on the basis of a belief in the experience 
of the reality of personal growth. On what grounds such a belief could be 
justified is a real and an intriguing question, but one which I cannot, alas, 
attempt to answer here. 
With the description of the fulfilment of personal powers our account of the basic 
forms of intersubjectivity is complete. 
and draw our conclusions. 
We must no~v proceed to sum up this study 
1~'> 
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CHAPTER 6. HUHAN SPIRITUALITY 
1 • Introduction 
The 1Jurpose of this chapter is to bring our study to a conclusion. Accordingly 
we review the results of our three descriptions of intersubjecti~ity to see how 
they manifest the spiritual nature of persons, We attempt to shmv that these 
results form a coherent picture of the spirituality of persons, a picture 
which thus presents us with a more easily recognisable personal and inter-
personal definition of the spiritual. 
Having thus completed our project 1n this respect we turn to consider the 
special case of human persons, since it is this that we are chiefly interested 
1n, and this has special problems of its own. We state and attempt to solve 
the problems specific to human spirituality. Finally, we state formally our 
conclusions to the study as a \vhole. 
2. The Intersubjective Hanifestation of Spirituality 
In each of our descriptions of th~intersubjective relations between persons the 
spirituality of personal powers has been manifested in a certain way. We must 
now collect these results together in a synthetic v1ew in order to see what 
conclusions we can form about human spirituality. 
2.1 The Exercise of Personal Powers 
If to be an agent is to be both self-conscious and self-determining in the sense 
that our first description implies, then persons are self-enacting 1n a locse and 
general sense of the term, It would indeed hardly seem necessary to argue for 
such a position. It is surely almost impossible to conceive of treating persons 
as though they were not aware of themselves as, in some sense, real originators 
of changes in the world. But this sort of self-reference cannot of course 
without more ado be equated with self-enactment as we have defined it. 
The most obviously striking sign of the spirituality of persons in our first 
description 1s that the exercise of personal powers cannot take place except in 
relation to an environment where they are already in use. (Chapter 3, Section 6) 
111e fact that personal capacities cannot be actualised by impersonal causes 
shows that there is a radical difference between persons and non-persons. This 
is the difference which we describe as that between spiritual and material beings. 
This difference is emphasised,by the fact that, according to the description, it 
1s not just any activity of persons that is required to enable the self-enactment 
of personal powers but precisely activity that proceeds from the specifically 
.., I 
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personal pmifers, and what ~s more from those pmvers as fully developed, The 
mother must actually Hill the personal development of the child, Acts that 
satisfy the child's biological needs produced by a machine arc not enough to 
enable the enactment of the child's personal powers, On the other hand a 
loving mother need perform !:~ __ other acts in order to reveal her love and her-
self to the child and so enable his strictly personal response. In the trans-
action as we have envisaged it there is a clear distinction between two different 
kinds of causality, 
The exercise of self-enactnlent on the part of the child in the transaction with 
the mother is revealed by two features of the description. (Chapter 3, Section 8) 
The first is the ability of the child to enter into the personal life of the 
mother and so appropriate her power to act as an agent. This ability to grasp 
the presence of a person as the origin of effects and to make bee project its 
ow~ represents a transcendence of its own separateness, and hence particularity, 
on the part of the child. The child's existence is revealed as (potentially) 
inclusive of the mother's. Its integrity as a personal individual does not 
depend on excluding the presence and influence of the mother as would that of 
an impersonal thing. The fact that it is able to really share the personal 
life of the mother in a way in '.-Jhich a non-personal thing could not, reveals a 
universality in the personal powers of the child. A concrete s~gn of this 
universality is the real lack of specificity in the capacities of a human infant. 
This empty openness we remarked on, this skill for no particular project, the 
very completeness of its orientation, albeit expressed initially as dependence, 
(one could even say parasitism) on the mother, provide a very expressive symbol 
of the universality of its powers that our description implies. 
The second feature of the description that reveals self-enactment Hi the strict 
sense, is the way that the causal influence of the mother creates not dependence 
but independence on the child's part. The more the child enters into the 
mother's acts the more it enacts itself. This freedom from deterministic 
causality (as opposed to personal causality) is not, to be sure, especially 
highlighted by the first description since it concerns the absolute minimum of 
the exercise of personal powers. The mother, rather than the child, exemplifies 
'the note of freedom in self-enactment, since in the exercise of her personal 
powers she is not motivated at all by ?eed but only by her project for the child. 
Nevertheless the fact that the child gains the exercise of essentially self-
referring powers while under the influence of the mother and because of that 
influence, is enough to show that it i~ 1n that respect, free of all ordinary 
causality and hence is self-enacting. 
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To sum up then, the first description offers us an interpersonal model of 
self-enactment in a person's ability to enter into and appropriate the life of 
another by means of a causality that 1s directly opposite to that of impersonal 
processes, One has only to compare this distinctively personal causality '"ith 
that involved in, say, the taking 1n of food, to grasp the crucial difference. 
2.2 The Growth of Personal Powers 
If personal growth consists in the development of self-knowledge and self-
affirmation as we have described them in our second description of interpersonal 
relations, then persons do become progressively more self-enacting in a loose 
and general sense of the term, There are those, no doubt, who are opposed to 
any idea of growth since it is inevitably a normative notion, but '"e can see no 
way of removing all normative discourse from the understanding and practice of 
human life, It would not be too hard to show that to argue for such a position 
would be inherently self-refuting. (cf. Boyle, 1976; Donceel, 1967; Lewis, 1947; 
Lonergan, 1957 and 1967; Mascall, 1957; Moleski, 1977; Muck, 1968) But, apart 
from all theoretical considerations, imagine how one would bring up children! 
As we saw in Chapter 4, Section 2, there are those who would admit growth in 
persons but confine it to areas susceptible of scientific control and measure-
ment, i.e. to the biological or strictly scientific psychological domains. 
One thinks of int~lligence testing, standards like genital primacy, and various 
other criteria fo~r grm.;rth in these realms. These areas of growth and standards 
of measurement are adequate as far as they go but they cannot be identified with 
personal growth as we have described it. 
Finally (as we also brought out in Chapter 4, Section 2) there are those who, 
\-.'hile admitting the notion of personal grm.;rth and recognising its normative 
character \.;rould '"ish to see it described in more obviously ethical terms than 
those that we have used. I do not think there is a problem here. If one 
substituted the terms "wisdom" and "love" for "self-knowledge" and "self-
affirmation" these critics would probably be satisfied, And it would make no 
difference to our idea of personal growth. But it would obscure our desire to 
overcome the dichotomy bet,.;reen psychology and morality, between what is merely 
part of nature and what is merely part of culture, The terms we use are intended 
to refer to the development of natural capacities, but to those uniquely personal 
ones that make culture in the strict sense possible. If we had described 
personal growth in terms of the growth of integration this could be interpreted 
in too narrowly a naturalistic way. If we had described it in terms of ration-
ality, then this could have been understood in a purely cultural way, 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
165,.. 
Over and above these considerations there is of course our desire to bring out, 
if at all possibie, the self-referential character of all personal life. If 
personal growth described in terms of self-knowledge and self-affirmation can be 
related to more obviously ethical notions as Hell as to a realistic grasp of the 
actual constants of human nature, then our description will have gone some way 
tmvards bridging a gap which to our mind needs bridging, 
The way the spirituality of persons stands out especially 1n our second descrlptio1 
is that the growth of a person is revealed as a growth of self control and 
autonomy. (Chapter 4, Section 5.1) This growth takes the form of a growth in 
unity or integration since, from the start, there 1s a question of a number of 
elements involved and an inevitable multiplicity of acts of each capacity. 
This is because of the spatia-temporal existence of human persons. Indeed the 
very notion of groHth implies multiplicity. What we have in personal growth 
is thus a progress1ve unification of the elements of personal life. The exist-
ence of the distinctively personal capacities from the start provide an enduring 
principle of unification, but the actual life of an incompletely developed 
person can manifest all kinds of disunity. In spite of the pervading and 
permanent tendency towards unity, the actual unity of the self-system can fail 
of comprehensiveness as well as of interior coherence. But as we have seen, 
as the harmony betHeen the systems of the self increases and the coherence within 
them, so the unity of the person becomes ever more total and ever more simple. 
It is always, from the beginning, a unity of self-reference, but as the inter-
gration of the self increases so the self as enacting and the self as enacted 
become more and more identical. In the end, when there is complete self-know-
ledge and complete consent to the self known, the acts of the self proceed from 
a single principle that 1s both simple and all-embracing. The self as a whole 
enacts the whole self. This is the term of personal growth at least as far as 
the distinctively personal powers are concerned. Since we are speaking of 
human persons there is still more to be said. Our description of personal 
growth nevertheless 1s not opposed to the growth of specifically human persons. 
Especially to be noted in this connection is our emphasis (Chapter 4, Section 4.1) 
on the multiplicity of acts, of systems of J:labits, (cf. Tallon, 1979) and of a 
hierarchy of values. 
For us it 1s this peculiar consistency and simplicity revealed 1n a person's- act·s 
and judgements that testify to growth of his personal powers. To say as 
Kierkegaard (1938) did that purity of heart is "to will one thing" is to indicate 
the simplicity or wholeheartedness that is in question here. We have tried to 
show in our description that it is inseparable from an insight into the fundamenta 
1 r-.r-. I. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
- 166 -
tendencies of our personal nature and a consequent unification of our emotional 
life on the basis of a unified hierarchy of value-judgements. The unity of a 
fully-developed person is strikingly different from that of an impersonal thing 
since it is both self-referential and wholly and simply such. The self-refer-
ential character of a person does not vitiate the simplicity and the totality of 
its unity but is the essential condition for it. 
The increase in the scope and intensity of self-enactment is revealed in the 
growth of persons in two chief ways. (Chapter 4, Sections 6.1 and 6.2) There 
is first of all the progressive participation ~n the other person's self-knowledge 
and self-affirmation. Ultimately, as we pointed out, ~uch participation 
involves gaining an identical character, based on identical degrees of consent to 
the same hierarchy of values. Until grm..rth is completed full mutuality is not 
achieved. There is however a growing reciprocity so that all opposition of will 
is progressively overcome. In the second place, at the same time as this pro-
gressive identification with the other increases, so does the completeness of the 
growing person's possession of himself. The law of personal causality, that 
self-enactment and identification with the other increase in direct rather than 
inverse proportion, is more fully exemplified in this description than in that 
of the mother and child. The more the life of the other is entered into~ the 
more self-control and autonomy ~ncreases. The more the difference in the 
character of the fundamental system of insights and choices is obliterated, the 
more the growing person possesses his own life. The more the grm·ling person 
suffers the personal causality of the other, the more it becomes his own, the 
more he ~s freed from the determinism of his own impersonal nature and the 
inevitable conflicts it produces in him. 
To sum up the description of personal growth: growth in self-enactment is seen 
as a growth in unity of the self. In a complex system the tendency to simplicity 
and wholeness gains the upper hand, integrating the various elements into a more 
simple whole. Simplicity and wholeness thus are the essential features of a 
self-enacting system. 
2.3 The Fulfilment of Personal Powers 
If the activity of fully developed persons consists in generous and disinterested 
love of others or in the attempts to realise a community that has an absolute 
value of its own, then such a person is self-enacting in the sense that his 
activities are not motivated by the desire to satisfy any need. He is, in 
Aristotle's sense of the term, self-contained or, better, in Rahner's and our own 
sense of the term, in possession of himself. 
1(..7/ 
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The unselfish love of others is, 1n fact, the most striking sign of the spirit-
uality of persons in its fullest possible development. (Chapter 5, Section 6) 
Its gratuitousness, its ecstatic character and apparent preference of the good 
of others above the good of self might appear to qualify it as irrational and 
compulsive. Yet, as our description showed, it 1s 1n fact the appropriate 
expression of the perfection of our personal powers. In addition, as the two 
previous descriptions show, it 1s the one essential condition for the gr0~vth to 
fulfilment of other persons. In exercising such love fully developed persons 
tend to bring into being the communion of full personal mutuality, 
That the commun1on of mutual love by each for each is in fact a true manifest-
ation of self-enactment in the strict sense is clearly the case. (Chapter 5, 
Section 7) The transcendence of particularity through identification with the 
other, the possession of oneself in freedom from impersonal influence, are both 
complete. Personal causality is reciprocal and mutual. 
In this situation of the fulfilment of personal powers, however, self-enactment 
reveals its ultimate root, namely the orientation to infinite being. It does 
this in its tendency tov1ards communion. This is the fullest expression of the 
self-donation in unselfish love. By its potential unlimitedness and lack of 
exclusiveness such communion 1s a sign of the infinite openness that makes 
persons spiritual beings. 
Finally, the lack of limitation that is the foundational feature of personal 
powers appears again 1n the fact that the actual existence of this communion of 
full personal mutuality depends, as we have seen, on the personal influence of 
a person who is strictly independent of any other person for the full expression 
of his personal powers. And in such a person the personal powers are simply 
unlimited in any '"ay at all. 
To sum up the description of personal fulfilment: full personal self-enactment 
reveals itself in the gratuitous love of other persons. This is its only 
adequate expression. Such love moreover is creative of a conununion betv1een 
persons that is ch_aracterised by mutuality and universality·. 
2.4 Spirituality in Personal Terms 
Having considered the way in which the spirituality of persons manifests itself 
in each of the three descriptions of the intersubjective relations between 
persons we are now in a position to present a comprehensive picture of the 
spirituality of persons as it manifests itself in the most strictly personal way, 
namely in the acts of persons in relation to other persons. ~!e shall then be in 
possession of a fully personal picture of spirituality Hhich we can compare 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
- 168 -· 
'"'ith the metaphysical account we produced in an earlier chapter. 
If it is the case that persons are spiritual beings then clearly all aspects of 
their spirituality are implicated in any stage of personal life. Nevertheless 
each of our descriptions highlights a different aspect of the spirituality of 
persons and so gives a different fully personal model for the spiritual. 
In the first description the self-transcendence of personal life stands out most 
clearly, the ability that persons have to make the life of another being, and 
that the most interior and autonomous of beings, their ovm. The ability to 
possess the other as other, without destroying his autonomy ~n any way, ~s 
what shmvs the spirituality of persons in a fully personal form at this stage. 
In the second description it 1s self-enactment as such that stands out most 
clearly, as the peculiarly personal form of spirituality. Coherence of belief 
and consistency of choice manifest the comprehensiveness and simplicity of the 
unity attendant on personal growth. 
In the third descriptiqn the spirituality of persons shows itself especially ~n 
the unselfish love of others that is creative of a universal community of 
personal mutuality. 
We are thus left with a fully personal picture of spirituality that is corn-
posed of three elements. We do not think it is far-fetched to relate them 
directly to the three elements of spirituality disclosed in our metaphysical 
analysis, namely universality, freedom, and the orientation to infinite being. 
As w~ saw in chapter two, self-enactment as we had defined it with the.help of 
Rahner, involved both the transcendence of particularity and freedom from 
physical causality. The first \vas brought out by Aquinas' argument from 
de Anima as interpreted by HcCabe, (Chapter 2, Section 5.1) the second emphas-
ised by C S Lewis' argument against determinism as developed by us. (Chapter 2, 
Section 5.2) Finally, this transcendence of particularity and this freedom 
were derived from the same basis in the operation of the intellect that was 
shown by Rahner to depend on an orientation to infinite being. 
It seems clear to us that the three elements of spirituality of persons as 
revealed by our descriptions of intersubjectivity do in fact parallel the three 
elements revealed by our metaphysical analysis. The self-transcendence 
involved in the exercise of personal powers parallels the universality of the 
understanding (the transcendence of particularity). The simplicity and whole-
ness involved in personal growth parallels the freedom of intellectual acts from 
physical causality. The gratuitousness and universality of the love of others 
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1n personal community parallels the infinity of the mind's orientation to being 
as such. 
From the evidence of these parallels we conclude formally that the phenomena of 
intersubjectivity do manifest the spiritual nature of persons and present us with 
a fully personal picture of the spiritual as such. 
There is a final elementin the fully personal picture of the spirituality of 
persons that \ve have been trying to draw, that phenomenon of intersubj ectivity 
that we have called personal or interpersonal causality. Whereas each of the 
three elements we have so far considered are features of persons as such, 
personal causality is a feature of relations between persons. As such it 1s 
manifested in each of our descriptions of the forms of intersubjectivity. In 
the first it appears as the influence of the mother that makes possible the 
self-transcendence of the child. In the second it takes the form of the other's 
knmvledge and love that enables the self not only to reciprocate but to grow in 
freedom, the freedom both of inner integration and absence of constraint from 
without. Finally, in the third description, it is manifest in that complete reciprocity 
that is creative of personal communion. Thus it is the case that our descriptions give 
us not only a fully personal description of the spiritual; they give us an interpersonal 
one as well~ Indeed the three descriptions car.. be seen as three stages in the developmen 
of personal causality, the 1vays in vJhich persons exist in relation to other persons. 
3. Human Persons 
We must now consider the special case of human persons. For if it 1s the case 
that persons are spiritual beings and spirituality involved both transcendence 
of particularity and· freedom from physical causality, as we have seen from our 
metaphysical account that it does, then it 1s difficult to see ho\v human beings 
can be persons at all. We assume and do not intend to demonstrate that human 
beings are both possessed of spatia-temporal specificity and subject to physical 
causality. On the other hand if the descriptions of intersubjectivity do 
persuade us that we are persons, then there is a corresponding problem about the 
unity of human persons. Because the unity of human persons derives from their 
spirituality, we propose first to discuss the relation of spirit and matter 1n 
human persons and then, from that perspective, the special nature of human 
bodiliness. 
3.1 Spirit and Matter 
There is a metaphysical solution to the problem of the unity of a human person 
in Thon1ist thought; it is expressed in the formula that in the human person the 
. ...,.,..... ·, 
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specifically personal pmvers are the for~ of the human individual (I. 76.1) 
We do not, however, propose to discuss this solution. If it is the case that 
we are now in possession of an intersubjective analogue of the metaphysical 
account of spirituality, then it is a possible project to see whether a solution 
to the problem can be found in terms of persons and their relations to other 
versons. Clearly all the details of our descriptions of intersubjectivity were 
dra.'\-m from our experience of human persons and their relationships. If, from 
these descriptions the spirituality of persons emerges with something approaching 
certainty, is it not likely that we may find in them an intersubjective analog•Je 
of rnateriality as well? If we can, and the descriptionS retain their plaus-
ibility, doing as well for our materiality what they diq for our spirituality, 
then we are in fact in possession of a personal and interpersonal formula for 
human persons that does justice to both aspects of their spiritual-material 
nature. Let us at any rate see whether something like this can be done. 
Our first move must be to see whether we can formulate an intersubjective __ 
analogue for materiality so as to be able to recognise its appearance in our 
intersubjective descriptions. I think we can. And it J.S the metaphysical 
notion of matter He formulated J.n Chapter one that shows us the '\vay. 
As '\ve say in Chapters One and Two, the material J.S characterised by spatia--
temporal specificity and causal dependence of a physical sort. The spatia-
temporal specificity is the sign of a peculiar particularity which involves an 
essential relation to others of the same kind. A material thing is essentially 
one of many; it is intrinsically repeatable. Each class of material things is 
bound to have.more than one possible member. For this reason, the particularity 
of materiality involves the separation from other individuals of the same kind. 
Now if this feature is taken together with the other, namely the causal depend-
ence en a system of physical causality, we have a picture of materiality as 
consisting essentially in a relation to otherness. This is what underlies both 
separatedness and dependence. There is the general relation to what is other, 
and that takes the form of dependence. And there is the special relation to 
others of the same species, and that takes the form of separate particularity. 
The relation to otherness that characterises materiality can thus be summed up 
in the relation of one material thing to others of its own species, since these 
others are both other than it and specifically the same. 
If we now consult our descriptions of the interpersonal relations of persons it 
certainly is the case that the personal life of persons is characterised by an 
intrinsic orientation towards other persons. In the case of the exercise and 
growth of personal powers there is dependence, while in their fulfilment, although 
1 71 I 
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the dependence ceases, there is still an intrinsic relation to others involved 
in the expression of fulfilment. If spirituality is self-enactment, then this 
relatedness to others might well be the personal analogue of materiality that we 
seek. Let us nmv see whether it can in all respects be made to fit. 
As spiritual beings human persons must reveal a radical in.dependence of others 
to justify the application of the term "self-enacting". And this they do accord-
ing to our descriptions. There is, however, an exception. In their orientation 
to infinite being, human persons experience the term and ground of this orient-
ation as radically other. This would seem to be an ineradicable feature of our 
experience of ourselves as persons. In the very transcendence of all finite 
others that makes us persons, we experience a dependence in our cognitive and 
volitional life that shm.;rs us that we are finite too. Our very power of self-
enactment is derived. This is simply the expression in consciousness of the 
metaphysical truth that although the existence of our personal powers cannot be exp-
lained as the result of impersonal causes (since these are not sufficient to explain 
their enactment), nor even of the causality of other finite persons (though 
they are necessary for their enactment), we are not ourselves their causes. 
Our existence as persons is caused. Thus as finite persons we are inherently 
oriented to what is other than ourselves but ~s also strictly infinite. As 
the descriptions disclose, the concrete form of this infinite other is the 
universal conwunityofpersonal mutuality together with its ennabling condition. 
This orientation to otherness is also expressive of limitation though not the 
limitation of materiality. In scholastic terms it is expressive of the 
distinction in us of essence and existence. The limitation of materiality on 
the other hand ~s express~ve of the distinction between act and potency. Human 
persons, because they are material, do not actualise all the potentialities of 
their essence. But the orientation to infinite being has another side to it. 
It does not only express our finiteness but the fact that we are persons. 
Impersonal beings are not thus open to the infinite. Thu~ in this relationship 
at leas4 our very power of self-enactment is derived from a self-transcendence 
made possible by another. But this positive orientation to others remains a 
feature of the personal life of human persons resulting from their finiteness. 
It must be distinguished from that dependence on finite others that is the 
expression of their materiality. 
Human persons are dependent on finite others as the descriptions show, and 
especially on other persons. In spite of a real independence of other human 
persons, both as finite and as material beings, we are also dependent on them, 
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both as finite persons and as material beings. We are dependent on them 
specifically as persons for the exerc~se and growth of our power of self-enactment. 
He are dependent on them as material beings (as necessary though not as sufficient 
causes) for our own existence as human beings. 
Seeing materiality in terms of an intrinsic relation of dependence on other 
human persons turns out to fit our descriptions of interpersonal relations very 
well. Still, a critic might object that the simultaneous independence of and 
dependence on others which seeing materiality in this way does involve, ~s as 
contradictory as supposing that human persons are both spiritual and material 
~n some more usual meanings of the terms. On the face of it that is so, but 
only on the face of it. The apparent contradiction here is precisely the same 
as that in the phenomenon of interpersonal causality as we described it, namely 
that freedom and influence increase in direct and not inverse proportion. It 
~s also present to a degree in the idea that self-transcendence and self-enactment 
go hand in hand. If the descriptions justify the latter two, then they also 
justify the former. 
If then, the notion of materiality can be fitted into our descriptions as an 
orientation to others, '!;ve can now try and see whether they can also yield an 
account of the fundamental ~nity of a human person. 
If vle attempt to find a formula that will characterise best ~n personal terms a 
human person, namely a finite spiritual and material being, we must proceed as 
follows: As spiritual we are self-enacting, but as finite we are dependent on 
others for the exercise and growth of this power. As finite spirits we are 
also self-transcending, both ~ith respect ot an infinite other, but also with 
respect to a positive relation to finite persons, since the activity most 
expressive of personal fulfilment was seen to be the love of others for their 
ow11 sake. Thus a relation to otherness can be expressive both of finite 
spirituality and of materiality; in the first case it is a relation of self-
donation and creativity, in the second it is one of need and dependence. 
Hence as a finite spiritual and material being this is the relation that ~s most 
expressive of our nature: the self-transcending relation with other human 
persons that is commonly called unselfish love, 
If materiality can be seen as a relation of dependence on finite others of one's 
ovm species, and spirituality can be seen as self-transcendence towards others 
of the same sort, then it is the case that our descriptions provide us with 
support for a formula that will reconcile the spirituality and the materiality 
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of human persons in this two-fold form of relatedness to other human persons. 
Thus to be both a spiritual and a material being might sound a contradiction in 
terms. The intersuhj ect ive descriptions of the :.:-elat ions between persons shmv, 
hmvever, that in personal terms this is not the c.ase. At le2.st the formulae 
for spirituality and materiality fit the descriptions. Whether they fit the 
reality of personal life can only be determined by one's estimate of the plaus-
ibility of the descriptions themselves. 
If self-enactment, ~vhich lS the general formula for the spiritual, can, ln the 
case of a finite person, express itself in a self-transcendence towards another 
finite person, then we have the necessary basis for the unity of a human person, 
in self-enactment itself. The orientation to others that characterises our 
materiality is founded on the orientation to others that characterises our %init~ 
spirituality. The fact that the one orientation is one of self-donation and 
creati'.'ity whereas the other is one of need and dependence, is precisely as it 
should be. The one is for the sake of the other; alternatively, they are related 
somewhat as means and end (I say somewhat, since I use this rather Aristotelian 
couplet impressionistically rather than exactly; of course in strict Aristotelian 
terms they are related precisely as matter and form!) And in this relation 
the end has priority in metaphysical terms. The positive orientation is the 
basis of the negative and not vice versa. The unity of a human person is a 
personal and not a material one, whatever that may be. For this reason it is 
probably best to define hu1nankind in terms of spirituality rather than anything 
else. So "incarnate spirit" or "spirit-in-the-world" is better" than "rational 
animal" all things considered, since it is possible to see animals merely in 
material terms. 
3. 2 Bodil iness 
Before we leave the topic of the compatibility of the spiritual and the material 
in human persons, we should say something about our bodiliness. In this 
connection one must distinguish physicality from what one could call "corporr. 
eality". Clearly human persons are physical systems, in the sense defined in 
chapter two. The laws of physics do apply to us. At the same time, neither 
the laws of physics nor any conceivable complex of scientific laws can, in 
principle, account for the fact or the nature of our strictly personal activity. 
We have said as much as we intend to say on this topic. 
Apart from our physicality however, there is another aspect to our materiality, 
what I have called its corporeality. I speak of human persons having the 
property of corporeality rather than of their having bodies. "Having bodies" 
is an expression redolent of dualism. At the same time the notion of a "body" 
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is big with materialistic confusion. If we are right about the spirituality 
of human persons then human bodies are not like any other animal bodies. We 
shall see presently why this is so. At the moment I ~:..rant to stress that if our 
account of spirituality 1s correct we shall have to rev1se our way of speaking 
about human beings. Both physicality and corporeality are consequence of our 
materiality. And vle have tried to interpret this in personal terms as a 
relation to otherness. As we have seen, human self-enactment 1s only possible 
in a relation of dependence on other persons. Yet the fact that it is self-
enactment that is achieved shows that the relation is simultaneously one of 
self-transcendence into the personal life of the other, through personal knm..rledge 
and love. The fact that one's self-knowledge (and self-affirmation) is received 
is manifest 1n one's experlence of the other from ,,1hom one recieves it as their 
corporeality. Their self-knowledge (and self-affirmation) exists_ for us only in 
the form of corporeality. We are speaking of the well-knmvn phenomenon whereby 
knmvledge of another is gained only through the senses. We see what they are 
feeling; we listen to their thoughts. Corporeality is the way ln which the 
strictly personal life of a human person is present for another, and indeed for 
himself in his o"m reflections. 
It can thus be clearly seen that corporeality is different from physicality. 
We are not considering another person simply as subject to physical laws but 
as a person. So his corporeality is he, but as he exists for a human person, 
Hhether himself or another. Corporeality lS thus different from physicality in 
that it implies an inherent meaningfulness. If a person's corporeality is the 
expression for finite persons of his personal life, then it contains meaning 
as an inherent component of its nature. Physical things as physical things do 
not. They are the referents of meaning systems that are applied by us to them. 
They do not contain their oHD meaning. To see this, one need only compare the 
notion of a physical thing with that of a word. Human corporeality contains 
meaning as a word does. A '"ord lS also a physical thing (either a sound or a 
mark with a certain colour), but it is not only a physical thing. Language 
howeve4 derives its meaningfulness from human corporeality. Words do not 
cohtain meaning as inherently as persons do. So speech is the utterance of 
meaning in ·its fullness. The meaning of words is the meaning they have within 
the language. But the language is the product of persons as an extension of 
their corporeality. Meaning is always meaning for a person. And language as 
such is not a person. Nevertheless it is probably a fair approximation to 
compare human corporeality to a word. ~fuat we sense when we are in the presence 
of another person is the total context and foundation of meaningfulness in any 
possible cultural product, language, art or whatever. Culture as a whole is an 
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articulation in bits and pieces of this simple spiritual totality that 1s 
present in every person's corporeality. And it is never complete. 
For this reason the corporeality of persons is different from tha~ of other 
material things that are present to us. I speak now of natural and not of 
cultural objects, which are, .of course, containers of human meaning insofar as 
they are extensions of human 'corporeality. The whole natural ~vorld, in its 
continuity with human corporeality, that is to say, in its presence as a whole 
to us and not just abstractly considered as a physical system, can be regarded as a 
sort of unconscious or pre-conscious of the world of persons. It is of course 
present in our cultural products in a transformed state, as the medium of our 
personal expression, but by itself it provides a world of images to make the 
thoughts of persons possible. 
This whole way of thinking is in fact a reversal of what 1s common to both ordinar 
thought and to scientific thought alike. It is based on the priority of our-
selves as objects of awareness rather than taking for granted an extroverted 
consciousness of the world with ourselves as one particular class of things 1n it. 
We can come to know the world and ourselves like that but it is neither the 
primary nor the foundational perspective that we have on reality. That 1s the 
perspective that led to the definition of a man as a rational animal and also to 
the development of the scientific consciousness that sees him as ultimately only 
a physical system. The two definitions are linked. Even Cartesian dualism is 
at home within this perspective, that of extroverted consc1ousness. It simply 
introduces a mythical corrective (the "ghost" in the machine) but does not by 
that undo the extroversion nor get back to a proper awareness of our spirituality. 
Indeed this sort of extroversion 1s a perpetual possibility for beings that are 
material as well as spiritual. It is the foundation of all myth-making. We try 
to give a material form to our spirituality. We can do this because we are 
spiritual. But in doing this we put ourselves, in imagination, outside the 
world. The appetitive correlate of this cognitive move is to make ourselves 
owners of the world. In our mind's eye we look down on the whole of the world, 
with ourselves in it. In our ambition we control the whole of the world, and 
our own destinies in it. Our spirituality makes this myth-making a perpetual 
possibility. Our materiality is simply the inevitable form that the myth must 
take, that and its ghostly partner. 
4. Summary of Conclusions 
We have now come to the end of our attempt to give a philosophical analysis of 
intersubjectivity as manifestation of the spiritual nature ~f persons. 
briefly su~narise our conclusions. 
We must 
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1. 
The three descriptions of intersubjectivity do manifest the spiritual nature 
of persons. V.lhether or not they constitute a proof of spirituality in their 
own right is a question \ve \vill not attempt to ansr,ver. The connections between 
the phenomena of intersubjective relations and the notion of spirituality '\vould 
seem to lack the tightness that could support a rigorous ·proof. Too much and 
too detailed interpretation 1s required. Nevertheless, the starting-points of 
each description would seem to be solid enough. Not simply that persons are 
agents, do grow, and are capable of unselfish love. But that agency involves 
self-consciousness and self-determination; and that personal grciwth is essentially 
a growth in self-knowledge and self-affirmation or, if it is preferred, in 
understanding and love of other persons; and finally that the goal implicit 1n 
acts of unselfish love 1s the creation of a universal community of personal 
mutuality. These assertions seem to us able to be argued for in a way quite 
in accordance with normal canons of rationality. In other word~, they are all 
probably true. Insofar as they are, and the spirituality of persons is what 
makes them possible, then the spirituality of persons is a fact. 
2. 
If the descriptions of intersubjectivity do in some sense show that persons are 
spiritual, then the most important purpose of this study has been achieved. 
There is of course a sense in which Rahner's analysis of cognition is a proof of 
spirituality, and a more rigorous one than anything in our descriptions. As 
indeed is that of Aquinas, and that of Lewis too. Taken together the work of 
Rahner, Aquinas, and LeHis, constitute an extremely powerful argument against 
contemporary materialism. There 1s a sense 1n which our own conclusions have 
not added to that but rather have borrowed from its strength. On the other hand 
by means of our descriptions we have presented the spiritual in a sli~htly novel 
way. As Macmurray might say, we have presented a new 11 form11 of the spiritual. 
Even defining the spiritual 1n terms of self-enactment 1s a move away from old 
categories of thought. It 1s certainly a move away from the 11ghost 11 • Of 
course writers such as Rahner have already done that. But to derive the notion 
of self-enactment as we have done from the phenomena of intersubjectifity rather 
than from a metaphysical analysis of cognition does serve to situate it in a 
new context and even to give it a somewhat new content. It is brought closer to 
the world of the human sciences and the materialist milieu. 
So if it is said of us that in revealing the spirituality of persons we have 
changed the notion of what it is to be spiritual we shall not object. r\s long 
as the notion of self-enactment ~s we have defined it can stand we shall be 
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satisfied. It does we feel embody a more properly personal notion of spirit-
uality, one that has been derived from that situation where persons are most 
fully in act, namely in personal relations with other persons. 
3. 
If what has been said above is true, then another objective has also been achieved, 
namely the reconciliation of the t~w traditions of thought about persons. In 
discovering in the phenomena of intersubjectivity, the self enactment of persons, 
we have reconciled the traditional notion of the spiritual with the insight of 
modern anthropology that "person" is a relational and a cultural notion. Our 
descriptions show that the social relations of persons, which of course are a 
cultural reality and indeed the foundational cultural reality, emanate from a 
natural capacity that lS adequate to explain them in all that seems furthest 
removed from anything we might share with the animals. 
In achieving this reconciliation, our notion of self-enactment has broken with 
the dualism that has, since Descartes, characterised the "spiritual" tradition 
of thought about human persons. The dualism of different substances is replaced 
by the duality of relation to self and to other 1n personal life, At the same 
stroke materialism is avoided. The foundation of the unity that is the human 
person 1s self-enactment, not relation to the other. It 1s the finiteness of 
the human person that produces the relation to the other, and it is there that 
the materiality of human persons finds its proper place. 
4. 
In conclusion, we feel that our' notion of spirituality as self-enactment makes 
possible a coherent picture of the human person that does justice both to our 
peculiar unity as well as the distinctive nature o~ our relations with others. 
With a notion such as this it should be possible to avoid both theoretical 
individualism and collectivism and the practical distortions of private and 
public life that depend upon them. 
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